SECOND DIVISION
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., G.R. No. 167571
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus
-
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO,
JR., and
BRION, JJ.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
RAMON C. TONGSON and
RODRIGO G. CAWILI, Promulgated:
Respondents.
November
25, 2008
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review[1] of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis
Panaguiton, Jr.’s (petitioner’s) petition for certiorari and his subsequent
motion for reconsideration.[2]
The facts,
as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992,
Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to
P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8
January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson),
jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said
loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili
and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were
dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the
account. Petitioner made formal demands
to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on
26 June 1995, but to no avail.[3]
On 24 August
1995, petitioner filed a complaint
against Cawili and Tongson[4] for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg.
22)[5] before the Quezon City
Prosecutor’s Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson
appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.[6]
Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent
in the case since petitioner had lent
money to Cawili in the latter’s personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner,
he had lent various sums to
Cawili and in
appreciation of his services, he
was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili’s business associate; in fact, he
himself had filed several criminal cases
against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that
his signatures on the said checks had
been falsified.
To counter
these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson’s
signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks.[7] He also showed a copy of an affidavit of
adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili’s business
associate.[8]
In a
resolution dated 6 December 1995,[9] City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found
probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.
Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even
while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July
1997,[10] after finding that it was
possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately
altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary
investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against
Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
Tongson
moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for
lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma.
Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson
without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor’s
resolution. In her resolution,[11] ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,[12] which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall
prescribe after four (4) years. In this
case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored,
or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the
Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995
did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not
administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than
four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed
against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had
already prescribed.[13] Moreover, ACP Sampaga
stated that the order of the
Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure because the
initiative should come from petitioner
himself and not the investigating prosecutor.[14] Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with
petitioner.[15]
Petitioner
appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
dismissed the same, stating that the offense
had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.[16] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003,[17] the DOJ, this time through then
Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez,
ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and
that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor’s office interrupted
the running of the prescriptive period
citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.[18] Thus,
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3)
separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[19] On 8
July 2003, the City Prosecutor’s Office
filed an information[20] charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[21]
However, in a resolution dated 9 August
2004,[22] the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by
Tongson, ruled that the subject offense
had already prescribed and ordered “the withdrawal of the three (3)
informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22” against Tongson. In justifying its
sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of
special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses
thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a
special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines
and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal
Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.[23] The
DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,[24] wherein the Supreme
Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are
judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor’s office.
Petitioner
thus filed a petition for certiorari[25] before the Court of Appeals assailing
the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ.
The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of
petitioner’s failure to attach
a proper verification and
certification of non-forum
shopping. The Court of
Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the
petition is a mere photocopy.[26] Petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court’s resolution,
attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping.[27] Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion, stating
that subsequent compliance with the
formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its
resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.[28]
In the
instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his
petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was
patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
The DOJ, in
its comment,[29] states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a
special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses
prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with
Act No. 3326.
Cawili and
Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err
in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already
prescribed per Act No. 3326. In
addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the
State, violated their constitutional
right to speedy disposition of cases.[30]
The petition
is meritorious.
First on the
technical issues.
Petitioner
submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of
Appeals substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended
simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He
points out that this Court has held in a
number of cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or
dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. [31]
Indeed, the
verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance
that matters which are alleged are true and correct—the court may simply order
the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served,[32]
as in the instant case. In the case at
bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner
sufficiently complied with the
verification requirement.
Petitioner
also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the
ground that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate
original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of
the DOJ. We
agree. A plain
reading of the
petition before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the
DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004,[33]
a certified true copy of which was attached as Annex “A.”[34] Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the
substantive aspects.
Petitioner
assails the DOJ’s reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,[35] a case involving the
violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period
is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable
in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,[36] wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint
with the fiscal’s office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of
the prescriptive period. Petitioner also
notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, petitioner
notes.[37] He argues that sustaining the
DOJ’s and the Court of Appeals’
pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since the delays
in the present case were clearly beyond his control.[38]
There is no
question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under
special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
SECTION 1. Violations
penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four
years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than
two years; (c) x x x
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P.
Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22
merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not
more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position
that only the filing of a case in court
can toll the running of the prescriptive
period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of
criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology
in the law, “institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment,”[39] and the prevailing rule
at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace
for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.[40]
The historical perspective on the application of Act No.
3326 is illuminating.[41] Act No. 3226
was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of
the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S.
v. Lazada[42] and People v. Joson,[43] is that the prescription of the offense
is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation inasmuch
as the filing of the
complaint signifies the
institution of the
criminal proceedings against the accused.[44] These cases were followed by our declaration
in People v. Parao and Parao[45] that
the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes
the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the
offense.[46] Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,[47] we held that the filing of the complaint in
the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed
cannot try the case on the merits. In
addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may
only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the
initial step of the proceedings against the offender,[48] and hence, the
prescriptive period should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan[49] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[50] which
involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019)
and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,[51]
the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the
Revised Securities Act,[52] another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively
interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition
in the Interport Resources case[53] is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term “judicial
proceedings” in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before “investigation and
punishment” in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the
investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the
executive branch, the term “proceedings” should now be understood either
executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this
clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the
guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.[54]
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party
the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control.[55] A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August
1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration
on the dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went
through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the
time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed
resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the
delay was beyond petitioner’s control.
After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case
as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ’s
flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do
not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be
allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond
their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and
inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet
prescribed. Petitioner ’s filing of his
complaint–affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24
August 1995 signified the commencement
of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for
the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is
a definite finding of probable cause,
with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any
impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice
dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information
against the petitioner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.