FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 74695 September
14, 1993
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament
of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA.
ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices,
Intermediate Appellate Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA.
RINO, respondents.
Vicente R. Redor for petitioner.
Bayani Ma. Rino for and in his own behalf.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 1986
1 of the First Civil Cases Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Order dated 27 June 1983 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting to probate the last will
and testament 3 with codicil 4 of the late Brigido Alvarado.
On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado
executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he
disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a
previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch
4 of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz, Laguna.
As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the
notary public and by private respondent who were present at the execution, the
testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private
respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same
aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the
notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective
copies previously furnished them.
Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted
to probate on 9 December 1977. On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil
entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa
Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was
executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for
the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the
disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the
notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the
codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence
and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the
notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own
copies.
A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil
was filed upon the testator's death on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as
executor with the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of
Siniloan, Laguna. 5 Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the following
grounds: that the will sought to be probated was not executed and attested as
required by law; that the testator was insane or otherwise mentally
incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due to senility and
old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear and
threats; that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on
the part of the beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of the
testator's estate; and lastly, that the signature of the testator was procured
by fraud or trick.
When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the
grounds relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on 27 June
1983 from which an appeal was made to respondent court. The main thrust of the
appeal was that the deceased was blind within the meaning of the law at the
time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto was
executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was
admittedly not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil
should have been denied.
On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision
under review with the following findings: that Brigido Alvarado was not blind
at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his
blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with
when both documents were read aloud to the testator with each of the three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their
respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded that
although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial
compliance since its purpose of making known to the testator the contents of
the drafted will was served.
The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido
Alvarado blind for purpose of Art, 808 at the time his "Huling
Habilin" and its codicil were executed? If so, was the double-reading
requirement of said article complied with?
Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the
following facts: Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind at the time the will
and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of
"counting fingers at three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which
he had been suffering from for several years and even prior to his first
consultation with an eye specialist on
14 December 1977.
The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances
would qualify Brigido as a "blind" testator under Art. 808 which
reads:
Art. 808. If the
testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the
subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is
acknowledged.
Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally
blind when the will and codicil were executed, he can be so considered within
the scope of the term as it is used in Art. 808. To support his stand,
petitioner presented before the trial court a medical certificate issued by Dr.
Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the Institute of Opthalmology (Philippine Eye
Research Institute), 6 the contents of which were interpreted in layman's terms
by Dr. Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise was admitted by private respondent. 7 Dr.
Roasa explained that although the testator could visualize fingers at three (3)
feet, he could no longer read either printed or handwritten matters as of 14
December 1977, the day of his first consultation. 8
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the
medical testimony, held that the testator could still read on the day the will
and the codicil were executed but chose not to do so because of "poor
eyesight." 9 Since the testator was still capable of reading at that time,
the court a quo concluded that Art. 808 need not be complied with.
We agree with petitioner in this respect.
Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the
testator was still capable of reading at the time his will and codicil were
prepared, the fact remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that
Brigido did not do so because of his "poor," 10
"defective," 11 or "blurred" 12 vision making it necessary
for private respondent to do the actual reading for him.
The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez 13
provides an insight into the scope of the term "blindness" as used in
Art. 808, to wit:
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to
the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when
he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he
may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes . . .
Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only
to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are
"incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was
incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate
occasions of their execution due to his "poor,"
"defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other
course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of
the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were
read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who
drafted the will and codicil did so confortably with his instructions. Hence,
to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is
essential that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied with.
Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido
Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental
witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the
contents of the document before signing and to give him an opportunity to object
if anything is contrary to his instructions.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.
Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it was the lawyer
(private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil
who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not twice as
Art. 808 requires.
Private respondent however insists that there was
substantial compliance and that the single reading suffices for purposes of the
law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance or
compliance to the letter and since it is admitted that neither the notary
public nor an instrumental witness read the contents of the will and codicil to
Brigido, probate of the latter's will and codicil should have been disallowed.
We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily, the
petition must be denied.
This Court has held in a number of occasions that
substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been
satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of
wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery
but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the
testamentary privilege. 14
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's
will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental
witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator
affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his
instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There
is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the
will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the
testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the
day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth
and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of
Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was
drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when
Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of
securing his conformity to the draft. 15
Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents
on
5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the
three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit
silently. Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr.
Crescente O. Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and the
testator's physician) asked the testator whether the contents of the document
were of his own free will. Brigido answered in the affirmative. 16 With four
persons following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be
safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to
him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were
the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially
true when we consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were
persons known to the testator, one being his physician (Dr. Evidente) and
another (Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known to him since childhood.
The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was
not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements
of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal
imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and
which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will. 17
As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of
the trial court's Probate Order and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we
quote the following pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, 18 to wit:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of
wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and
curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation
already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
frustrative of the testator's will, must be disregarded (emphasis supplied).
Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and
unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached
thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside fro the mere reason that a legal
requirement intended for his protection was not followed strictly when such
compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the fact that the purpose of the law,
i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of
his will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance
suffices where the purpose has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
of respondent Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the
length of time that this case has remained pending, this decision is
immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, GriƱo-Aquino, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.