EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3497
May 18, 1951
THE MATTER OF THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
JOSE VENZON. VALENTINA CUEVAS, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
PILAR ACHACOSO, oppositor-appellant.
Juan R. Arbizo and Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellee.
Mariano Trinidad and Luis J. Nepomuceno for
oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Zambales admitting to probate the last will and testament of the
late Jose Venzon.
On January 19, 1946, Jose Venzon died in Iba, Zambales,
leaving a will. In said will the deceased instituted as his heirs, Valentina
Cuevas, his widow and Rosario Asera Venzon, his daughter. He named therein his
widow as executrix of the will. On February 1, 1946, Valentina Cuevas filed a
petition for the probate of said will.
On May 10, 1946, one Pilar Achacoso filed an alternative
petition for the probate of a previous will executed by the deceased praying
therein that, if the will submitted by the widow be rejected, the other will be
admitted to probate in lieu thereof. In the previous will there are other heirs
instituted, among them petitioner Pilar Achacoso. Pilar Achacoso objected to
the probate of the second will executed by the deceased on October 10, 1945.
After due hearing, the court found that the latter will was executed in
accordance with law and ordered that it be admitted to probate. Pilar Achacoso
took the case to the Court of Appeals, but the latter certified it to this
Court on the ground that it involves purely questions of law.
The main error assigned refers to the alleged lack of
attestation clause in the will under consideration, or to the fact that, if
there is such attestation clause, the same has not been signed by the
instrumental witnesses, but by the testator himself, and it is claimed that
this defect has the effect of invalidating the will.
The will in question, after reciting in separate paragraphs,
and under correlative numbers, the provisions of the will, winds up with the
following clause:
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign this testament or last will in
the municipality of Iba, Zambales, Philippines, this 10th day of October, 1945,
in the presence of the three witnesses, namely Dr. Nestorio Trinidad, Don
Baldomero Achacoso, and Mr. Proceso Cabal as instrumental witnesses to my
signing; this testament is written in three (3) sheets marked by letter
"A", "B" and "C" consecutively on top of each
sheet and upon my request and in my presence and also in the presence of each
of the aforesaid instrumental witnesses, they also signed this testament
already reffered to.
I hereby manifest that every sheet of the aforesaid
testament, on the left-hand margin as well as the testament itself have been
signed by me as also each of the witnesses has also signed in my presence and
in the presence of each other.
(Sgd.) JOSE VENZON
Witnesses:
(Sgd.) NESTORIO TRINIDAD
(Sgd.) BALDOMERO L. ACHACOSO
(Sgd.) PROCESO CABAL.
The clause above quoted is the attestation clause reffered
to in the law which, in our opinion, substantially complies with its
requirements. The only apparent anomaly we find is that it appears to be an
attestation made by the testator himself more than by the instrumental
witnesses. This apparent anomaly, as to affect the validity of the will, it
appearing that right under the signature of the testator, there appear the
signatures of the three instrumental witnesses.
"Instrumental witness, as define by Escriche in his
Diccionario Razonado de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, Vol. 4, p. 1115, is one
who takes part in the execution of an instrument or writing" (In re will
of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil., 807, 809). An instrumental witness, therefore, does not
merely attest to the signature of the testator but also to the proper execution
of the will. The fact that the three instrumental witnesses have signed the
will immediately under the signature of the testator, shows that they have in
fact attested not only to the genuineness of his signature but also to the due
execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
The attestation clause in question bears close similarity
with the attestation clause in the will involved in Aldaba vs. Roque, (43
Phil., 378). In that case, the attestation claused formed part of the body of
the will and its recital was made by the testratrix himself and was signed by
her and by the three instrumental witnesses. In upholding the validity of the
will, the court said:
In reality it appears that it is the testratrix who makes
the declaration about the points in the last paragraph of the will; however as
the witnesses together with the testratrix, have signed the said declaration,
we are of the opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the testament
constitute a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Act No. 2645.
As was said in one case, "the object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of the wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their
truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be
intrepreted in such a way as to attain this premordial ends. But on the other
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's will, must be disregarded." (In
re will of Tan Diuco, supra, p. 811.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Expressive of this liberal view of interpretation, are also
the following rules embodied in the new Civil Code. These provisions, although
not directly applicable, are however, significant because they project the
point of view of our legislature when it adopted them having in view the
existing law and jurisprudence on the matter.
. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition
is to be operative shall be preferred.
Art. 791. The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the appellant.
Paras, C.J., Feria and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
JUGO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result.
MONTEMAYOR, J., dissenting:
Bengzon and Padilla, JJ., concurring and dissenting:.
The facts in this case are correctly related in the learned
majority decision penned by Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo. The main issue
involved is well stated in that portion of the majority decision which for
purposes of reference quote below:
The main error assigned refers to the alleged lack of
attestation clause in the will under consideration, or to the fact that, If
there is such attestation clause, the same has not been signed by the testator
himself, and it is claimed that this defect has the effect of invalidating the
will.
The will in question, after reciting in seperate paragraphs,
and under correlative numbers, the provisions of the will, winds up with the
following clause:
In witness whereof, I sign this testament or last will in
the municipality of Iba, Zambales, Philippines, the 10th day of October, 1945,
in the presence of the three witnesses, namely Dr. Nestorio Trinidad, Don
Baldomero Achacoso, and Mr. Proceso Cabal as instrumental witnesses to my
signing; this testament is written in three (3) sheets marked by letter
"A", "B" and "C" consecutively on top of each
sheet and upon my request and in my presence and also in the presence of each
of the afforesaid instrumental witnesses, they also signed this testament
already referred to.
I hereby manifest that every sheet of the aforesaid
testament, on the left-hand margin as well as the testament itself have been
signed by me as also each of the witnesses has also signed in my presence and
in the presence of each other.
(Sgd.) JOSE VENZON
Witnesses:
(Sgd) NESTOR TRINIDAD
(Sgd) BALDOMERO L. ACHACOSO
(Sgd) PROCESO CABAL
The majority opinion correctly states that the clause of the
will above-quoted "appears to be an attestation made by the testator
himself more than by the instrumental witnesses." I go further and say
that it is an attestation by the only, and not by the witnesses. The three
witnesses — Trinidad, Achacoso and Cabal — signed under the signature of Jose
Venzon under the word "witnesses." Nothing can be more clear than
that they merely witnessed the signature of the testator, nothing more.
In an ordinary attestation clause to a will, as may be seen
or verified from any legal form, the attestation clause invariably contains a
certification, affirmation or solemn statement made by the witnesses and signed
by them, to the effect that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, in their presence, and that they also signed in the same manner and in
the presence of each other. In other words, it is they (witnesses) who speak
and certify and attest. They are the ones who assures all persons interested,
including the probate court that the attestation clause signed by them contains
a true and faithful certificate or guarantee of the signing of the will by the
testator and by themselves as required by law, and that they were in a position
to do so because they signed last.
Now, let us examined the clause of the will above-quoted. As
the majority opinion states, it is the testator that speak and not the
attesting witnesses He certifies that not only he signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of three witnesses, but that said three witness
also signed in his presence and in the presence of each other. Then he signed
said clause and the will, and thereafter, the three witnesses signed under the
word "witnesses", evidently giving us to understand that they saw him
sign, nothing more.
From our everyday experience and observation, in ordinary
written contracts or deeds, the witnesses who signed at the foot of the
instrument and after the signatures of the parties to the contract or deed
merely witness the signatures of said parties, nothing beyond that. The law
does not require, and they do not certify that they signed in the presence of
each other much less, that the instrument or deed has been executed according
to legal requirements. They have nothing to do or to say about the truth or
falsity of the statements contained in the body of the document. For all they
know the vendor may not be the owner of the land he is selling, and the vendee
may not in fact have paid the amount stated as received by the vendor. All that
they know and impliedly affirm and attest is that they saw the parties sign the
deed. And that is exactly what took place in the execution of the will in
question. The witnesses signed merely as witnesses to the signature of the
testator. They neither expressly nor the impliedly affirmed or certified that
the assertions about the signing of the will and every page thereof, contained
in the so-called attestation clause, are true for the obvious reason that said
clause is not their own, neither have they signed it.
Let us apply a simple a simple test. Supposing that the
statements contained in the so-called attestation clause in this case contained
a false narration of facts. Can and may said three witnesses or anyone of them
be properly and justly accused of falsification? I seriously doubt it. They can
truthfully and correctly say in their defense that they made no certificate,
statement or narration, Whether false or true. The certificate and attestation
was made only by the testator himself and not by them (witnesses). As admitted
and stated in the majority opinion, it was he (testator) who spoke, not
they(witnesses). It may be that the testator, as it were took the very words
out of their mouths, but the utterance and the affirmation were his not theirs.
He erroneously assumed their role as attesting witnesses. But that is far from
from fulfilling the requisites of the law that demands such utterance,
assurance and affirmation from three witness and from no one else.
Incidentally, it may be stated that what the testator states
in said clause could not have been all true. He says and certifies that the
three witnesses signed the will in his presence and in the presence of each
other. Then he signed said certificate or statement or clause. How could he
truthfully and correctly say all this when at the time that he was making the
statement or certificate and at the very instant that he signed the same the
three witnesses had not yet signed (in his presence and in the presence of each
other), for the simple reason that they signed last, and, naturally, after the
testator had made and signed his premature and untrue statement and
affirmation. The sequence is obviously wrong. In other words, the testator was
basing his statement and certificate upon a mere future presumption and
expectation.
The majority bolster its stand by citing the case of Aldaba
vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378, where a similar attestation clause was signed by the
testatrix herself and this Court held that inasmuch as the witnesses signed
with the testatrix, it was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
law on wills. I am afraid of the doctrine laid down in that case of Aldaba vs.
Roque, supra, constitutes a wide departure from the well established rule about
due execution of wills and, for the guidance of prospective testators the bench
and the bar, it is about time that we revised said doctrine. We should strictly
comply with requirements of the law about the execution of wills so as to
effectively close the door to fraud, deceit, and duress. When the law requires
that the attesting witnesses make the attestation and formal declaration, we
should insist that they and not someone else, even the testator, assume that
role. Of what value can the statement or attestation or certificate about the
signatures on the will, made by the testator be? Absolutely none. It will be
remembered in the sense that it comes to life and goes into effect only after
the death of the testator, not before. Naturally, in the probate of a will, the
testator can never be a witness to established and support the truth of the
statement contained in his certificate or attestation. In other words, in a
contested will where evidence is required to prove the due execution of the
statement, a certificate or affirmation made by the testator himself, besides
being unnecessary and not required by law, becomes an empty and ineffective
attestation because the attestator himself is no longer available to support it
by his declaration under oath in court. That is why the law requires as
attesting witnesses, three other persons who might be expected to be yet alive
and available when the will is presented for probate. And when the will is
contested the law further requires all the said three witnesses to appear in
court and testify and ratify the statement clause.
So in the case of In Re Will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil. 807,
this court speaking attesting witnesses said that the three witnesses should
sign the attestation clause "inasmuch as they alone can certify the facts
to be stated in said clause, for having taken a direct part therein, as they
saw the testator sign the will, or the person requested by him to sign all the
will, or the person requested by him to sign all the sheets of the will, that
is, the document constituting his last will and testament, and affirmed that it
was signed under his express direction in the presence said witnesses and that
all the sheets thereof had also been signed by them in the presence of said
testator and of each of them, . . . ."
To consider the words and statements contained in the
so-called attestation clause in the presence case, as made and uttered by the
three witnesses just because they signed their names under the testators
signature, as witnesses to his signing the document, is to ascribed and impute
to them as their act and declaration an act clearly not their own, and to put
into their mouth's words and statements never uttered or spoken by them; it is
to give to the clause and the signatures under it, a significance and meaning
and effect not warranted by normal and reasonable understanding and
interpretation.
Under the interpretation given to the clause in question by
the majority opinion as well as the interpretation given by this Court to a
similar clause in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque, supra, in a case where a testator
makes and signs a similar attestation clause, any three persons who may happen
to have been in the same room where the testator was, and have seen him or
where in a position to have seen him affix his signature to his intended last
will and testament, may afterwards leave the room and go to their respective
homes, towns and provinces; and subsequently, indeed, even after the death of
the testator, when the persons or persons who prepared the will came to realize
the necessity of attesting witnesses, they could send the document to said
witnesses, in the places where they may be found, one after the other and
request said three persons to sign as attesting witnesses; and each of said
three persons may honestly, truthfully and without any mental reservation, sign
his name to the document as a witness for the reason that he had actually
witnesses the signature of the testator, for after all, that is all that he
impliedly certifies by his signature as a witness, and, yet, such signatures of
the witnesses under such circumstances would not only be without the
contemplation of law but would also expressly and openly violate its
requirements, for the law provides that the attesting witnesses must certify
and attest that they signed as witnesses in the presence of the testator and in
the presence of each other, facts which are absolutely and completely wanting
in the example given.
The foregoing are the reasons why i am of the opinion that
the interpretation given by the majority to the called attestation clause in
the present case, as well as the interpretation given by the majority to the
so-called attestation clause in the case, as well the interpretation given by
this Court to a similar attestation clause in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque,
supra, are not exactly correct and warranted.
In the possibility that the testator in the present case, or
the person or persons who prepared the will had relied upon the ruling laid
down in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque, supra, and that it would now be unfair to
reject the present will when in its preparation a ruling by this Court has been
followed, I am willing to admit said will to probate and I concur in the result
of the majority opinion; but I dissent insofar as it holds out and regards the
interpretation given by it of the clause in question, as a doctrine that may be
followed in future cases, especially from now on. I also believe and hold that
for the reasons stated in this occurring and dissenting opinion, the doctrine
laid down in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque, supra, should be abandoned.
