FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 108581 December
8, 1999
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as
Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but
declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory
still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from the following
antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her
estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after
Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro
before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last
will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's
will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983,
they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The
trial court granted the motion and issued an order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued
declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the
provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as
intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose
Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be
liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of
estate and other taxes due to the government. 1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is
entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his
death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon
denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief
within the extended period
granted. 2 This dismissal became final and executory on
February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by
the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the
lower court to implement the final and executory Order. Consequently, private
respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to
surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties
of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the TCT's, private
respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of
new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B.
Angas setting aside the final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as
well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the
ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in
character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even
directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order
dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29,
1990 and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review
arguing that the case filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals
was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack
of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed orders,
Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated
to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court of Appeals
upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the
intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix
of the estate of the late Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or lease of
the premises thereon to third parties. 3 Private respondents opposed the motion
on the ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not
the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory
decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has
attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment
made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot
reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so
would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review.
It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is
binding on the whole world. 4
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in
due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality
by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the
question determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew,
either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due
execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character
of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical
questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed. 5 Such final
order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic
validity and due execution. 6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally
with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, 7 particularly
on three aspects:
n whether the will
submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
n compliance with
the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
n the testamentary
capacity of the testator; 8
n and the due
execution of the last will and testament. 9
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination
of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its
execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under
duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a
forgery, 10 that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person
not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. 11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions
regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been
authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically
valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will
was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives
or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according
to the laws on succession, 13 the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof
cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already
determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically
void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding
on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the
will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of
which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals
must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the
remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of
other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court
action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the
decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy
and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of
courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14 become final otherwise there
will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium — the
very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time
limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. 16
The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a
final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence, 17 which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration
of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an
unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January
30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not
bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of
the testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were
parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters
anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should
be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already
been resolved adversely by some other court. 18 It is clear from the executory
order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed
according to the laws of intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely
interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by the trial court. In support
thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely declaring who are heirs
and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of
execution to require delivery of shares from one person to another particularly
when no project of partition has been filed." 19 The trial court declared
in the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of
Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners
herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But it should be noted
that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late
spouses be distributed according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has
no option but to implement that order of intestate distribution and not to
reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil
Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy.
20 But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the
scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased
testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions,
aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in
nature and that no one is presumed to give — Nemo praesumitur donare. 21 No
intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had
failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is
extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic
validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine
its intrinsic validity — that is whether the provisions of the will are valid
according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the
will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof
were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial
court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged
share in the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his
"only beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final and
executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging
exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime
cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that
were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated
and determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that
of his late spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is
rendered moot considering that she was not married to the late Alejandro and,
therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
