EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678
June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,
oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors
appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E.
A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust
Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of
law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30,
1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case
No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the
State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who
survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and
expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children,
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00
each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder
shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely:
Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin
G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a
resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the
will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the
form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time
according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or
petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of
their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its
administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the
delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies
of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of
partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the
testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven
equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by
his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and,
therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to
him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted
on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order
overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report
and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil
Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas
law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been
denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to
this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine
law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor
even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of
another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that
even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei
sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties
are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found
in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they
never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that
their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and
to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph
three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil
Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17
of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second
paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have
been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision
in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the
national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended
to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed
two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate
— arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine
estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano
v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect
that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and
not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the
Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied
to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed
in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.