SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
Eduardo P. Manuel v. People of the philippines
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is
a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in
Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was
charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the
said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA
GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the existence of the
first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].
CONTRARY
TO LAW. [3]
The
prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in
Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of
Rizal.[4] He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in
Dagupan City sometime in January 1996.
She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to
Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where,
despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several
occasions, assuring her that he was single.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents,
and was assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina
finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes,
the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.[5] It appeared in their marriage contract that
Eduardo was “single.”
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married
life. Through their joint efforts, they
were able to build their
home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and
went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would
slap her.[6] Sometime in January 2001,
Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been
previously married. She secured
an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.[7] She was so embarrassed and humiliated when
she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their
own vows.[8]
For his
part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she
worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO).
He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to
Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until
this one time when he noticed that she had a “love-bite” on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further
testified that he declared he was “single” in his marriage contract with Tina
because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo
further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she
threatened to commit suicide unless he did so.
Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and
never saw her again. He insisted that he
married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he
had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial,
the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy. He was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of
from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as
maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the
amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.[9]
The trial
court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all
the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been
dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not
exculpate him from liability for bigamy.
Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,[10] the trial court
further ruled that even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had
been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for
bigamy.
Eduardo
appealed the decision to the CA.
He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he
married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he
married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first
marriage no longer subsisted. He
insisted that conformably to Article
3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally
liable for a felony. He was not
motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only
out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have
taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the
appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. Peñalosa[11] and
Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.[12]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that
Eduardo’s defense of good faith and reliance on the Court’s ruling in United
States v. Enriquez[13] were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the
Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic
v. Nolasco,[14] the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the
Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was
void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves the
nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for
resolution. Moreover, the OSG
maintained, the private complainant’s knowledge of the first marriage would not
afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State and not just
against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty
imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the
decision appealed from with modification.
On June 18,
2004, the CA rendered
judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty
of the accused. It ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code
should apply. Before Manuel could
lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial
declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this
Court in Mercado v. Tan[15] and Domingo v. Court of Appeals[16] to support its
ruling. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision
promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that
accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari, insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN
IT RULED THAT PETITIONER’S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER
ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF
PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN
IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN
FACT AND IN LAW.[18]
The
petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of
the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
under the Civil Code. He avers that when
he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been “absent” for 21 years since 1975;
under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of
law. He points out that, under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven
years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all
purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule
on legal presumption of death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the
absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of two
requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable belief
that the absentee is dead. He insists
that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975
and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive;
hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had
arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil
Code are present. The petitioner
concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of
absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on
legal presumptions remains valid and effective.
Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there
must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive
death would apply. He further asserts
that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement
of a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second
marriage.
The
petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding
moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The private complainant was a “GRO” before he
married her, and even knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and
gave her financial support. He also
pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought
to their house.
In its
comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA
affirming the petitioner’s conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence
and the evidence on record. To bolster
its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[19]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty
of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second
or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The
provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que
contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legítimamente disuelto el
anterior, será castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is
considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.[20] The phrase “or before the absent spouse had been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings” was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of
the law were of the impression that “in consonance with the civil law which
provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years,
the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be
a justification for bigamy.”[21]
For the accused to be held
guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she
has been legally married; and (b)
he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been
lawfully dissolved. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.[22] It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy
that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would
be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.[23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime
is that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent
(intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony by
dolo.[24] On the other hand, Cuello
Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence
of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of
a second marriage. It does not matter
whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have
juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent
jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled in
Domingo v. Court of Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the Family Code
of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that there
are three (3) elements of bigamy:
(1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent
intention constituting the felony of the act.[28] He explained that:
… This
last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly
incorporated in the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of
the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is
no crime. There is no willfulness if the
subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and
this must be supported by very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the
act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime.
Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and
well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many years that
have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his
endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because
there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the
crime.[29]
As gleaned
from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a
felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a
felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed
voluntary.[30] Although the words “with
malice” do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is
included in the word “voluntary.”[31]
Malice
is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without
legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have
been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been
intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a
legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable
consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and
such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a
consideration of the whole evidence.[34]
For one to be criminally liable
for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an
evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea.[35]
In the
present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in
1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the
marriage is presumed to subsist.[36] The
prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in
1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil
intent when he married the private complainant.
As a general rule,
mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal
intent. However, ignorance of the law is
not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was
the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the
private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that
his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20
years since 1975. He should have adduced
in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of
his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and
would negate criminal intent on his
part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could
not be held guilty of bigamy in such case.
The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase “or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings” in
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or
useless words. The requirement for a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of
the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a
second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of
bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found
incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the
benefit of the State. Under Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution, the “State shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution.” Marriage is a social institution of the
highest importance. Public policy, good
morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation should be
surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed
and the causes specified by law.[37] The
laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety,
good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can
waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society
by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the
welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil
marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations
to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and
death. The consequences of an invalid
marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious
that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the
most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death
of the absent spouse[38] after the lapse of the period provided for under the
law. One such means is the requirement
of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a
well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, “men readily believe what they wish
to be true,” is a maxim of the old jurists.
To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the
parties believed the other to be dead would make the existence of the marital
relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of
forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals.[39] Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved
as to permit second marriages.[40] Thus,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage
dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain
objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance,[41] namely, a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioner’s sole
reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy
is misplaced.
Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –
Art.
390. After an absence of seven years, it
being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The
absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession
till after an absence of ten years. If
he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on
board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in
the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four
years;
(3) A person who
has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent
for seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is
created by law and arises without
any necessity of judicial declaration.[42] However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the
foregoing rules on
presumptive death, reads:
Art.
41. A marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the
purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[43]
With
the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the period of seven years under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive
years. Thus, before the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee
spouse,[45] without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee
spouse. As explained by this
Court in Armas v. Calisterio:[46]
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a
subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the
following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting
party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the
Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is,
unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the
Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the
requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse
present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one
charged with bigamy. Such provision was
designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and
put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of
eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v.
Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is not necessary to
have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage.
It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been absent
for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse
present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.[48] In In Re Szatraw,[49] the Court declared that
a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or she had
been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only,
subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final;
and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard from
in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined. The
Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead
because he or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final
and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an
appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains
subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its
valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless
act.[50] The Court also took note that a
petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even
be made in collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the Court
declared that the words “proper proceedings” in Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration or settlement of the
estate of a deceased person. In Gue v.
Republic of the Philippines,[52] the Court rejected the contention of the
petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are
authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of
seven years. The Court reiterated its
rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that
“the provision of Article 349 or “before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings” is
erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes
that, if the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first
spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings,
the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He
maintains that the supposition is not true.[53]
A second marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs
1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present.[54] Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was,
likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of
dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a
second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not
illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to bigamy.[55] Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other
hand, was of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged
and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.[56]
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the
amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the
requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only
after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse
to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to
adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead.[57] Such judgment is proof
of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage;
thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee
spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy:
… Such
rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing
that the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death
of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she
marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides
that for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or
she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration
of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s
reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a
criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code
because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively
dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is
already established.[58]
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now
Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive
death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The
present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in
trial will not be followed. Affidavits
will suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge
finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as
presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of
authority is that the clause “before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead x x x” should be disregarded because of Article 83,
paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the
new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration
of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.[59]
According to
Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on
Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead,
there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could then be
made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.[60] Before such declaration, it was held that the
remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good faith.[61] Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary
views because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the
Civil Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of
the Family Code, “which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry.”
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a
declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of
the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.[62]
On the
second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for
awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages
may be awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The
petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in
People v. Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy was
disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant
failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private
complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy
is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it
is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not
bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se
debió indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Código Civil de Filipinas
autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto,
violación, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta
enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe,
por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aquí los daños de P5,000.00 arriba
mencionados.[64]
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are
based on the evidence and the law. The
OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v.
Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or
omission.[65] An award for moral damages
requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury,
whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third,
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the claimant; and
fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[66]
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party
only in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7
of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:
Art.
2219. Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal
offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction,
abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or
concubinage;
(5) Illegal or
arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander
or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious
prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned
in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the
female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and
sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order
named.
Thus, the
law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the
aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been
any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219[67] and analogous
cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds
to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion,
relation, etc.)[68]
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay
moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the
private complainant for moral
damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code.
According to Article 19, “every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.” This provision contains what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but
also in the performance of one’s duties.
The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his
due; and observe honesty and good faith.
The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or
duty; (b) exercised in bad faith;
and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[69]
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other
provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible.[70] If
the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be
proper. Article 20 provides that “every
person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another
shall indemnify the latter for the same.”
On the other hand, Article 21 provides that “any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.” The latter provision
is adopted to remedy “the countless gaps in the statutes
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human
foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes.” Whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of
the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the
circumstances of each case.[71]
In the
present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to
marry her. He assured her that he was
single. He even brought his parents to
the house of the private complainant where he and his parents made the same
assurance – that he was single. Thus,
the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the
certificate of marriage that he was single.
She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his
wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or
so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had
no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioner’s chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a
single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of
being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman,
lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have
married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man
who it turned out was not her lawful husband.[72]
The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of
fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private
complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
latter. That she did not sustain any
physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,[73] the New
Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that,
absent physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish
are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper &
James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the
authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than
negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate
consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental
anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery
Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953);
Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the
defendant’s conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously
wrongful. It was bound to result in
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result
did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but also to
punitive damages. See Spiegel v.
Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24,
supra. CF. Note, “Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts,” 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517
(1957). The plaintiff testified that
because of the defendant’s bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity
she not only was embarrassed and “ashamed to go out” but “couldn’t sleep” but
“couldn’t eat,” had terrific headaches” and “lost quite a lot of weight.” No just basis appears for judicial
interference with the jury’s reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on
the first count. See Cabakov v.
Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.[74] 1955).
The Court
thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the
family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general
welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of
the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy
would not prevent her from recovery. As
held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:[75]
Where a
person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act
which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither
illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of
action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in
consequence of his having done such act.
Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816.
In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the
court said that a false representation by the defendant that he was divorced
from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her
a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to
have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law
or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the
action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in
her being led by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to
one who was not her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition
that proved to be false and ignominious.
Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v.
Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of
action upon any transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendant’s
misrepresentation. The criminal
relations which followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the
incidental results of the defendant’s fraud for which damages may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to
enter into the marriage relation have been maintained in other
jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150
Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash.
626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v.
Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411.
Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the
circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude,
that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendant’s
misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself.
Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has
refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or
to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act
upon which the cause of action is founded.
Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R.
958.[76]
Considering
the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of
P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
