EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6801
March 14, 1912
JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Salas and Kalaw for appellants.
Jose Santiago for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Bataan, admitting to probate a document which was
offered as the last will and testament of Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro. The will
purports to have been executed in the pueblo of Pilar, Province of Bataan, on
the 19th day of April, 1908. The testator died on the 28th of September, 1909,
a year and five months following the date of the execution of the will. The
will was propounded by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent,
and the opponents are a son and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the
latter being the children of a deceased daughter.
The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is
that the same was not executed according to the formalities and requirements of
the law touching wills, and further that the testator was not in the full of
enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without the mental capacity
necessary to execute a valid will.
The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for
some fourteen of fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from a
paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his
hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis
of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He
retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well.
Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and
to other members of his family.
At the time of the execution of the will there were present
the four testamentary witnesses, Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro
Paguio, and attorney, Señor Marco, and one Florentino Ramos. Anacleto Paguio
and the attorney have since died, and consequently their testimony was not
available upon the trial of the case in the lower court. The other three
testamentary witnesses and the witness Florentino Ramos testified as to the
manner in which the will was executed. According to the uncontroverted
testimony of these witnesses the will was executed in the following manner:
Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper
notes and items relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes
were in turn delivered to Señor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in
form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes were
written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them
to the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the
testator assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head; that
after the will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in
a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Señor
Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over
it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they
in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and each other.
These are the facts of record with reference to the
execution of the will and we are in perfect accord with the judgment of the
lower court that the formalities of the Code of Civil Procedure have been fully
complied with.
This brings us now to a consideration of appellants' second
assignment of error, viz, the testator's alleged mental incapacity at the time
of the execution of the will. Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced
at the trial. One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the
execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he
was seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were.
Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether
decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been
ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other
subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness
for the opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish
of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity
and advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The
witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own signature
as a subscribing witness.
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated
that he was present when the will was executed and his testimony was cumulative
in corroboration of the manner in which the will was executed and as to the
fact that the testator signed the will. This witness also stated that he had
frequently transacted matters of business for the decedent and had written
letters and made inventories of his property at his request, and that
immediately before and after the execution of the will he had performed offices
of his character. He stated that the decedent was able to communicate his
thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates the
presence of mental capacity on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses
for the opponents were two physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa
testified that he had attended the testator some four or five years prior to
his death and that the latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from
which the paralysis resulted. The following question was propounded to Doctor
Basa:
Q. Referring to
mental condition in which you found him the last time you attended him, do you
think he was in his right mind?
A. I can not say
exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some mental disorder,
because when I spoke to him he did not answer me.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of
his testimony is that the testator had suffered a paralysis and that he had
noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his
right mind at the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at his
opinion that he was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will.
He did not state in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other
than that he had noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one occasion
when he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the
testator, but his answer was in reply to a hypothetical question as to what be
the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and who had suffered from
a malady such as the testator was supposed to have had according to the
testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied
and discussed at some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from
which the testator had suffered; he read in support of his statements from a
work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct
question, he stated that he would be unable to certify to the mental condition
of a person who was suffering from such a disease.
We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians
in any way strengthens the contention of the appellants. Their testimony only
confirms the fact that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his
death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which his physician and
mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what
was the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in
question. There can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very
serious character, and it is quite evident that his mind was not as active as
it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can not include from
this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his
property by will.
The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills
executed under such circumstances, but the weight of the authority is in
support if the principle that it is only when those seeking to overthrow the
will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts
will intervene to set aside a testamentary document of this character. In the
case of Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 Phil. Rep., 163), the question of testamentary
capacity was discussed by this court. The numerous citations there given from
the decisions of the United States courts are especially applicable to the case
at bar and have our approval. In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is in
favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the
contestants of the will to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. (In the
matter of the will of Cabigting, 14 Phil. Rep., 463; in the matter of the will
of Butalid, 10 Phil. Rep., 27; Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 1 Phil. Rep., 689.)
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental
soundness is well established, and the testator in the case at bar never having
been adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption
continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this
legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do.
There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the
courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age
and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not
require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his
pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such
were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could
meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are
universal in statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree,
and that there are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness
to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated as
insanity and idiocy.
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition
is as sacred as any other right which a person may exercise and this right
should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is established in a positive
and conclusive manner. In discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it
is stated in volume 28, 70, of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law,
that —
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect
soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be
afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and
still be capable in law of executing a valid will. (See the numerous cases
there cited in support of this statement.)
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in
Buswell on Insanity, section 365, and quoted with approval in Campbell vs.
Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary
that the mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease
or otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of his
reasoning faculties.
In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
The question is not so much, that was the degree of memory
possessed by the testator, as, had he a disposing memory? Was he able to
remember the property he was about to bequeath, the manner of disturbing it,
and the objects of his bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently
sound to enable him to know and understand the business in which he was engaged
at the time when he executed his will. (See authorities there cited.)
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts
appeared upon the trial of the case: The testator died at the age of nearly 102
years. In his early years he was an intelligent and well informed man. About
seven years prior to his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that
time his mind and memory were mush enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing
and in consequence of the shrinking of his brain he was affected with senile
cataract causing total blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his habits,
although formerly he was observant of the properties of life. The court, in commenting
upon the case, said:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor
debility of body will affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient
intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient to create the
incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to his immediate family or property.
. . .
x x x x x
x x x x
Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years
before he made the will, and his physical and mental weakness and defective
memory were in striking contrast with their strength in the meridian of his
life. He was blind; not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he
was forgetful or recent events, especially of names, and repeated questions in
conversation; and sometimes, when aroused for sleep or slumber, would seem
bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known him when he was
remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of the opinion that his reason was
so far gone that he was incapable of making a will, although they never heard
him utter an irrational expression.
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar
we might draw the same contrast as was pictured by the court in the case just
quoted. The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator
during the last years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in
his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will,
yet we think that the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will
and statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he
unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion.
At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct
was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what
the nature of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that
the writing and execution of the will occupied a period several hours and that
the testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in all the
proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its
dispositions are those of a rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will
should be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against
the appellants.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Moreland,
JJ., concur.
