FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-58509 December
7, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO
B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO
SUMULONG, intervenor.
Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant.
Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.
RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of
Appeals for final determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The
petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees Amparo
Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim
Bonilla on the following grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased
left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of
the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not
contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take
effect after death, and therefore it was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged
copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held
in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or
otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the
case with another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was granted by the
court in an order dated April 4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the
cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the
will. They argued that:
(1) The alleged
holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management
and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B.
Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by
secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was
denied by the court in its order of February 23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the order was contrary to law and settled pronouncements and
rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an
opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February 23,
1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B.
Bonilla. The court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy
of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the
original.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme
Court held that 'in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable
to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity
of said wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will
was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976.
In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of
the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the original of the will
could not be located shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded before
his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an
appeal to the Court of Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of
appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this
Court on the ground that the appeal does not involve question of fact and
alleged that the trial court committed the following assigned errors:
I. THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY
THEREOF;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAS
DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.
The only question here is whether a holographic will which
was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.
Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the
allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The
probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying
witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted
to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However,
if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is
the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a
comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will
may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the
testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that
"the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will
may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read
such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no
effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that
"Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a
mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested
before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the
lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3,
1979, denying appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of
the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the will of
the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
