THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138322
October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of
the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and
the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between
Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at
Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing
and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the
above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick
A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband
and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June
26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
"Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian
government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.7 In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as "single" and
"Filipino."8
Starting
October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9
On
March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of
bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993,
he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's
wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending –
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it
stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor
General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted
the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they
submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial
court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the
marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of
the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to
remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our
consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce
decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated
his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a
second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized
Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes
absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the
respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art.
26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in
disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the
applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the
divorce decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this
Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce
between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was
proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on
these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha
Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the
divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong
Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like
any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce
and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably
failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the
law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist).
In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place
where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles
as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and
1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the
Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it
is consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as
pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees
that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law."28 Therefore,
before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be
admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements
under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as
follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of
the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such
license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the
following:
x x x x x
x x x x
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
x x x x x
x x x x
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has
been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of
the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the
death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be
recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian
divorce decree is a public document – a written official act of an Australian
family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and
due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself.31 The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body
or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.35 However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree
of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not
to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court
ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37Hence,
it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible
as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance
with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal
act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian
divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the
validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with
the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine
courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise
of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with
"the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among
those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof
of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab
initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which
was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to
marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means
the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent
presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after
the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some
other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty
party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after
proof of good behavior.47
On its
face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1.
A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This
quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity
to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the
ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce
decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil
status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of
the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity
required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the
application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that
respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of
the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that
proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records
before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before
the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b)
Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52(c) Exhibit "C" –
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D.
Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d)
Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and
Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit
"E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2)
for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b)
Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit
"3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d)
Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family
Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" –
Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and
Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's
contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian
personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may
turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry
petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the
most judicious course is to remand
this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the
court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on
the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon,
Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated
January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence
which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and
failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of
bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., concur.