EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for
oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding
No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the
final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy
Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her
legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue,
one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc.,
in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen.
The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following
provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants,
and no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY.
x x x x x
x x x x
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN,
now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to
be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao
Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal
thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
x x x x x
x x x x
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and
estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may
have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that
the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the payment
of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the
estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was
filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her
legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in
G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one
of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership.
In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern
the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements
are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were
decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was
also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged
natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from
the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a
citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his
death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his
will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a
testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires,
because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and
In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal).
Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD
E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE
INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING
FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF
THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE
ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a
citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his
death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was
domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the
executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the
facts of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on
November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the
Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the
U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City
of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the
Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United
States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which
time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in
July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for
the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years
later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the
Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon
liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the
Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI
Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and
"CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l",
"MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
California shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now in
question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March
5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30,
1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the
deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in
New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he
came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only
for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never
to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the
State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of
meaning from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally,
however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical presence.
(Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship
that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from
1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was
a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased
appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that
State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the
following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile"
might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But
domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be
domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place
where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his
time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on
business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might
properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a
resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as
continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former
"home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a
domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical
presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used
with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only
proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and
to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires
the determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is used
therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having
its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within
the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general
American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of
California.
The next question is: What is the law in California
governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the court
below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the
form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article
946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner,
and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's
opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code
and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the
decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly
cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was
a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that
given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity
of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force
in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on
the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of
the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back
to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various
authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the
Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for
decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws
rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan
court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of
Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having
determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of
references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The
opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of
Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law
rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution
avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory
avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and
at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a
bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors
to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their
respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to
achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two
states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the
result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case
stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have
been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts,
and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same
result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would
hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances:
where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of
divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of
the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the
forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a
person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every
court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in
France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The
question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of
kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts
court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to
movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile.
Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions,
or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution
accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French
court were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it
would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying
the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to
apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into
a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption
that this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi
doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented
which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the
conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the
law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for
this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31,
pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is
to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question may
arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law
also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered
by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been
descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or
the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption
of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S.
872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi",
has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of
the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the
whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws,
and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has
generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and
the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an
article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent
parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules
of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the
ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the
conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means
the whole of its law.
x x x x x
x x x x
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute
of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following
theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as
regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary
exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the
right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and
desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the
domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree
in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.
x x x x x
x x x x
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to
distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in
Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire
whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in
accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would
make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the
English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its
conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its
internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate
sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in
the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with
foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow
the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more
states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property,
the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be
looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as
the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is
logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal
estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the
validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also,
it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary
state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict
of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in
the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine.
The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a
dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is
valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that
international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it
this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property
take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of
the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp.
442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of
California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two
sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the
California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and
enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so
declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of
California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its
conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if
there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is
situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the
Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the
deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in
the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of
our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code,
i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to
the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California,
Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the
case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case
back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and
forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its
own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent,
if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the
internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156;
Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock
Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil.
293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the
case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not
appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state
of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946
of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased
Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the
provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant,
should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of
the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be
made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with
costs against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
