THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MARIA MARLENA[2] COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals,[3] dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set
aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City,
and ordered the defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its
fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of
testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the
herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855
square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special
Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by
me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my
name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the
aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow,
shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge
Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil),
that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership
of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease
of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall
have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five
(25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall
give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the
sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No.
1392, in the event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his
heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee,
mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE
HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each
month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25)
piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer,
lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my
addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately
seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it
over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation
to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I
further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of
this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to
sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near
descendants and my sister."[4]
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred
to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his
wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all
surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza
Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch
52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned
heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The
Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the
Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National
Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific
instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister
of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to
deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs
domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar
crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil,
despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the
Codicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the
property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to
deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the
late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the
deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title
in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in
default but on March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to
defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and
a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of
the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an
amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the
obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in
Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of
1989, more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then
existing in any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin,
during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is
considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will
compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86,
1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of
piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into
consideration the composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which
is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on
a staggered cash installment, payable on or before the end of December of every
sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year
1991-92."[5]
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid
Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar
corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a
decision, dismissing the complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings,
the Court finds that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action
against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there
maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated exaction from them simply
because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the
lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The
remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the
left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate
proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to
give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being
prematurely filed is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."[6]
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering
thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established
plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the
produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's
codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of
sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with
said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the
codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the
estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it
proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of
Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant
must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure
the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja
Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the
codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the
produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and
another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla,
to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to
the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."[7]
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition,
contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot
1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6
of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New
Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
resolving the appeal in accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on
modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised which is the
absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article
882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and the
testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near
descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private
respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and
without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary
provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid
substitution for the reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the
substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near descendants"
without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants"
and therefore, under Articles 843[8] and 845[9] of the New Civil Code, the
substitution should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his
supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it,
which was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of
Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the
petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to
stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against the
petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals
ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent[10] and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate
parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.[11] Thus, the
petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of
further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from
the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished
by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of
subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death.
And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of
the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs
upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No.
1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof
would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death
of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title
over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to
deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such
obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of
private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which
is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar.
Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the
trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil
Code on modal institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix
intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the
testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation
to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person
or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under
substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the
original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,[12] or (2) leave his/her
property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted
subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.[13]
The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or
renunciation.[14] In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject
Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to
predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would
substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on
this point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first
heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same
later to the second heir.[15] In the case under consideration, the instituted
heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the
negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus,
a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the
obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the
property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation
to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no
fideicommissary substitution."[16] Also, the near descendants' right to
inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver
part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is
also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to
whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first
heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the
first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir.[17] In the case
under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a
modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the
provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the
application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him,
shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his
intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at
once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for
compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or
they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should
disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution
referred to in the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner
stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to
and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in
Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub
modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1)
the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property
left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the
heir.[18] A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but
it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.[19] On the
other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must
happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the
testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates
but does not suspend.[20] To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory
condition.[21]
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be
gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be
inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the
testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein
private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the
latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance
and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the
performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the
obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge
upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such
institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts
of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a
condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the
intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered
as modal and not conditional.[22]
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of
petitioner that the private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the
right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the right to
seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises
on the face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking
into consideration the circumstances under which it was made.[23] Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be
adopted.[24]
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation
to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza
Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell,
lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil
further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is
not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it
over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said
obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion
thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is
clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his
successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of
non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir
and his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by
virtue of the amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil
has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become
the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a
substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the
consummated settlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and
having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the
private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable
settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn,
revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take
effect after his death.[25] Since the Will expresses the manner in which a
person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the
testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a
compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a
Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., (Chairman), concur in the separate opinion of
Justice Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., join the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part.