EN BANC
G.R. No.
L-21278 December 27, 1966
FEATI UNIVERSITY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations
and FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB-PAFLU, respondents.
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G.R. No.
L-21462 December 27, 1966
FEATI UNIVERSITY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB-PAFLU, respondent-appellee.
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G.R. No.
L-21500 December 27, 1966
FEATI UNIVERSITY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB-PAFLU, respondent-appellee.
Rafael Dinglasan for petitioner.
Cipriano Cid and Associates for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This Court, by resolution, ordered that these three cases be
considered together, and the parties were allowed to file only one brief for
the three cases.
On January
14, 1963, the President of the respondent Feati University Faculty Club-PAFLU —
hereinafter referred to as Faculty Club — wrote a letter to Mrs. Victoria L.
Araneta, President of petitioner Feati University — hereinafter referred to as
University — informing her of the organization of the Faculty Club into a
registered labor union. The Faculty Club is composed of members who are
professors and/or instructors of the University. On January 22, 1963, the President of the Faculty
Club sent another letter containing twenty-six demands that have connection
with the employment of the members of the Faculty Club by the University, and
requesting an answer within ten days from receipt thereof. The President of the
University answered the two letters, requesting that she be given at least
thirty days to study thoroughly the different phases of the demands. Meanwhile
counsel for the University, to whom the demands were referred, wrote a letter
to the President of the Faculty Club demanding proof of its majority status and
designation as a bargaining representative. On February 1, 1963, the President
of the Faculty Club again wrote the President of the University rejecting the
latter's request for extension of time, and on the same day he filed a notice
of strike with the Bureau of Labor alleging as reason therefor the refusal of
the University to bargain collectively. The parties were called to conferences
at the Conciliation Division of the Bureau of Labor but efforts to conciliate
them failed. On February 18, 1963, the members of the Faculty Club declared a
strike and established picket lines in the premises of the University,
resulting in the disruption of classes in the University. Despite
further efforts of the officials from the Department of Labor to effect a
settlement of the differences between the management of the University and the
striking faculty members no satisfactory agreement was arrived at. On March 21, 1963, the President
of the Philippines certified to the Court of Industrial Relations the dispute
between the management of the University and the Faculty Club pursuant to the
provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875.
In
connection with the dispute between the University and the Faculty Club and
certain incidents related to said dispute, various cases were filed with the
Court of Industrial Relations — hereinafter referred to as CIR. The
three cases now before this Court stemmed from those cases that were filed with
the CIR.
CASE NO. G.R. NO. L-21278
On May
10, 1963, the University filed before this Court a "petition for certiorari and
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction", docketed as G.R.
No. L-21278, praying: (1) for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining respondent Judge Jose S. Bautista of the CIR to desist
from proceeding in CIR Cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC, and V-30; (2) that the
proceedings in Cases Nos. 41-IPA and 1183-MC be annulled; (3) that the orders
dated March 30, 1963 and April 6, 1963 in Case No. 41-IPA, the order dated
April 6, 1963 in Case No. 1183-MC, and the order dated April 29, 1963 in Case
No. V-30, all be annulled; and (4) that the respondent Judge be ordered to
dismiss said cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 of the CIR.
On May
10, 1963, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the
University's filing a bond of P1,000.00, ordering respondent Judge Jose S.
Bautista as Presiding Judge of the CIR, until further order from this Court,
"to desist and refrain from further proceeding in the premises
(Cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 of the Court of Industrial
Relations)."1 On December 4, 1963, this Court ordered the
injunction bond increased to P100,000.00; but on January 23, 1964, upon a
motion for reconsideration by the University, this Court reduced the bond to P50,000.00.
A brief statement of the three cases — CIR Cases 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 —
involved in the Case G.R. No. L-21278, is here necessary.
CIR
Case No. 41-IPA,
relates to the case in connection with the strike staged by the members of the
Faculty Club. As we have stated, the dispute between the University and
the Faculty Club was certified on March 21, 1963 by the President of the
Philippines to the CIR. On
the strength of the presidential certification, respondent Judge Bautista set
the case for hearing on March 23, 1963. During the hearing, the Judge
endeavored to reconcile the part and it was agreed upon that the striking
faculty members would return to work and the University would readmit them
under a status quo arrangement. On that very same day, however, the University, thru
counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground that the CIR has no
jurisdiction over the case, because (1) the Industrial Peace Act is not
applicable to the University, it being an educational institution, nor to the
members of the Faculty Club, they being independent contractors; and (2) the
presidential certification is violative of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace
Act, as the University is not an industrial establishment and there was no
industrial dispute which could be certified to the CIR. On March 30, 1963 the respondent
Judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and declaring that the
Industrial Peace Act is applicable to both parties in the case and that the CIR
had acquired jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the presidential
certification. In the same order, the respondent Judge, believing that the
dispute could not be decided promptly, ordered the strikers to return
immediately to work and the University to take them back under the last terms
and conditions existing before the dispute arose, as per agreement had
during the hearing on March 23, 1963; and likewise enjoined the University,
pending adjudication of the case, from dismissing any employee or laborer
without previous authorization from the CIR. The University filed on April 1,
1963 a motion for reconsideration of the order of March 30, 1963 by the CIRen
banc, and at the same time asking that the motion for reconsideration be
first heard by the CIR en banc. Without the motion for reconsideration having been acted
upon by the CIR en banc, respondent Judge set the case for hearing
on the merits for May 8, 1963. The University moved for the cancellation
of said hearing upon the ground that the court en banc should
first hear the motion for reconsideration and resolve the issues raised therein
before the case is heard on the merits. This motion for cancellation of the
hearing was denied. The
respondent Judge, however, cancelled the scheduled hearing when counsel for the
University manifested that he would take up before the Supreme Court, by a
petition for certiorari, the matter regarding the actuations
of the respondent Judge and the issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration, specially the issue relating to the jurisdiction of the CIR.
The order of March 30, 1963 in Case 41-IPA is one of the orders sought to be
annulled in the case, G.R. No. L-21278.
Before the above-mentioned order of March 30, 1963 was
issued by respondent Judge, the University had employed professors and/or
instructors to take the places of those professors and/or instructors who had
struck. On April 1, 1963,
the Faculty Club filed with the CIR in Case 41-IPA a petition to declare in
contempt of court certain parties, alleging that the University refused to
accept back to work the returning strikers, in violation of the return-to-work
order of March 30, 1963. The University filed, on April 5,1963, its opposition
to the petition for contempt, denying the allegations of the Faculty Club and
alleging by way of special defense that there was still the motion for
reconsideration of the order of March 30, 1963 which had not yet been acted
upon by the CIR en banc. On April 6, 1963, the respondent
Judge issued an order stating that "said replacements are hereby warned
and cautioned, for the time being, not to disturb nor in any manner commit any
act tending to disrupt the effectivity of the order of March 30,1963, pending
the final resolution of the same."2 On April 8, 1963, there
placing professors and/or instructors concerned filed, thru counsel, a motion
for reconsideration by the CIR en banc of the order of
respondent Judge of April 6, 1963. This order of April 6, 1963 is one of the
orders that are sought to be annulled in case G.R. No. L-21278.
CIR
Case No. 1183-MC relates to a petition for certification election filed by the Faculty
Club on March 8, 1963 before the CIR, praying that it be certified as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees of the University.
The University filed an opposition to the petition for certification election
and at the same time a motion to dismiss said petition, raising the very same
issues raised in Case No. 41-IPA, claiming that the petition did not comply
with the rules promulgated by the CIR; that the Faculty Club is not a
legitimate labor union; that the members of the Faculty Club cannot unionize
for collective bargaining purposes; that the terms of the individual contracts
of the professors, instructors, and teachers, who are members of the Faculty
Club, would expire on March 25 or 31, 1963; and that the CIR has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition because the Industrial Peace
Act is not applicable to the members of the Faculty Club nor to the University.
This case was assigned to Judge Baltazar Villanueva of the CIR. Before Judge Villanueva
could act on the motion to dismiss, however, the Faculty Club filed on April 3,
1963 a motion to withdraw the petition on the ground that the labor dispute
(Case No. 41-IPA) had
already been certified by the President to the CIR and the issues raised in
Case No. 1183-MC were absorbed by Case No. 41-IPA. The University
opposed the withdrawal, alleging that the issues raised in Case No. 1183-MC
were separate and distinct from the issues raised in Case No. 41-IPA; that the
questions of recognition and majority status in Case No. 1183-MC were not
absorbed by Case No. 41-IPA; and that the CIR could not exercise its power of
compulsory arbitration unless the legal issue regarding the existence of
employer-employee relationship was first resolved. The University prayed that
the motion of the Faculty Club to withdraw the petition for certification
election be denied, and that its motion to dismiss the petition be heard. Judge
Baltazar Villanueva, finding that the reasons stated by the Faculty Club in the
motion to withdraw were well taken, on April 6, 1963, issued an order granting
the withdrawal. The University filed, on April 24, 1963, a motion for
reconsideration of that order of April 6, 1963 by the CIR en banc.
This order of April 6, 1963 in Case No. 1183-MC is one of the orders sought to
be annulled in the case, G.R. No. L-21278, now before Us.
CIR Case No. V-30 relates to a complaint for indirect contempt
of court filed against the administrative officials of the University.
The Faculty Club, through the Acting Chief Prosecutor of the CIR, filed with
the CIR a complaint docketed as Case No. V-30, charging President Victoria L.
Araneta, Dean Daniel Salcedo, Executive Vice-President Rodolfo Maslog, and
Assistant to the President Jose Segovia, as officials of the University, with
indirect contempt of court, reiterating the same charges filed in Case No.
41-IPA for alleged violation of the order dated March 30, 1963. Based on the
complaint thus filed by the Acting Chief Prosecutor of the CIR, respondent
Judge Bautista issued on April 29, 1963 an order commanding any officer of the
law to arrest the above named officials of the University so that they may be
dealt with in accordance with law, and the same time fixed the bond for their
release at P500.00 each. This order of April 29, 1963 is also one of the orders
sought to be annulled in the case, G.R. No. L-2l278.
The principal allegation of the University in its petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in
Case G.R. No. L-21278, now before Us, is that respondent Judge Jose S. Bautista acted
without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in
taking cognizance of, and in issuing the questioned orders in, CIR Cases Nos.
41-IPA 1183-MC and V-30. Let it be noted that when the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was
filed on May 10, 1963 in this case, the questioned order in CIR Cases Nos.
41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 were still pending action by the CIR en banc upon
motions for reconsideration filed by the University.
On June 10, 1963, the Faculty Club filed its answer to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, admitting some allegations contained in the petition and denying
others, and alleging special defenses which boil down to the contentions that
(1) the CIR had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of Case No. 41-IPA by
virtue of the presidential certification, so that it had jurisdiction to issue
the questioned orders in said Case No. 41-IPA; (2) that the Industrial Peace
Act (Republic Act 875) is applicable to the University as an employer and to
the members of the Faculty Club as employees who are affiliated with a duly
registered labor union, so that the Court of Industrial Relations had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Cases Nos. 1183-MC and V-30 and to issue the
questioned orders in those two cases; and (3) that the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction was prematurely filed because the
orders of the CIR sought to be annulled were still the subjects of pending
motions for reconsideration before the CIR en banc when said
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
was filed before this Court.
CASE G.R. NO. L-21462
This case, G.R. No. L-21462, involves also CIR Case No.
1183-MC. As already stated Case No. 1183-MC relates to a petition for
certification election filed by the Faculty Club as a labor union, praying that
it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all
employees of the University. This petition was opposed by the University, and
at the same time it filed a motion to dismiss said petition. But before Judge
Baltazar Villanueva could act on the petition for certification election and
the motion to dismiss the same, Faculty Club filed a motion to withdraw said
petition upon the ground that the issue raised in Case No. 1183-MC were
absorbed by Case No. 41-IPA which was certified by the President of the
Philippines. Judge Baltazar Villanueva, by order April 6, 1963, granted the
motion to withdraw. The University filed a motion for reconsideration of that
order of April 6, 1963 by the CIR en banc. That motion for
reconsideration was pending action by the CIR en banc when the
petition forcertiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
in Case G.R. no. L-21278 was filed on May 10, 1963. As earlier stated this
Court, in Case G.R. No. L-21278, issued a writ of preliminary injunction on May
10, 1963, ordering respondent Judge Bautista, until further order from this
Court, to desist and refrain from further proceeding in the premises (Cases
Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 of the Court of Industrial Relations).
On June 5, 1963, that is, after this Court has issued the
writ of preliminary injunction in Case G.R. No. L-21278, the CIR en
banc issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the
order of April 6, 1963 in Case No. 1183-MC.
On July 8, 1963, the University filed before this Court a
petition for certiorari, by way of an appeal from the resolution of
the CIR en banc, dated June 5, 1963, denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order of April 6, 1963 in Case No. 1183-MC. This
petition was docketed as G.R. No. L-21462. In its petition for certiorari,
the University alleges (1) that the resolution of the Court of Industrial
Relations of June 5, 1963 was null and void because it was issued in violation
of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in Case G.R. No. L-21278; (2) that
the issues of employer-employee relationship, the alleged status as a labor
union, majority representation and designation as bargaining representative in
an appropriate unit of the Faculty Club should have been resolved first in Case
No. 1183-MC prior to the determination of the issues in Case No. 41-IPA and
therefore the motion to withdraw the petition for certification election should
not have been granted upon the ground that the issues in the first case have
been absorbed in the second case; and (3) the lower court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petition for certification
election and that the same should have been dismissed instead of having been
ordered withdrawn. The University prayed that the proceedings in Case No.
1183-MC and the order of April 6, 1963 and the resolution of June 5, 1963
issued therein be annulled, and that the CIR be ordered to dismiss Case No.
1183-MC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The Faculty Club filed its answer, admitting some, and
denying other, allegations in the petition for certiorari; and
specially alleging that the lower court's order granting the withdrawal of the
petition for certification election was in accordance with law, and that the
resolution of the court en banc on June 5, 1963 was not a
violation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in Case G.R. No. L-21278
because said writ of injunction was issued against Judge Jose S. Bautista and
not against the Court of Industrial Relations, much less against Judge Baltazar
Villanueva who was the trial judge of Case No. 1183-MC.
CASE G.R. NO. L-21500
This case, G.R. No. L-21500, involves also CIR Case No.
41-IPA. As earlier stated, Case No. 41-IPA relates to the strike staged by the
members of the Faculty Club and the dispute was certified by the President of
the Philippines to the CIR. The University filed a motion to dismiss that case
upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the case, and on March
30, 1963 Judge Jose S. Bautista issued an order denying the motion to dismiss
and declaring that the Industrial Peace Act is applicable to both parties in
the case and that the CIR had acquired jurisdiction over the case by virtue of
the presidential certification; and in that same order Judge Bautista ordered
the strikers to return to work and the University to take them back under the
last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose; and enjoined the
University from dismissing any employee or laborer without previous authority
from the court. On April 1, 1963, the University filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of March 30, 1963 by the CIR en banc.
That motion for reconsideration was pending action by the CIR en banc when
the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction in Case G.R. No. L-21278 was filed on May 10, 1963. As we have
already stated, this Court in said case G.R. No. L-21278, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction on May 10, 1963 ordering respondent Judge Jose S.
Bautista, until further order from this Court, to desist and refrain from
further proceeding in the premises (Cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 of the
Court of Industrial Relations).
On July 2, 1963, the University received a copy of the
resolution of the CIR en banc, dated May 7, 1963 but actually
received and stamped at the Office of the Clerk of the CIR on June 28, 1963,
denying the motion for reconsideration of the order dated March 30, 1963 in
Case No. 41-IPA.
On July 23, 1963, the University filed before this Court a
petition for certiorari, by way of an appeal from the resolution of
the Court of Industrial Relations en banc dated May 7, 1963
(but actually received by said petitioner on July 2, 1963) denying the motion
for reconsideration of the order of March 30, 1963 in Case No. 41-IPA. This
petition was docketed as G.R. No. L-21500. In its petition for certiorari the
University alleges (1) that the resolution of the CIR en banc,
dated May 7, 1963 but filed with the Clerk of the CIR on June 28, 1963, in Case
No. 41-IPA, is null and void because it was issued in violation of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by this Court in G.R. No. L-21278; (2) that the
CIR, through its Presiding Judge, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Case No. 41-IPA and the order of March 30, 1963 and the resolution dated May 7,
1963 issued therein are null and void; (3) that the certification made by the
President of the Philippines is not authorized by Section 10 of Republic Act
875, but is violative thereof; (4) that the Faculty Club has no right to
unionize or organize as a labor union for collective bargaining purposes and to
be certified as a collective bargaining agent within the purview of the
Industrial Peace Act, and consequently it has no right to strike and picket on
the ground of petitioner's alleged refusal to bargain collectively where such
duty does not exist in law and is not enforceable against an educational
institution; and (5) that the return-to-work order of March 30, 1963 is
improper and illegal. The petition prayed that the proceedings in Case No.
41-IPA be annulled, that the order dated March 30, 1963 and the resolution
dated May 7, 1963 be revoked, and that the lower court be ordered to dismiss
Case 41-IPA on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On September 10, 1963, the Faculty Club, through counsel,
filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certiorari on the
ground that the petition being filed by way of an appeal from the orders of the
Court of Industrial Relations denying the motion to dismiss in Case No. 41-IPA,
the petition for certiorari is not proper because the orders
appealed from are interlocutory in nature.
This Court, by resolution of September 26, 1963, ordered
that these three cases (G.R. Nos. L-21278, L-21462 and L-21500) be considered
together and the motion to dismiss in Case G.R. No. L-21500 be taken up when
the cases are decided on the merits after the hearing.
Brushing aside certain technical questions raised by the
parties in their pleadings, We proceed to decide these three cases on the
merits of the issues raised.
The University has raised several issues in the present
cases, the pivotal one being its claim that the Court of Industrial Relations
has no jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in CIR Cases
41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30, brought before it, upon the ground that Republic Act
No. 875 is not applicable to the University because it is an educational
institution and not an industrial establishment and hence not an
"employer" in contemplation of said Act; and neither is Republic Act
No. 875 applicable to the members of the Faculty Club because the latter are
independent contractors and, therefore, not employees within the purview of the
said Act.
In support of the contention that being an educational
institution it is beyond the scope of Republic Act No. 875, the University
cites cases decided by this Court: Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs.
Juliana Araos, L-10091, Jan. 29, 1958; University of San Agustin
vs. CIR, et al., L-12222, May 28, 1958; Cebu Chinese High
School vs. Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, PLASLU,
L-12015, April 22, 1959; La Consolacion College, et al. vs. CIR, et
al., L-13282, April 22, 1960; University of the Philippines,
et al. vs. CIR, et al., L-15416, April 8, 1960; Far Eastern
University vs. CIR, L-17620, August 31, 1962. We have reviewed these cases,
and also related cases subsequent thereto, and We find that they do not sustain
the contention of the University. It is true that this Court has ruled that
certain educational institutions, like the University of Santo Tomas,
University of San Agustin, La Consolacion College, and other juridical
entities, like the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and Manila Sanitarium, are
beyond the purview of Republic Act No. 875 in the sense that the Court of
Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of charges of
unfair labor practice filed against them, but it is nonetheless true that the
principal reason of this Court in ruling in those cases that those institutions
are excluded from the operation of Republic Act 875 is that those entities are
not organized, maintained and operated for profit and do not declare dividends
to stockholders. The decision in the case of University of San Agustin vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-12222, May 28, 1958, is very pertinent.
We quote a portion of the decision:
It appears that the University of San Agustin, petitioner
herein, is an educational institution conducted and managed by a
"religious non-stock corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines." It was organized not for profit or gain or
division of the dividends among its stockholders, but solely for religious and
educational purposes. It likewise appears that the Philippine Association of
College and University Professors, respondent herein, is a non-stock
association composed of professors and teachers in different colleges and
universities and that since its organization two years ago, the university has
adopted a hostile attitude to its formation and has tried to discriminate,
harass and intimidate its members for which reason the association and the
members affected filed the unfair labor practice complaint which initiated this
proceeding. To the complaint of unfair labor practice, petitioner filed an
answer wherein it disputed the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations over the controversy on the following grounds:
"(a) That complainants therein being college and/or
university professors were not "industrial" laborers or employees,
and the Philippine Association of College and University Professors being
composed of persons engaged in the teaching profession, is not and cannot be a
legitimate labor organization within the meaning of the laws creating the Court
of Industrial Relations and defining its powers and functions;
"(b) That the University of San Agustin, respondent
therein, is not an institution established for the purpose of
gain or division of profits, and consequently, it is not an
"industrial" enterprise and the members of its teaching staff are not
engaged in "industrial" employment (U.S.T. Hospital Employees
Association vs. Sto. Tomas University Hospital, G.R. No. L-6988, 24 May 1954;
and San Beda College vs. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor
Union, G.R. No. L-7649, 29 October 1955; 51 O.G. (Nov. 1955) 5636-5640);
"(c) That, as a necessary consequence, alleged
controversy between therein complainants and respondent is not an
"industrial" dispute, and the Court of Industrial Relations has no
jurisdiction, notonly on the parties but also over the subject
matter of the complaint."
The issue now before us is: Since the University of San
Agustin is not an institution established for profit or gain, nor an industrial
enterprise, but one established exclusively for educational purposes, can it be
said that its relation with its professors is one of employer and employee that
comes under the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations? In other
words, do the provisions of the Magna Carta on unfair labor practice apply to
the relation between petitioner and members of respondent association?
The issue is not new. Thus, in the case of Boy
Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana V. Araos, G.R. No. L-10091,
promulgated on January 29, 1958, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Montemayor, answered the query in the negative in the following wise:
"The main issue involved in the present case is whether
or not a charitable institution or one organized not for profit but for more
elevated purposes, charitable, humanitarian, etc., like the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines, is included in the definition of "employer" contained in
Republic Act 875, and whether the employees of said institution fall under the
definition of "employee" also contained in the same Republic Act. If
they are included, then any act which may be considered unfair labor practice,
within the meaning of said Republic Act, would come under the jurisdiction of
the Court of Industrial Relations; but if they do not fall within the scope of
said Republic Act, particularly, its definitions of employer and employee, then
the Industrial Court would have no jurisdiction at all.
xxx xxx xxx
"On the basis of the foregoing considerations, there is
every reason to believe that our labor legislation from Commonwealth Act No.
103, creating the Court of Industrial Relations, down through the Eight-Hour
Labor Law, to the Industrial Peace Act, was intended by the Legislature to
apply only to industrial employment and to govern the relations between
employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of profit and gain,
and their industrial employees, but not to organizations and entities which are
organized, operated and maintained not for profit or gain, but for elevated and
lofty purposes, such as, charity, social service, education and instruction, hospital
and medical service, the encouragement and promotion of character, patriotism
and kindred virtues in youth of the nation, etc.
"In conclusion, we find and hold that Republic Act No.
875, particularly, that portion thereof regarding labor disputes and unfair
labor practice, does not apply to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and
consequently, the Court of Industrial Relations had no jurisdiction to
entertain and decide the action or petition filed by respondent Araos.
Wherefore, the appealed decision and resolution of the CIR are hereby set
aside, with costs against respondent."
There being a close analogy between the relation and facts
involved in the two cases, we cannot but conclude that the Court of Industrial
Relations has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint for unfair labor
practice lodged by respondent association against petitioner and, therefore, we
hereby set aside the order and resolution subject to the present petition, with
costs against respondent association.
The same doctrine was confirmed in the case of University
of Santo Tomas v. Hon. Baltazar Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. L-13748,
October 30, 1959, where this Court ruled that:
In the present case, the record reveals that the petitioner
University of Santo Tomas is not an industry organized for profit but an
institution of learning devoted exclusively to the education of the youth. The
Court of First Instance of Manila in its decision in Civil Case No. 28870,
which has long become final and consequently the settled law in the case, found
as established by the evidence adduced by the parties therein (herein
petitioner and respondent labor union) that while the University collects fees
from its students, all its income is used for the improvement and enlargement
of the institution. The University declares no dividend, and the members of the
corporation who founded it, as ordained in its articles of incorporation,
receive no material compensation for the time and sacrifice they render to the
University and its students. The respondent union itself in a case before the
Industrial Court (Case No. 314-MC) has averred that "the University of
Santo Tomas, like the San Beda College, is an educational institution operated
not for profit but for the sole purpose of educating young men." (See Annex
"B" to petitioner's motion to dismiss.). It is apparent, therefore,
that on the face of the record the University of Santo Tomas is not a
corporation created for profit but an educational institution and therefore not
an industrial or business organization.
In the case of La Consolacion College, et al. vs.
CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-13282, April 22, 1960, this Court repeated the
same ruling when it said:
The main issue in this appeal by petitioner is that the
industry trial court committed an error in holding that it has jurisdiction to
act in this case even if it involves unfair labor practice considering that the
La Consolacion College is not a business enterprise but an educational
institution not organized for profit.
If the claim that petitioner is an educational institution
not operated for profit is true, which apparently is the case, because the very
court a quo found that it has no stockholder, nor capital . .
. then we are of the opinion that the same does not come under the jurisdiction
of the Court of Industrial Relations in view of the ruling in the case of Boy
Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana V. Araos, G.R. No. L-10091, decided on
January 29, 1958.
It is noteworthy that the cases of the University of San
Agustin, the University of Santo Tomas, and La Consolacion College, cited
above, all involve charges of unfair labor practice under Republic Act No. 875,
and the uniform rulings of this Court are that the Court of Industrial
Relations has no jurisdiction over the charges because said Act does not apply
to educational institutions that are not operated or maintained for profit and
do not declare dividends. On the other hand, in the cases of Far
Eastern University v. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-17620, August 31, 1962,
this Court upheld the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations finding the
Far Eastern University, also an educational institution, guilty of unfair labor
practice. Among the findings of fact in said case was that the Far Eastern
University made profits from the school year 1952-1953 to 1958-1959. In
affirming the decision of the lower court, this Court had thereby ratified the
ruling of the Court of Industrial Relations which applied the Industrial Peace
Act to educational institutions that are organized, operated and maintained for
profit.
It is also noteworthy that in the decisions in the cases of
the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the University of San Agustin, the
University of Sto. Tomas, and La Consolacion College, this Court was not
unanimous in the view that the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875) is
not applicable to charitable, eleemosynary or non-profit organizations — which
include educational institutions not operated for profit. There are members of
this Court who hold the view that the Industrial Peace Act would apply also to
non-profit organizations or entities — the only exception being the Government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, in so far as
governmental functions are concerned. However, in the Far Eastern University
case this Court is unanimous in supporting the view that an educational
institution that is operated for profit comes within the scope of the
Industrial Peace Act. We consider it a settled doctrine of this Court,
therefore, that the Industrial Peace Act is applicable to any organization or
entity — whatever may be its purpose when it was created — that is operated for
profit or gain.
Does the University operate as an educational institution
for profit? Does it declare dividends for its stockholders? If it does not, it
must be declared beyond the purview of Republic Act No. 875; but if it does,
Republic Act No. 875 must apply to it. The University itself admits that it has
declared dividends.3 The CIR in its order dated March 30, 1963
in CIR Case No. 41-IPA — which order was issued after evidence was heard — also
found that the University is not for strictly educational purposes and that
"It realizes profits
and parts of such earning is distributed as dividends to private stockholders
or individuals (Exh. A and also 1 to 1-F, 2-x 3-x and 4-x)"4 Under this circumstance,
and in consonance with the rulings in the decisions of this Court, above cited,
it is obvious that Republic Act No. 875 is applicable to herein petitioner
Feati University.
But the University
claims that it is not an employer within the contemplation of Republic Act No.
875, because it is not an industrial establishment. At most, it says, it is
only a lessee of the services of its professors and/or instructors pursuant to
a contract of services entered into between them. We find no merit in
this claim. Let us clarify who is an "employer" under the Act. Section 2(c) of said Act
provides:
Sec. 2.
Definitions.—As used in this Act —
(c) The
term employer include any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include any labor organization (otherwise
than when acting as an employer) or any one acting in the capacity or agent of
such labor organization.
It will
be noted that in defining the term "employer" the Act uses the word
"includes", which it also used in defining "employee".
[Sec. 2 (d)], and "representative" [Sec. 2(h)]; and not the word
"means" which the Act uses in defining the terms "court"
[Sec. 2(a)], "labor organization" [Sec. 2(e)], "legitimate labor
organization [Sec. 2(f)], "company union" [Sec. 2(g)], "unfair
labor practice" [Sec. 2(i)], "supervisor" [Sec. 2(k)],
"strike" [Sec. 2(l)] and "lock-out" [Sec. 2(m)]. A
methodical variation in terminology is manifest. This variation and distinction
in terminology and phraseology cannot be presumed to have been the
inconsequential product of an oversight; rather, it must have been the result
of a deliberate and purposeful act, more so when we consider that as
legislative records show, Republic Act No. 875 had been meticulously and
painstakingly drafted and deliberated upon. In using the word
"includes" and not "means", Congress did not intend to give a complete definition of
"employer", but rather that such definition should be complementary
to what is commonly understood as employer. Congress intended the term
to be understood in a broad meaning because, firstly, the statutory definition
includes not only "a principal employer but also a person acting in the
interest of the employer"; and, secondly, the Act itself specifically enumerated those who are
not included in the term "employer", namely: (1) a labor
organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer), (2) anyone acting in
the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization [Sec. 2(c)], and
(3) the Government and any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof
insofar as the right to strike for the purpose of securing changes or
modifications in the terms and conditions of employment is concerned (Section
11). Among these statutory exemptions, educational institutions are not included; hence, they
can be included in the term "employer". This Court, however, has
ruled that those educational institutions that are not operated for profit are
not within the purview of Republic Act No. 875.5
As stated above, Republic Act No. 875 does not give a
comprehensive but only a complementary definition of the term
"employer". The term encompasses those that are in ordinary parlance
"employers." What is commonly meant by "employer"? The term
"employer" has been given several acceptations. The lexical
definition is "one who employs; one who uses; one who engages or keeps in
service;" and "to employ" is "to provide work and pay for;
to engage one's service; to hire." (Webster's New Twentieth Century
Dictionary, 2nd ed., 1960, p. 595). The Workmen's Compensation Act defines
employer as including "every person or association of persons,
incorporated or not, public or private, and the legal representative of the
deceased employer" and "includes the owner or lessee of a factory or
establishment or place of work or any other person who is virtually the owner
or manager of the business carried on in the establishment or place of work but
who, for reason that there is an independent contractor in the same, or for any
other reason, is not the direct employer of laborers employed there."
[Sec. 39(a) of Act No. 3428.] The Minimum Wage Law states that "employer
includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the
employer in relation to an employee and shall include the Government and the
government corporations". [Rep. Act No. 602, Sec. 2(b)]. The Social
Security Act defines employer as "any person, natural or juridical,
domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry,
undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person
who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and
any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including
corporations owned or controlled by the Government." (Rep. Act No. 1161,
Sec. 8[c]).
This Court, in the cases of the The Angat River Irrigation
System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union (PLUM), et al., G.R. Nos. L-10934
and L-10944, December 28, 1957, which cases involve unfair labor practices and
hence within the purview of Republic Act No. 875, defined the term employer as
follows:
An employer is one who employs the services of others; one
for whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries (Black Law
Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 618).
An employer includes any person acting in the interest of an
employer, directly or indirectly (Sec. 2-c, Rep. Act 875).
Under none of the above definitions may the University be
excluded, especially so if it is considered that every professor, instructor or
teacher in the teaching staff of the University, as per allegation of the
University itself, has a contract with the latter for teaching services, albeit
for one semester only. The University engaged the services of the professors,
provided them work, and paid them compensation or salary for their services.
Even if the University may be considered as a lessee of services under a
contract between it and the members of its Faculty, still it is included in the
term "employer". "Running through the word `employ' is the
thought that there has been an agreement on the part of one person to perform a
certain service in return for compensation to be paid by an employer. When you
ask how a man is employed, or what is his employment, the thought that he is
under agreement to perform some service or services for another is predominant
and paramount." (Ballentine Law Dictionary, Philippine ed., p. 430, citing
Pinkerton National Detective Agency v. Walker, 157 Ga. 548, 35 A. L. R. 557,
560, 122 S.E. Rep. 202).
To bolster its claim of exception from the application of
Republic Act No. 875, the University contends that it is not state that the
employers included in the definition of 2 (c) of the Act. This contention can
not be sustained. In the first place, Sec. 2 (c) of Republic Act No. 875 does
not state that the employers included in the definition of the term
"employer" are only and exclusively "industrial
establishments"; on the contrary, as stated above, the term
"employer" encompasses all employers except those specifically
excluded by the Act. In the second place, even the Act itself does not refer
exclusively to industrial establishments and does not confine its application
thereto. This is patent inasmuch as several provisions of the Act are
applicable to non-industrial workers, such as Sec. 3, which deals with
"employees' right to self-organization"; Sections 4 and 5 which
enumerate unfair labor practices; Section 8 which nullifies private contracts
contravening employee's rights; Section 9 which relates to injunctions in any
case involving a labor dispute; Section 11 which prohibits strikes in the
government; Section 12 which provides for the exclusive collective bargaining
representation for labor organizations; Section 14 which deals with the
procedure for collective bargaining; Section 17 which treats of the rights and
conditions of membership in labor organizations; Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21
which provide respectively for the establishment of conciliation service,
compilation of collective bargaining contracts, advisory labor-management
relations; Section 22 which empowers the Secretary of Labor to make a study of
labor relations; and Section 24 which enumerates the rights of labor
organizations. (See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Concepcion in Boy Scouts of
the Philippines v. Juliana Araos, G.R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958.)
This Court, in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines v.
Araos, supra, had occasion to state that the Industrial Peace Act
"refers only to organizations and entities created and operated for
profits, engaged in a profitable trade, occupation or industry". It cannot
be denied that running a university engages time and attention; that it is an
occupation or a business from which the one engaged in it may derive profit or
gain. The University is not an industrial establishment in the sense that an
industrial establishment is one that is engaged in manufacture or trade where
raw materials are changed or fashioned into finished products for use. But for
the purposes of the Industrial Peace Act the University is an industrial
establishment because it is operated for profit and it employs persons who work
to earn a living. The term "industry", for the purposes of the
application of our labor laws should be given a broad meaning so as to cover
all enterprises which are operated for profit and which engage the services of
persons who work to earn a living.
The word "industry" within State Labor Relations
Act controlling labor relations in industry, cover labor conditions in any
field of employment where the objective is earning a livelihood on the one side
and gaining of a profit on the other. Labor Law Sec. 700 et seq. State Labor
Relations Board vs. McChesney, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 866, 868." (Words and Phrases,
Permanent Edition, Vol. 21, 1960 edition p. 510).
The University urges that even if it were an employer, still
there would be no employer-employee relationship between it and the striking
members of the Faculty Club because the latter are not employees within the
purview of Sec. 2(d) of Republic Act No. 875 but are independent contractors.
This claim is untenable.
Section 2 (d) of Republic Act No. 875 provides:
(d) The term "employee" shall include any employee
and shall not be limited to the employee of a particular employer unless the
act explicitly states otherwise and shall include any individual whose work has
ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice and who has not obtained any other
substantially equivalent and regular employment.
This definition is again, like the definition of the term
"employer" [Sec. 2(c)], by the use of the term "include",
complementary. It embraces
not only those who are usually and ordinarily considered employees, but also
those who have ceased as employees as a consequence of a labor dispute.
The term "employee", furthermore, is not limited to those of a
particular employer. As already stated, this Court in the cases of The Angat
River Irrigation System, et al. v. Angat River Workers' Union (PLUM), et
al., supra, has defined the term "employer" as "one
who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who pays
their wages or salaries. "Correlatively, an employee must be one who is engaged in the service of
another; who performs services for another; who works for salary or wages. It
is admitted by the University that the striking professors and/or instructors
are under contract to teach particular courses and that they are paid for their
services. They are, therefore, employees of the University.
In support of its claim that the members of the Faculty Club
are not employees of the University, the latter cites as authority Francisco's
Labor Laws, 2nd ed., p. 3, which states:
While
the term "workers" as used in a particular statute, has been regarded
as limited to those performing physical labor, it has been held to embrace
stenographers and bookkeepers. Teachers are not included, however.
It is evident from the above-quoted authority that
"teachers" are not to be included among those who perform
"physical labor", but it does not mean that they are not employees.
We have checked the source of the authority, which is 31 Am. Jur., Sec. 3, p.
835, and the latter cites Huntworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash 670, 152 P. 523, Ann Cas
1917 D 676. A reading of the last case confirms Our view.
That teachers are "employees' has been held in a number
of cases (Aebli v. Board of Education of City and County of San Francisco, 145
P. 2d 601, 62 Col. App 2.d 706; Lowe & Campbell Sporting Goods Co. v. Tangipahoa
Parish School Board, La. App., 15 So. 2d 98, 100; Sister Odelia v. Church of
St. Andrew, 263 N. W. 111, 112, 195 Minn. 357, cited in Words and Phrases,
Permanent ed., Vol. 14, pp. 806-807). This Court in the Far Eastern University
case, supra, considered university instructors as employees and
declared Republic Act No. 875 applicable to them in their employment relations
with their school. The professors and/or instructors of the University neither
ceased to be employees when they struck, for Section 2 of Rep. Act 875 includes
among employees any individual whose work has ceased as consequence of, or in
connection with a current labor dispute. Striking employees maintain their
status as employees of the employer. (Western Cartridge Co. v. NLRB, C.C.A. 7,
139 F2d 855, 858).
The contention of the University that the professors and/or
instructors are independent contractors, because the University does not
exercise control over their work, is likewise untenable. This Court takes
judicial notice that a university
controls the work of the members of its faculty; that a university prescribes
the courses or subjects that professors teach, and when and where to teach;
that the professors' work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a
fixed duration; that professors are compensated for their services by wages and
salaries, rather than by profits; that the professors and/or instructors cannot
substitute others to do their work without the consent of the university; and
that the professors can be laid off if their work is found not satisfactory.
All these indicate that the university has control over their work; and
professors are, therefore, employees and not independent contractors.
There are authorities in support of this view.
The principal consideration in determining whether a workman
is an employee or an independent contractor is the right to control the manner
of doing the work, and it is not the actual exercise of the right by
interfering with the work, but the right to control, which constitutes the
test. (Amalgamated Roofing Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 133 N.E. 259, 261, 300
Ill. 487, quoted in Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., Vol. 14, p. 576).
Where, under Employers' Liability Act, A was instructed when
and where to work . . . he is an employee, and not a contractor, though paid
specified sum per square. (Heine v. Hill, Harris & Co., 2 La. App. 384,
390, in Words and Phrases, loc, cit.) .
Employees are those who are compensated for their labor or
services by wages rather than by profits. (People vs. Distributors Division,
Smoked Fish Workers Union Local No. 20377, Sup. 7 N. Y. S. 2d 185, 187 in Words
and Phrases, loc, cit.)
Services of employee or servant, as distinguished from those
of a contractor, are usually characterized by regularity and continuity of work
for a fixed period or one of indefinite duration, as contrasted with employment
to do a single act or a series of isolated acts; by compensation on a fixed
salary rather than one regulated by value or amount of work; . . . (Underwood
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A., 56 F. 2d 67, 71 in Words and
Phrases, op. cit., p. 579.)
Independent contractors can employ others to work and
accomplish contemplated result without consent of contractee, while
"employee" cannot substitute another in his place without consent of
his employer. (Luker Sand & Gravel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 23 P. 2d
225, 82 Utah, 188, in Words and Phrases, Vol. 14, p. 576).
Moreover,
even if university professors are considered independent contractors, still they
would be covered by Rep. Act No. 875. In the case of the Boy Scouts of
the Philippines v. Juliana Araos, supra, this Court observed that
Republic Act No. 875 was modelled after the Wagner Act, or the National Labor
Relations Act, of the United States, and this Act did not exclude
"independent contractors" from the orbit of "employees". It
was in the subsequent legislation — the Labor Management Relation Act
(Taft-Harley
Act) — that "independent contractors" together with agricultural
laborers, individuals in domestic service of the home, supervisors, and others
were excluded. (See Rothenberg on Labor Relations, 1949, pp. 330-331).
It having been shown that the members of the Faculty Club
are employees, it follows that they have a right to unionize in accordance with
the provisions of Section 3 of the Magna Carta of Labor (Republic Act No. 875)
which provides as follows:
Sec. 3. Employees' right to self-organization.—Employees
shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or
protection. . . .
We agree with the statement of the lower court, in its order
of March 30, 1963 which is sought to be set aside in the instant case, that the
right of employees to self-organization is guaranteed by the Constitution, that
said right would exist even if Republic Act No. 875 is repealed, and that
regardless of whether their employers are engaged in commerce or not. Indeed,
it is Our considered view that the members of the faculty or teaching staff of
private universities, colleges, and schools in the Philippines, regardless of
whether the university, college or school is run for profit or not, are
included in the term "employees" as contemplated in Republic Act No.
875 and as such they may organize themselves pursuant to the above-quoted
provision of Section 3 of said Act. Certainly, professors, instructors or teachers of private
educational institutions who teach to earn a living are entitled to the
protection of our labor laws — and one such law is Republic Act No. 875.
The contention of the University in the instant case that
the members of the Faculty Club can not unionize and the Faculty Club can not
exist as a valid labor organization is, therefore, without merit. The record
shows that the Faculty Club is a duly registered labor organization and this
fact is admitted by counsel for the University.5a
The other issue raised by the University is the validity of
the Presidential certification. The University contends that under Section 10
of Republic Act No. 875 the power of the President of the Philippines to
certify is subject to the following conditions, namely: (1) that here is a
labor dispute, and (2) that said labor dispute exists in an industry that is
vital to the national interest. The University maintains that those conditions
do not obtain in the instant case. This contention has also no merit.
We have previously stated that the University is an
establishment or enterprise that is included in the term "industry"
and is covered by the provisions of Republic Act No. 875. Now, was there a
labor dispute between the University and the Faculty Club?
Republic Act No. 875 defines a labor dispute as follows:
The
term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms,
tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether the
disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employees.
The test of whether a controversy comes within the
definition of "labor dispute" depends on whether the controversy
involves or concerns "terms, tenure or condition of employment" or
"representation." It is admitted by the University, in the instant
case, that on January 14, 1963 the President of the Faculty Club wrote to the President
of the University a letter informing the latter of the organization of the
Faculty Club as a labor union, duly registered with the Bureau of Labor
Relations; that again on January 22, 1963 another letter was sent, to which was
attached a list of demands consisting of 26 items, and asking the President of
the University to answer within ten days from date of receipt thereof; that the
University questioned the right of the Faculty Club to be the exclusive
representative of the majority of the employees and asked proof that the
Faculty Club had been designated or selected as exclusive representative by the
vote of the majority of said employees; that on February 1, 1963 the Faculty
Club filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a notice of strike alleging as
reason therefor the refusal of the University to bargain collectively with the
representative of the faculty members; that on February 18, 1963 the members of
the Faculty Club went on strike and established picket lines in the premises of
the University, thereby disrupting the schedule of classes; that on March 1,
1963 the Faculty Club filed Case No. 3666-ULP for unfair labor practice against
the University, but which was later dismissed (on April 2, 1963 after Case
41-IPA was certified to the CIR); and that on March 7, 1963 a petition for
certification election, Case No. 1183-MC, was filed by the Faculty Club in the
CIR.6 All these admitted facts show that the controversy
between the University and the Faculty Club involved terms and conditions of employment,
and the question of representation. Hence, there was a labor dispute between
the University and the Faculty Club, as contemplated by Republic Act No. 875.
It having been shown that the University is an institution operated for profit,
that is an employer, and that there is an employer-employee relationship,
between the University and the members of the Faculty Club, and it having been
shown that a labor dispute existed between the University and the Faculty Club,
the contention of the University, that the certification made by the President
is not only not authorized by Section 10 of Republic Act 875 but is violative
thereof, is groundless.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 provides:
When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines
there exists a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the national
interest and when such labor dispute is certified by the President to the Court
of Industrial Relations, said Court may cause to be issued a restraining order
forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout the employees,
and if no other solution to the dispute is found, the Court may issue an order
fixing the terms and conditions of employment.
This Court had occasion to rule on the application of the
above-quoted provision of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875. In the case
of Pampanga Sugar Development Co. v. CIR, et al., G.R. No.
L-13178, March 24, 1961, it was held:
It thus appears that when in the opinion of the President a
labor dispute exists in an industry indispensable to national interest and he
certifies it to the Court of Industrial Relations the latter acquires
jurisdiction to act thereon in the manner provided by law. Thus the court may
take either of the following courses: it may issue an order forbidding the employees
to strike or the employer to lockout its employees, or, failing in this, it may
issue an order fixing the terms and conditions of employment. It has no other
alternative. It can not throw the case out in the assumption that the
certification was erroneous.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The
fact, however, is that because of the strike declared by the members of the
minority union which threatens a major industry the President deemed it wise to
certify the controversy to the Court of Industrial Relations for
adjudication. This is the power that the law gives to the President the
propriety of its exercise being a matter that only devolves upon him. The same
is not the concern of the industrial court. What matters is that by virtue of
the certification made by the President the case was placed under the
jurisdiction of said court. (Emphasis supplied)
To
certify a labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under
the law, and this Court will not interfere in, much less curtail, the exercise
of that prerogative. The jurisdiction of the CIR in a certified case is
exclusive (Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Rizal Cement Workers Union (FFW),
et al., G.R. No. L-12747, July 30, 1960). Once the jurisdiction is acquired
pursuant to the presidential certification, the CIR may exercise its broad
powers as provided in Commonwealth Act 103. All phases of the labor dispute and
the employer-employee relationship may be threshed out before the CIR, and the
CIR may issue such order or orders as may be necessary to make effective the
exercise of its jurisdiction. The parties involved in the case may appeal to the Supreme Court from
the order or orders thus issued by the CIR.
And so,
in the instant case, when the President took into consideration that the
University "has some 18,000 students and employed approximately 500
faculty members", that `the continued disruption in the operation of the
University will necessarily prejudice the thousand of students", and that
"the dispute affects the national interest",7and certified
the dispute to the CIR, it is not for the CIR nor this Court to pass upon the
correctness of the reasons of the President in certifying the labor dispute to
the CIR.
The third issue raised by the University refers to the
question of the legality of the return-to-work order (of March 30, 1963 in Case
41-IPA) and the order implementing the same (of April 6, 1963). It alleges that
the orders are illegal upon the grounds: (1) that Republic Act No. 875,
supplementing Commonwealth Act No. 103, has withdrawn from the CIR the power to
issue a return-to-work order; (2) that the only power granted by Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 875 to the CIR is to issue an order forbidding the employees
to strike or forbidding the employer to lockout the employees, as the case may
be, before either contingency had become a fait accompli; (3) that
the taking in by the University of replacement professors was valid, and the
return-to-work order of March 30, 1963 constituted impairment of the obligation
of contracts; and (4) the CIR could not issue said order without having
previously determined the legality or illegality of the strike.
The contention of the University that Republic Act No. 875
has withdrawn the power of the Court of Industrial Relations to issue a
return-to-work order exercised by it under Commonwealth Act No. 103 can not be
sustained. When a case is certified by the President to the Court of Industrial
Relations, the case thereby comes under the operation of Commonwealth Act No.
103, and the Court may exercise the broad powers and jurisdiction granted to it
by said Act. Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 875 empowers the Court of Industrial Relations to issue an
order "fixing the terms of employment." This clause is broad enough
to authorize the Court to order the strikers to return to work and the employer
to readmit them. This Court, in the cases of the Philippine
Marine Officers Association vs. The Court of Industrial Relations, Compania
Maritima, et al.; and CompaΓ±ia Martima, et al. vs. Philippine
Marine Radio Officers Association and CIR, et al., G.R. Nos. L-10095 and
L-10115, October 31, 1957, declared:
We cannot subscribe to the above contention. We agree with
counsel for the Philippine Radio Officers' Association that upon certification
by the President under Section 10 of Republic Act 875, the case comes under the
operation of Commonwealth Act 103, which enforces compulsory arbitration in
cases of labor disputes in industries indispensable to the national interest
when the President certifies the case to the Court of Industrial Relations. The
evident intention of the law is to empower the Court of Industrial Relations to
act in such cases, not only in the manner prescribed under Commonwealth Act
103, but with the same broad powers and jurisdiction granted by that act. If
the Court of Industrial Relations is granted authority to find a solution to an
industrial dispute and such solution consists in the ordering of employees to
return back to work, it cannot be contended that the Court of Industrial
Relations does not have the power or jurisdiction to carry that solution into
effect. And of what use is its power of conciliation and arbitration if it does
not have the power and jurisdiction to carry into effect the solution it has
adopted? Lastly, if the said court has the power to fix the terms and
conditions of employment, it certainly can order the return of the workers with
or without backpay as a term or condition of employment.
The foregoing ruling was reiterated by this Court in the
case of Hind Sugar Co. v. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-13364, July
26, 1960.
When a case is certified to the CIR by the President of the
Philippines pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875, the CIR is granted
authority to find a solution to the industrial dispute; and the solution which
the CIR has found under the authority of the presidential certification and
conformable thereto cannot be questioned (Radio Operators Association of the
Philippines vs. Philippine Marine Radio Officers Association, et al., L-10112,
Nov. 29, 1957, 54 O.G. 3218).
Untenable also is the claim of the University that the CIR
cannot issue a return-to-work order after strike has been declared, it being
contended that under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 the CIR can only
prevent a strike or a lockout — when either of this situation had not yet
occurred. But in the case of Bisaya Land Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., No. L-10114, Nov. 26, 1957, 50 O.G. 2518, this
Court declared:
There is no reason or ground for the contention that
Presidential certification of labor dispute to the CIR is limited to the
prevention of strikes and lockouts. Even after a strike has been declared where
the President believes that public interest demands arbitration and
conciliation, the President may certify the ease for that purpose. The practice
has been for the Court of Industrial Relations to order the strikers to work, pending
the determination of the union demands that impelled the strike. There is
nothing in the law to indicate that this practice is abolished." (Emphasis
supplied)
Likewise untenable is the contention of the University that
the taking in by it of replacements was valid and the return-to-work order
would be an impairment of its contract with the replacements. As stated by the
CIR in its order of March 30, 1963, it was agreed before the hearing of Case
41-IPA on March 23, 1963 that the strikers would return to work under the status
quo arrangement and the University would readmit them, and the
return-to-work order was a confirmation of that agreement. This is a
declaration of fact by the CIR which we cannot disregard. The faculty members,
by striking, have not abandoned their employment but, rather, they have only
ceased from their labor (Keith Theatre v. Vachon et al., 187 A. 692). The
striking faculty members have not lost their right to go back to their
positions, because the declaration of a strike is not a renunciation of their
employment and their employee relationship with the University (Rex Taxicab Co.
vs. CIR, et al., 40 O.G., No. 13, 138). The employment of replacements was not
authorized by the CIR. At most, that was a temporary expedient resorted to by
the University, which was subject to the power of the CIR to allow to continue
or not. The employment of replacements by the University prior to the issuance
of the order of March 30, 1963 did not vest in the replacements a permanent
right to the positions they held. Neither could such temporary employment bind
the University to retain permanently the replacements.
Striking employees maintained their status as employees of
the employer (Western Castridge Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, C.C.A.
139 F. 2d 855, 858) ; that employees who took the place of strikers do not
displace them as `employees." ' (National Labor Relations Board v. A.
Sartorius & Co., C.C.A. 2, 140 F. 2d 203, 206, 207.)
It is
clear from what has been said that the return-to-work order cannot be
considered as an impairment of the contract entered into by petitioner with the
replacements. Besides, labor contracts must yield to the common good and such
contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and similar subjects (Article 1700, Civil Code).
Likewise unsustainable is the contention of the University
that the Court of Industrial Relations could not issue the return-to-work order
without having resolved previously the issue of the legality or illegality of
the strike, citing as authority therefor the case of Philippine Can
Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-3021, July 13, 1950.
The ruling in said case is not applicable to the case at bar, the facts and
circumstances being very different. The Philippine Can Company case, unlike the
instant case, did not involve the national interest and it was not certified by
the President. In that case the company no longer needed the services of the
strikers, nor did it need substitutes for the strikers, because the company was
losing, and it was imperative that it lay off such laborers as were not
necessary for its operation in order to save the company from bankruptcy. This
was the reason of this Court in ruling, in that case, that the legality or
illegality of the strike should have been decided first before the issuance of
the return-to-work order. The University, in the case before Us, does not claim
that it no longer needs the services of professors and/or instructors; neither
does it claim that it was imperative for it to lay off the striking professors
and instructors because of impending bankruptcy. On the contrary, it was
imperative for the University to hire replacements for the strikers. Therefore,
the ruling in the Philippine Can case that the legality of the strike should be
decided first before the issuance of the return-to-work order does not apply to
the case at bar. Besides, as We have adverted to, the return-to-work order of
March 30, 1963, now in question, was a confirmation of an agreement between the
University and the Faculty Club during a prehearing conference on March 23,
1963.
The University also maintains that there was no more basis
for the claim of the members of the Faculty Club to return to their work, as
their individual contracts for teaching had expired on March 25 or 31, 1963, as
the case may be, and consequently, there was also no basis for the
return-to-work order of the CIR because the contractual relationships having
ceased there were no positions to which the members of the Faculty Club could
return to. This contention is not well taken. This argument loses sight of the
fact that when the professors and instructors struck on February 18, 1963, they
continued to be employees of the University for the purposes of the labor
controversy notwithstanding the subsequent termination of their teaching
contracts, for Section 2(d) of the Industrial Peace Act includes among
employees "any individual whose work has ceased a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or of any unfair labor practice and
who has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment."
The question raised by the University was resolved in a
similar case in the United States. In the case of Rapid Roller Co. v. NLRB 126
F. 2d 452, we read:
On May 9, 1939 the striking employees, eighty-four in
number, offered to the company to return to their employment. The company
believing it had not committed any unfair labor practice, refused the
employees' offer and claimed the right to employ others to take the place of
the strikers, as it might see fit. This constituted discrimination in the hiring
and tenure of the striking employees. When the employees went out on a strike
because of the unfair labor practice of the company, their status as employees
for the purpose of any controversy growing out of that unfair labor practice
was fixed. Sec. 2 (3) of the Act. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 61 S. Ct. 845, 85. L. ed. 1271, 133 A.L.R. 1217.
For the purpose of such controversy they remained employees
of the company. The company contended that they could not be their employees in
any event since the "contract of their employment expired by its own terms
on April 23, 1939."
In this we think the company is mistaken for the reason we
have just pointed out, that the status of the employees on strike became fixed
under Sec. 2 (3) of the Act because of the unfair labor practice of the company
which caused the strike.
The University, furthermore, claims that the information for
indirect contempt filed against the officers of the University (Case No. V-30)
as well as the order of April 29, 1963 for their arrest were improper,
irregular and illegal because (1) the officers of the University had complied
in good faith with the return-to-work order and in those cases that they did
not, it was due to circumstance beyond their control; (2) the return-to-work
order and the order implementing the same were illegal; and (3) even assuming
that the order was legal, the same was not Yet final because there was a motion
to reconsider it.
Again We find no merit in this claim of Petitioner. We have
already ruled that the CIR had jurisdiction to issue the order of March 30,
1963 in CIR Case 41-IPA, and the return-to-work provision of that order is
valid and legal. Necessarily the order of April 6, 1963 implementing that order
of March 30, 1963 was also valid and legal.
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 empowers the Court of
Industrial Relations of any Judge thereof to punish direct and indirect
contempts as provided in Rule 64 (now Rule 71) of the Rules of Court, under the
same procedure and penalties provided therein. Section 3 of Rule 71 enumerates
the acts which would constitute indirect contempt, among which is
"disobedience or resistance to lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
command of a court," and the person guilty thereof can be punished after a
written charge has been filed and the accused has been given an opportunity to
be heard. The last paragraph of said section provides:
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to
prevent the court from issuing process to bring the accused party into court,
or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
The provision authorizes the judge to order the arrest of an
alleged contemner (Francisco, et al. v. Enriquez, L-7058, March 20, 1954, 94
Phil., 603) and this, apparently, is the provision upon which respondent Judge
Bautista relied when he issued the questioned order of arrest.
The contention of petitioner that the order of arrest is
illegal is unwarranted. The return-to-work order allegedly violated was within
the court's jurisdiction to issue.
Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 provides that in
cases brought before the Court of Industrial Relations under Section 4 of the
Act (referring to strikes and lockouts) the appeal to the Supreme Court from
any award, order or decision shall not stay the execution of said award, order
or decision sought to be reviewed unless for special reason the court shall
order that execution be stayed. Any award, order or decision that is appealed
is necessarily not final. Yet under Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 that
award, order or decision, even if not yet final, is executory, and the stay of
execution is discretionary with the Court of Industrial Relations. In other
words, the Court of Industrial Relations, in cases involving strikes and
lockouts, may compel compliance or obedience of its award, order or decision
even if the award, order or decision is not yet final because it is appealed,
and it follows that any disobedience or non-compliance of the award, order or
decision would constitute contempt against the Court of Industrial Relations
which the court may punish as provided in the Rules of Court. This power of the
Court of Industrial Relations to punish for contempt an act of non-compliance
or disobedience of an award, order or decision, even if not yet final, is a
special one and is exercised only in cases involving strikes and lockouts. And
there is reason for this special power of the industrial court because in the
exercise of its jurisdiction over cases involving strikes and lockouts the
court has to issue orders or make decisions that are necessary to effect a
prompt solution of the labor dispute that caused the strike or the lockout, or
to effect the prompt creation of a situation that would be most beneficial to
the management and the employees, and also to the public — even if the solution
may be temporary, pending the final determination of the case. Otherwise, if
the effectiveness of any order, award, or decision of the industrial court in
cases involving strikes and lockouts would be suspended pending appeal then it
can happen that the coercive powers of the industrial court in the settlement
of the labor disputes in those cases would be rendered useless and nugatory.
The University points to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No.
103 which provides that "Any violation of any order, award, or decision of
the Court of Industrial Relations shall after such order, award or decision has
become final, conclusive and executory constitute contempt of
court," and contends that only the disobedience of orders that are final
(meaning one that is not appealed) may be the subject of contempt proceedings.
We believe that there is no inconsistency between the above-quoted provision of
Section 6 and the provision of Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103. It will
be noted that Section 6 speaks of order, award or decision that is executory.
By the provision of Section 14 an order, award or decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations in cases involving strikes and lockouts are immediately executory,
so that a violation of that order would constitute an indirect contempt of
court.
We believe that the action of the CIR in issuing the order
of arrest of April 29, 1963 is also authorized under Section 19 of Commonwealth
Act No. 103 which provides as follows:
SEC. 19. Implied condition in every contract of
employment.—In every contract of employment whether verbal or written, it
is an implied condition that when any dispute between the employer and the
employee or laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for
settlement or arbitration pursuant to the provisions of this Act . . . and
pending award, or decision by the Court of such dispute . . . the employee or
laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so enjoined by the
Court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already
done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the Court, which
shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the
dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled; and if the
employees or laborers fail to return to work, the Court may authorize the
employer to accept other employees or laborers. A condition shall further be
implied that while such dispute . . . is pending, the employer shall refrain
from accepting other employees or laborers, unless with the express authority
of the Court, and shall permit the continuation in the service of his employees
or laborers under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute
arose. . . . A violation by the employer or by the employee or laborer of such
an order or the implied contractual condition set forth in this section shall
constitute contempt of the Court of Industrial Relations and shall be punished
by the Court itself in the same manner with the same penalties as in the case
of contempt of a Court of First Instance. . . .
We hold that the CIR acted within its jurisdiction when it
ordered the arrest of the officers of the University upon a complaint for
indirect contempt filed by the Acting Special Prosecutor of the CIR in CIR Case
V-30, and that order was valid. Besides those ordered arrested were not yet
being punished for contempt; but, having been charged, they were simply ordered
arrested to be brought before the Judge to be dealt with according to law.
Whether they are guilty of the charge or not is yet to be determined in a
proper hearing.
Let it be noted that the order of arrest dated April 29,
1963 in CIR Case V-30 is being questioned in Case G.R. No. L-21278 before this
Court in a special civil action for certiorari. The University did
not appeal from that order. In other words, the only question to be resolved in
connection with that order in CIR Case V-30 is whether the CIR had jurisdiction,
or had abused its discretion, in issuing that order. We hold that the CIR had
jurisdiction to issue that order, and neither did it abuse its discretion when
it issued that order.
In Case G.R. No. L-21462 the University appealed from the
order of Judge Villanueva of the CIR in Case No. 1183-MC, dated April 6, 1963,
granting the motion of the Faculty Club to withdraw its petition for
certification election, and from the resolution of the CIR en banc,
dated June 5, 1963, denying the motion to reconsider said order of April 6,
1963. The ground of the Faculty Club in asking for the withdrawal of that
petition for certification election was because the issues involved in that
petition were absorbed by the issues in Case 41-IPA. The University opposed the
petition for withdrawal, but at the same time it moved for the dismissal of the
petition for certification election.
It is contended by the University before this Court, in G.R.
L-21462, that the issues of employer-employee relationship between the
University and the Faculty Club, the alleged status of the Faculty Club as a
labor union, its majority representation and designation as bargaining
representative in an appropriate unit of the Faculty Club should have been
resolved first in Case No. 1183-MC prior to the determination of the issues in
Case No. 41-IPA, and, therefore, the motion to withdraw the petition for
certification election should not have been granted upon the ground that the
issues in the first case were absorbed in the second case.
We believe that these contentions of the University in Case
G.R. No. L-21462 have been sufficiently covered by the discussion in this
decision of the main issues raised in the principal case, which is Case G.R.
No. L-21278. After all, the University wanted CIR Case 1183-MC dismissed, and
the withdrawal of the petition for certification election had in a way produced
the situation desired by the University. After considering the arguments
adduced by the University in support of its petition for certiorari by
way of appeal in Case G.R. No. L-21278, We hold that the CIR did not commit any
error when it granted the withdrawal of the petition for certification election
in Case No. 1183-MC. The principal case before the CIR is Case No. 41-IPA and
all the questions relating to the labor disputes between the University and the
Faculty Club may be threshed out, and decided, in that case.
In Case G.R. No. L-21500 the University appealed from the
order of the CIR of March 30, 1963, issued by Judge Bautista, and from the
resolution of the CIR en banc promulgated on June 28, 1963,
denying the motion for the reconsideration of that order of March 30, 1963, in
CIR Case No. 41-IPA. We have already ruled that the CIR has jurisdiction to
issue that order of March 30, 1963, and that order is valid, and We, therefore,
hold that the CIR did not err in issuing that order of March 30, 1963 and in
issuing the resolution promulgated on June 28, 1963 (although dated May 7,
1963) denying the motion to reconsider that order of March 30, 1963.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction in Case G.R. No. L-21278 is dismissed and
the writs prayed for therein are denied. The writ of preliminary injunction
issued in Case G.R. No. L-21278 is dissolved. The orders and resolutions
appealed from, in Cases Nos. L-21462 and L-21500, are affirmed, with costs in
these three cases against the petitioner-appellant Feati University. It is so
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs but reserves his vote
on the teacher's right to strike.
