SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 124099 October 30, 1997
MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE,
MARITES AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TORRES, JR., J.:
Unless legally flawed, a testator’s intention in his last
will and testament is its “life and soul” which deserves reverential
observance.
The controversy before us deals with such a case.
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes,
Lyn Agape, Marites Agape, Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in
Special Proceedings No. 112 for the probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes,
assail in this petition for review the decision of the Court of Appeals[1]
dated November 29, 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from
allowing or admitting the will of Torcuato J. Reyes to probate and directing
the issuance of Letter Testamentary in favor of petitioner Julio A. Vivares as
executor without bond is AFFIRMED but modified in that the declaration that
paragraph II of the Torcuato Reyes' last will and testament, including
subparagraphs (a) and (b) are null and void for being contrary to law is hereby
SET ASIDE, said paragraphs (a) and (b) are declared VALID. Except as above modified, the judgment
appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."[2]
The antecedent facts:
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will
and testament declaring therein in part, to wit:
“xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion “Oning” R. Reyes
the following properties to wit:
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among
others of jewelries, coins, antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures
and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all
the real estates I own in common with my brother Jose, situated in
Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camiguin; real
estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc, Kinoguinatan,
Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis
Oriental.”[3]
The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato
Reyes in the presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and
Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent
Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default or incapacity,
his son Roch Alan S. Vivares.
Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private
respondent filed a petition for probate of the will before the Regional Trial
Court of Mambajao, Camiguin. The
petitioner was set for hearing and the order was published in the Mindanao
Daily Post, a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three
consecutive weeks. Notices were likewise
sent to all the persons named in the petition.
On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of
Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all
surnamed Reyes, and the deceased’s natural children with Celsa Agape, namely
Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition with the following allegations: a)
that the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in
accordance with the formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle
exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of the
execution of the will. The opposition
further averred that Reyes was never married to and could never marry Asuncion
Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was
already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was
never annulled. Thus Asuncion can not be
a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public
morals.
On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an ordering
declaring that it had acquired jurisdiction over the petition and, therefore,
allowed the presentation of evidence.
After the presentation of evidence and submission of the respective
memoranda, the trial court issued its decision on April 23, 1993.
The trial court declared that the will was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based
on the testimonies of the witnesses, was never married to the deceased Reyes,
and, therefore, their relationship was an adulterous one. Thus:
“The admission in the will by the testator to the illicit
relationship between him and ASUNCION REYES EBARLE who is somebody else’s,
wife, is further bolstered, strengthened, and confirmed by the direct
testimonies of the petitioner himself and his two “attesting” witnesses during
the trial.
In both cases, the common denominator is the immoral
meretrecious, adulterous and adulterous and illicit relationship existing
between the testator and the devisee prior to the death of the testator, which
constituted the sole and primary consideration for the devise or legacy, thus
making the will intrinsically invalid.”[4]
The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for
paragraph II (a) and (b) of the will which was declared null and void for being
contrary to law and morals. Hence, Julio
Vivares filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with the allegation that
the oppositors failed to present any competent evidence that Asuncion Reyes was
legally married to another person during the period of her cohabitation with
Torcuato Reyes.
On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated the
assailed decision which affirmed the trial court’s decision admitting the will
for probate but the modification that paragraph II including subparagraphs (a)
and (b) were declared valid. The
appellee court stated:
“Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent,
documentary or otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion “Oning” Reyes’
marriage to the testator was inexistent or void, either because of a
pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely erred
in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and
Testament, as void for being contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to
destroy the presumption of marriage. Nor
is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion
Reyes is his wife.”[5]
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
oppositors filed this petition for review.
Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusion of the
Court of Appeals was contrary to law, public policy and evidence on
record. Torcuato Reyes and Asuncion
“Oning” Reyes were collateral relatives up to the fourth civil degree. Witness Gloria Borromeo testified that Oning
Reyes was her cousin as her mother and the latter’s father were sister and
brother. They were also nieces of the
late Torcuato Reyes. Thus, the purported
marriage of the deceased Reyes and Oning Reyes was void ab initio as it was
against public policy pursuant to Article 38 (1) of the Family Code. Petitioners further alleged that Oning Reyes
was already married to Lupo Ebarle at the time she was cohabiting with the
testator hence, she could never contact any valid marriage with the
latter. Petitioners argued that the
testimonies of the witnesses as well as the personal declaration of the
testator, himself, were sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. To further support their contention,
petitioners attached a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and
Lupo Ebarle.[6]
The petition is devoid of merit.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited
to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.[7]
Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it
complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity
of the testator. It does not determine
nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will’s
provisions.[8] The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration
thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances
wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the
will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony
if it is intrinsically invalid.[9] The intrinsic validity of a will may be
passed upon because “practical considerations” demanded it as when there is
preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are doubtful legality.[10]
Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the
probate court may also do so.[11] Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not
inflexible and absolute. Under
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.[12]
The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition
for the probate of the will of the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in
the said proceeding were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus testandi;
(2) whether or not vices of consent attended the execution of the will; and (3)
whether or not the formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to rule
upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator
that Asuncion “Oning” Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during
the probate proceedings. The propriety
of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already
involved inquiry on the will’s intrinsic validity and which need not be
inquired upon by the probate court.
The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling in Nepomuceno
vs. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 206) in the instant case. In the case aforesaid, the testator himself,
acknowledged his illicit relationship with the devisee, to wit:
“Art. IV. That since
1952, I have been living, as man and wife, with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I
declare and avow to be entitled to my love an [sic] affection, for all the
things which she has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J.
Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did comfort and represent
myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the
law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my
aforementioned previous marriage.”
Thus, the very tenor of the will invalidates the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing of the properties to a person
with whom he had been living in concubinage.[13] To remand the case would only
be a waste of time and money since the illegality or defect was already
patent. This case is different from the
Nepomuceno case. Testator Torcuato Reyes
merely stated in his will that he was bequeathing some of his personal and real
properties to his wife, Asuncion “Oning” Reyes.
There was never an open admission of any illicit relationship. In the case of Nepomuceno, the testator
admitted that he was already previously married and that he had an adulterous
relationship with the devisee.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court
relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still
married to another during the time she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were merely
hearsay and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle,
the supposed husband of Asuncion. Thus:
“The foregoing testimony cannot go against the declaration
of the testator that Asuncion “Oning” Reyes is his wife. In Alvarado v. City Government of Tacloban
(supra) the Supreme Court stated that the declaration of the husband is
competent evidence to show the fact of marriage.
Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent
evidence, documentary or otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion
“Oning” Reyes’ marriage to the testator was inexistent or void, either because
of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely
erred in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and
Testament, as void for being contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to
destroy the presumption of marriage. Nor
is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion
Reyes is his wife.”[14]
In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written decades
ago, he said-
“A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same
force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court
in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the
will. That was the special purpose of
the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and
testament. Men wished to speak after
they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them
to do so. xxx All doubts must be
resolved in favor of the testator’s having meant just what he said.” (Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the Court of
Appeals by presenting belatedly a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion
Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. Their failure to
present the said certificate before the probate court to support their position
that Asuncion Reyes had an existing marriage with Ebarle constituted a waiver
and the same evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal, much less in this
petition for review. This Court would no
try the case a new or settle factual issues since its jurisdiction is confined
to resolving questions of law which have been passed upon by the lower
courts. The settled rule is that the
factual findings of the appellate court will not be disturbed unless shown to
be contrary to the evidence on the record, which petitioners have not shown in
this case.[15]
Considering the foregoing premises, we sustain the findings
of the appellate court it appearing that it did not commit a reversible error
in issuing the challenged decision.
ACCORDINGLY, decision appealed from dated November 29, 1995,
is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
