SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18924
October 19, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the
Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the
information that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of
having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of
English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half
miles from the shores of the city.
The
demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so
held and dismissed the case.
The
question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is
erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court
has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The
point at issue is whether
the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one
herein involved, committed
aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
There
are two fundamental rules
on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the
French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant
vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose
territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects
the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the
territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which,
crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules,
it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories
and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority
in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
In the
cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U.
S.], 116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
. . .
When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual
infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants
did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the
jurisdiction of the country. . . .
In
United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . .
No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime
committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other
country, but when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the
headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial
waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International
Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.;
Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the
jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have
been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . .
It is
true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and
Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said
that:
. . .
The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb
only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively
by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public
peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper
authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to
determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs.
Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular
case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local
jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in
the regular way the consul has no right to interfere to prevent it.
Hence
in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such
vessels being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule
does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands,
is landed from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open
violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as it is
a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the
crime, no court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction
of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
As to whether the United States
has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction or a
part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to
which nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs.
Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page
625, Malloy says the following:
There
shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the
territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of
commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have
liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such
places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other
foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and
reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and
occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and,
generally, the merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy
the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject
always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1,
Commerce and Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere
possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court
not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law
to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects
entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without
being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those
effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is
not considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our
territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a
breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to
produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes
the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive
statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking
opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila in
open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him,
is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the
imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila
and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board.
The order appealed from is
revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.
So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm,
Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
