FIRST DIVISION
G.R. NO. 146779
January 23, 2006
RENATO S. GATBONTON, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MAPUA INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY and JOSE CALDERON, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to set aside the Decision1
dated November 10, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57470,
affirming the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); and
the CA Resolution dated January 16, 2001, denying the motion for
reconsideration.2
Petitioner
Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua Institute of
Technology (MIT), Faculty of Civil Engineering. Some time in November 1998, a
civil engineering student of respondent MIT filed a letter-complaint against
petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual harassment and conduct
unbecoming of an academician. Pending investigation of the complaint, respondent MIT, through
its Committee on Decorum and Investigation placed petitioner under a 30-day preventive suspension
effective January 11, 1999. The committee believed that petitioner’s continued stay during the
investigation affects his performance as a faculty member, as well as the
students’ learning; and that the suspension will allow petitioner to
"prepare himself for the investigation and will prevent his influences to
other members of the community."3
Thus, petitioner
filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension, damages and attorney’s
fees,4 docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 01-00388-99.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in a petition for certiorari but the case was
terminated on May 21, 1999 when the parties entered into a compromise agreement
wherein respondent MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the rules and
regulations implementing Republic Act No. 7877 (R.A. No. 7877) or the
Anti-Sexual Harassment Act; disregard the previous administrative proceedings
and conduct anew an investigation on the charges against petitioner.
Petitioner agreed to recognize the validity of the published rules and
regulations, as well as the authority of respondent to investigate, hear and
decide the administrative case against him.5
On June
18, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, the thirty day preventive
suspension of complainant is hereby declared to be illegal. Accordingly, respondents are directed to pay his wages during
the period of his preventive suspension.
The rest of complainant’s claims are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.6
Both respondents and petitioner filed their appeal from the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision, with petitioner questioning the dismissal of his claim for
damages. In a Decision dated September 30, 1999, the NLRC granted respondents’ appeal and set aside the
Labor Arbiter’s decision. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the NLRC on December 13, 1999, petitioner filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the CA.
On November 10, 2000, the CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the NLRC
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and ORDERED DISMISSED, and the challenged decision and
order of public respondent NLRC AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA
denied in its Resolution dated January 16, 2001.
Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:
A
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE NLRC
WAS NOT GUILTY OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING BOTH THE APPEAL
DECISION AND THE NLRC RESOLUTION.
B
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE NLRC’S
DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.8
Petitioner finds fault in the CA’s decision, arguing that
his preventive suspension does not find any justification in the Mapua Rules
and Regulations considering that at the time of his preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the
rules have not been promulgated yet as it was published only on February 23,
1999. Petitioner also contests the lack of award of damages in his
favor.9
The petition is partly meritorious.
Preventive
suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the company’s
property pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed
by the employee. The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive
suspension if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to
the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.10 However, when it is determined
that there is no sufficient basis to justify an employee’s preventive
suspension, the latter is entitled to the payment of salaries during the time
of preventive suspension.11
R.A.
No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to
"promulgate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly
approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly
designated representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of
sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor."12
Petitioner’s preventive
suspension was based on respondent MIT’s Rules and Regulations for the
Implemention of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877.
Rule II, Section 1 of the MIT Rules and Regulations provides:
Section 1. Preventive Suspension of Accused in Sexual
Harassment Cases. Any member of the educational community may be placed
immediately under preventive suspension during the pendency of the hearing of
the charges of grave sexual harassment against him if the evidence of his guilt
is strong and the school head is morally convinced that the continued stay of
the accused during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the
normal operations of the institution or poses a risk or danger to the life or
property of the other members of the educational community.
It must be noted however, that respondent published said
rules and regulations only on February 23, 1999. In Tañada vs. Tuvera,13 it was
ruled that:
… all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed
by the legislature.
Covered
by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning
the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance
of their duties.
…
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Mapua
Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity,
since its purpose is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a law of
general application.14 In fact, the Mapua Rules itself explicitly
required publication of the rules for its effectivity, as provided in Section 3, Rule IV
(Administrative Provisions), which states that "[T]hese Rules and
Regulations to implement the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 shall take
effect fifteen (15) days after publication by the Committee." Thus, at the
time of the imposition of petitioner’s preventive suspension on January 11,
1999, the Mapua Rules were not
yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had no legal basis.
Moreover, even assuming that the Mapua Rules are applicable,
the Court finds that there is no sufficient basis to justify his preventive
suspension. Under the Mapua Rules, an accused may be placed under preventive
suspension during pendency of the hearing under any of the following
circumstances:
(a) if the evidence of his guilt is strong and the school
head is morally convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the
period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of
the institution; or
(b) the accused poses a risk or danger to the life or property
of the other members of the educational community.
In petitioner’s case, there is no indication that
petitioner’s preventive suspension may be based on the foregoing circumstances.
Committee Resolution No. 1 (Re: Preventive Suspension of Engr. Renato Gatbonton)
passed by the Committee on Decorum and Investigation states the reasons for
petitioner’s preventive suspension, to wit:
Whereas, the committee believe[s] that the continued stay of
the respondent during the period of investigation,
1. Affects the respondent’s performance as a faculty member
and laboratory head considering the psychological effects depression and/or
emotional stress during investigation
2. Affects the student[’s] learning and other members of the
Mapua Institute of Technology community.
Whereas, the committee believe[s] that this preventive
suspension will allow the respondent to prepare himself for the investigation
and will prevent his influences to other members of the community.15
Said resolution does not show that evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong and that
the school head is morally convinced that petitioner’s continued stay during
the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations
of the institution; or that petitioner poses a risk or danger to the life or
property of the other members of the educational community.
Even
under the Labor Code, petitioner’s preventive suspension finds no valid justification.
As provided in Section 8,
Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code:
Sec. 8.
Preventive Suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned under
preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious threat to the
life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.
As previously stated, there is nothing on record which shows
that respondent MIT imposed the preventive suspension on petitioner as his
continued employment poses a serious threat to the life or property of the
employer or of his co-workers; therefore, his preventive suspension is not
justified.16 Consequently, the payment of wages during his 30-day preventive
suspension, i.e., from January 11, 1999 to February 10, 1999, is in order.
With regard to petitioner’s claim for damages, the Court
finds the same to be without basis. While petitioner’s preventive suspension may have been unjustified,
this does not automatically mean that he is entitled to moral or other damages.
In Cocoland Development Corp. vs. NLRC,17 the Court ruled:
In Primero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held
that "… an award (of moral damages) cannot be justified solely upon the
premise (otherwise sufficient for redress under the Labor Code) that the employer
fired his employee without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be
pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code,
these being, to repeat, that the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or
fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy; and of course, that social humiliation, wounded
feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom." This was reiterated in
Garcia vs. NLRC, where the Court added that exemplary damages may be awarded
only if the dismissal was shown to have been effected in a wanton, oppressive
or malevolent manner.
This the private respondent failed to do. Because no
evidence was adduced to show that petitioner company acted in bad faith or in a
wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the private respondent, the labor
arbiter did not award any moral and exemplary damages in his decision.
Respondent NLRC therefore had no factual or legal basis to award such damages
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. …
The records of this case are bereft of any evidence showing
that respondent MIT acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in
preventively suspending petitioner, thus, the Labor Arbiter was correct in not
awarding any damages in favor of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10,
2000 and Resolution dated January 16, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57470 as well
as the NLRC Decision dated September 30, 1999 together with its Resolution
dated December 13, 1999, are hereby SET ASIDE and the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated June 18, 1999 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.