EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18979
June 30, 1964
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA
VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO,
oppositors-appellants.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellee.
Rosendo J. Tansinin for oppositor-appellant Natividad
Icasiano.
Jaime R. Nuevas for oppositor-appellant Enrique Icasiano.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila admitting to probate the document and its duplicate, marked as Exhibits
"A" and "A-1", as the true last will and testament of
Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and appointing as executor Celso Icasiano, the
person named therein as such.
This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a
petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the original, Exhibit
"A" as the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the
appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor thereof.
The court set the proving of the alleged will for November
8, 1958, and caused notice thereof to be published for three (3) successive
weeks, previous to the time appointed, in the newspaper "Manila
chronicle", and also caused personal service of copies thereof upon the
known heirs.
On October 31, 1958, Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the
testatrix, filed her opposition; and on November 10, 1958, she petitioned to
have herself appointed as a special administrator, to which proponent objected.
Hence, on November 18, 1958, the court issued an order appointing the
Philippine Trust Company as special administrator. 1äwphï1.ñët
On February 18, 1959, Enrique Icasiano, a son of the
testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as his own Natividad's opposition
to the probate of the alleged will.
On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the
introduction of his evidence; but on June 1, 1959, he filed a motion for the
admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent
left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he
was, on that date, submitting the signed duplicate (Exhibit "A-1"),
which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959. On June 17, 1959,
oppositors Natividad Icasiano de Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint
opposition to the admission of the amended and supplemental petition, but by
order of July 20, 1959, the court admitted said petition, and on July 30, 1959,
oppositor Natividad Icasiano filed her amended opposition. Thereafter, the
parties presented their respective evidence, and after several hearings the
court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. From
this order, the oppositors appealed directly to this Court, the amount involved
being over P200,000.00, on the ground that the same is contrary to law and the
evidence.
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect
that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Manila on September 12, 1958; that
on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament
in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara
Street, Manila, published before and attested by three instrumental witnesses,
namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio
B. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three
instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong,
Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will was actually
prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present during the execution
and signing of the decedent's last will and testament, together with former
Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl. Of
the said three instrumental witnesses to the execution of the decedent's last
will and testament, attorneys Torres and Natividad were in the Philippines at
the time of the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and
authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will
was acknowledged by the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also attorneys
Fermin Samson, who actually prepared the document. The latter also testified
upon cross examination that he prepared one original and two copies of Josefa
Villacorte last will and testament at his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he
brought only one original and one signed copy to Manila, retaining one unsigned
copy in Bulacan.
The records show that the original of the will, which was
surrendered simultaneously with the filing of the petition and marked as
Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and
in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting
witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the
duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition and marked as
Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting
witnesses in each and every page.
The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends
to show that the original of the will and its duplicate were subscribed at the
end and on the left margin of each and every page thereof by the testatrix
herself and attested and subscribed by the three mentioned witnesses in the
testatrix's presence and in that of one another as witnesses (except for the
missing signature of attorney Natividad on page three (3) of the original);
that pages of the original and duplicate of said will were duly numbered; that
the attestation clause thereof contains all the facts required by law to be
recited therein and is signed by the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the
will is written in the language known to and spoken by the testatrix that the
attestation clause is in a language also known to and spoken by the witnesses; that
the will was executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies; and that both
the original and the duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before Notary
Public Jose Oyengco of Manila on the same date June 2, 1956.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page
three (3) of the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of
one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his
presence.
Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to
the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate (Exhibit
"A-1") are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same
occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents
were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and
pressure because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and
testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of
the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the
execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby
proponents-appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as
attorneys-in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein,
while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not
mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of
forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial
court was, that the testatrix signed both original and duplicate copies
(Exhibits "A" and "A-1", respectively) of the will
spontaneously, on the same in the presence of the three attesting witnesses,
the notary public who acknowledged the will; and Atty. Samson, who actually
prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in
Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses,
and read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Fermin Samson, together before they
were actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in a language known
to and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses. The opinion of expert for
oppositors, Mr. Felipe Logan, that the signatures of the testatrix appearing in
the duplicate original were not written by the same had which wrote the
signatures in the original will leaves us unconvinced, not merely because it is
directly contradicted by expert Martin Ramos for the proponents, but
principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him to support the
conclusion that the differences between the standard and questioned signatures
are beyond the writer's range of normal scriptural variation. The expert has,
in fact, used as standards only three other signatures of the testatrix besides
those affixed to the original of the testament (Exh. A); and we feel that with
so few standards the expert's opinion and the signatures in the duplicate could
not be those of the testatrix becomes extremely hazardous. This is particularly
so since the comparison charts Nos. 3 and 4 fail to show convincingly that the
are radical differences that would justify the charge of forgery, taking into
account the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her
signatures, and the effect of writing fatigue, the duplicate being signed right
the original. These, factors were not discussed by the expert.
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the
ink in the admitted and questioned signatures does not appear reliable,
considering the standard and challenged writings were affixed to different
kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole,
therefore, we do not find the testimony of the oppositor's expert sufficient to
overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses, Torres and
Natividad (Dr. Diy being in the United States during the trial, did not
testify).
Nor do we find adequate evidence of fraud or undue
influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of
neither (see In re Butalid, 10 Phil. 27; Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163; Pecson
vs. Coronal, 45 Phil. 216). Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for
making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The
testamentary dispositions that the heirs should not inquire into other property
and that they should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty
of forfeiture of their shares in the free part do not suffice to prove fraud or
undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged
litigation which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable
portion of the estate being diverted into the hands of non-heirs and
speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated
on another occassion. It is also well to note that, as remarked by the Court of
Appeals in Sideco vs. Sideco, 45 Off. Gaz. 168, fraud and undue influence are
mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for
opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the
will.
On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure
of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the
simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient
to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is
assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign
the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal
of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and
all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally
interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a
single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the
law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is
sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the
evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.
Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479
(decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling
or bungling it or the attestation clause".
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3)
was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by
the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in
every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before
the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the
time.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs
from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the
purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of
the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its
foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless
be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the
requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure
to make the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect
(Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy
to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against
fraud and bid faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the
testamentary privilege.
The appellants also argue that since the original of the
will is in existence and available, the duplicate (Exh. A-1) is not entitled to
probate. Since they opposed probate of original because it lacked one signature
in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here
into a dilemma; if the original is defective and invalid, then in law there is
no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate (Exh. A-1), and the same is
probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to
the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant.
At any rate, said duplicate, Exhibit A-1, serves to prove that the omission of
one signature in the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and
not intentional.
That the carbon duplicate, Exhibit A-1, was produced and
admitted without a new publication does not affect the jurisdiction of the
probate court, already conferred by the original publication of the petition
for probate. The amended petition did not substantially alter the one first filed,
but merely supplemented it by disclosing the existence of the duplicate, and no
showing is made that new interests were involved (the contents of Exhibit A and
A-1 are admittedly identical); and appellants were duly notified of the
proposed amendment. It is nowhere proved or claimed that the amendment deprived
the appellants of any substantial right, and we see no error in admitting the
amended petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Barrera and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
