ARTEMIO
G. ILANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO, represented by her
mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
Ernesto
P. Pangalangan for petitioner.
Eduardo
S. Rodriguez for private respondent.
NOCON,
J.:
After
the great flood, man was commanded to go forth, be fertile, multiply and fill
the earth. Others did not heed the sequence of this command because they
multiply first and then go. Corollarily, it is now commonplace for an abandoned
illegitimate offspring to sue his father for recognition and support.
The
antecedent facts are narrated in the trial court's decision, as follows:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G.
Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients
of
Atty. Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took lunch together. In
less that a year's time, she resigned from her work.
Sometime
in 1957, Leoncia, then
managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again who
was engaged in the same business and they renewed acquaintances. Since then, he
would give her his unsold allocation of goods. Later, he courted her more than
four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of
marriage, they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962. They stayed at
La Mesa Apartment, located behind the Filipinas Telephone Company branch
office, of which he is the president and general manager. He came home to her
three or four times a week.
The
apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the Filipinas
Telephone Company branch office. He also took care of the marketing and paid
rentals, lights and water bills. 1 Unable to speak the local
dialect, Leoncia was provided also by Melencio with a maid by the name of Nena.
Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month for their expenses at home.
In
June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner
and they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she
delivered a still-born female child at the Manila Sanitarium. The death
certificate was signed by petitioner. 2 Thereafter, while they were living at
Highway 54, Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born on December
30, 1963 also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano,
child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano.
3 Leoncia submitted receipts issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show
that she was confined there from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under
the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano. 4
The
support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was sometimes in the form of
cash personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia)
5 or thru Merceditas herself; 6 and sometimes in
the form of a check like Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532, 7
the signature appearing thereon having been identified by Leoncia as that
of petitioner because he often gives her checks which he issues at home and saw
him sign the checks. 8 Both petitioner and his daughter
admitted that the check and the signature are those of the former. 9
During the time that petitioner and
Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St.
Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth
grading periods 10 as her parent. Those signatures
were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because he signed them in their
residence in their presence and of Elynia. 11 Since
Merceditas started to have discernment, he was already the one whom she
recognized as her Daddy. 12 He treated her as a father would
to his child. He would bring home candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys.
He would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to
sleep. 13
When
petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he gave
Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best
regards, Temiong." 14
In
May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and
petitioner. She accompanied her aunt when she started having labor pains in the
morning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the
afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still
unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse sought the information. Inasmuch as it was already past
seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following
morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth
certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following
morning.
Prior
to the birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompany her aunt and sometimes
with petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal
check-up. At times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila, upon his instructions to get money as support and sometimes he would
send notes of explanation if he cannot come which she in turn gave to her aunt.
15 They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966
before they finally transferred to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived with
them up to June, 1971 when he stopped coming home.
Petitioner's
defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with Leoncia and
Merceditas. He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures opposite column
16 of the death certificate of a female child surnamed Ilano, although in
column 13 thereof opposite father's name the typewritten name, Artemio G.
Ilano, appears. He also denied the following: all the notes alleged to have
been received from him by Elynia for delivery to Leoncia; the signatures
appearing in Merceditas' Report Card; and being the source of a photo of
himself with a handwritten dedication. He admitted that Manila Banking
Corporation Check No. 81532 including the signature is his. He was sick on
December 30, 1963 and was hospitalized on January 7, 1964. 16 He
does not understand why this case was filed against him. 17
Melencio
admitted that he was the one who procured the apartment for Leoncia, leased it
in his name, paid the rentals and bought the necessities therefor. He and
Leoncia lived together and shared the same bed. They later transferred to San
Juan St., Pasay City and to Highway 54, Makati. He stopped visiting her in
March or April, 1963 because he planned to get married with another which he
eventually did in September, 1963.
Diosdado
Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the apartment fishes ordered by
Melencio which were received by Leoncia.
Nilda
Ilano Ramos, daughter of petitioner, does not know Leoncia; neither has she
been brought to their family home in Imus, Cavite. On December 30, 1963, her
father was at their home because he got sick on December 25, 1963 and was
advised to have a complete bed rest. Her father was hospitalized on January 7,
1964. She denied that her father was at the Manila Sanitarium on December 30,
1963; that he fetched a certain woman on January 2, 1964, at the Manila
Sanitarium because he was at their home at that time; and that her father lived
with a certain woman in 1963 up to June, 1971 because all this time he was
living with them in Imus, Cavite. He was working and reporting to the office
everyday and when he goes to Guagua or Manila on business, her mother or
brother goes with him.
Victoria
J. Ilano, petitioner's wife, further corroborated the previous testimonies
about petitioner's sickness on December 30, 1963 and hospitalization on January
7, 1964. It could not be true that her husband, during the years 1963 to 1968,
lived three (3) times a week with a certain Leoncia de los Santos because her
husband never slept out of their house and that in his capacity as President
and Chairman of the Board of the Filipinas Telephone Company he does not go to
Guagua even once a year because they have a branch manager, Melencio Reyes.
After
weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the trial
court was not fully satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merceditas, on
the basis of the following:
1)
petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation during the period of
Merceditas' conception;
2)
testimony of Melencio that he frequented the apartment where Leoncia was
living, took care of all the bills and shared the same bed with her;
3)
the birth certificate of Merceditas was not signed by petitioner;
4)
petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of Merceditas; and
5)
there is no clear and sufficient showing that support was given by petitioner
to Merceditas.
Thus
it rendered judgment on
April 24, 1981 dismissing the complaint. 18
Fortunately
for private respondent, respondent Court of Appeals did not share the same view
as the trial court. A review of the testimonial and documentary evidenced
adduced by private respondent led respondent court to the firm conclusion that
petitioner is her father, entitling her to support. The dispositive portion of
its decision dated December 17, 1991 reads:
WHEREFORE,
the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS
S. ILANO as the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of
defendant ARTEMIO G. ILANO with all the right appurtenant to such status.
Defendant
is directed to pay the plaintiff support in arrears at the rate of EIGHT
HUNDRED (P800.00) PESOS a month from the date of the filing of the complaint on
August 16, 1972 up to August 15, 1975; ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS a month
from August 16, 1975 to August 15, 1978; ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (P1,300.00)
PESOS a month from August 16, 1978 to August 15, 1981; and ONE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (P1,500.00) a month from August 16, 1981 up to the time she reached the
age of majority on December 30, 1984.
Defendant
is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's
fees plus the costs.
SO
ORDERED. 19
The
motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution dated February 26,
1992. 20
Hence,
the present petition.
We
shall resolve the following pertinent errors allegedly committed by respondent
court:
1)
in awarding "back support" even in the absence of recognition or of a
judgment declaring petitioner father of Merceditas with finality;
2)
in not ruling that an adulterous child cannot file an action for recognition;
and
3)
in deciding matters of substance manifestly against established decisions of
this Court.
Petitioner
argues that since the complaint against him has been dismissed by the trial
court, therefore was absolutely no obligation on his part to give support to
Merceditas. It would have been only from the date of the judgment of the trial
court that support should have commenced, if so granted. Under the law in force
when the complaint was filed, an adulterous child cannot maintain an action for
compulsory recognition. In order that the birth certificate may constitute a
voluntary recognition, it must be signed by the father. Equivocal act, such as
signing under the caption "parent" in the report card, is not
sufficient. Merceditas has never been to the family home of petitioner at Imus,
Cavite; nor introduced to his family; nor brought around town by him, treated
as his child, introduced to other people as his child, led people to believe
that she was part of his family.
The
petition utterly lacks merit.
Under the then prevailing provisions of
the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out
of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether
actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who,
at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment
to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil Code)
and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on
account of certain legal impediments. 21 Since petitioner had
a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived,
22 she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code
provides that illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with
Article 269 23 and other than natural children by legal
fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in
the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to them because the
transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not be
visited upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should
help them to surmount the disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of
their parents. 24 However, before Article 287 can be availed
of, there must first be a recognition of paternity 25 either
voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal principle that an
unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights from his parents
or to their estate because his rights spring not from the filiation or blood
relationship but from his acknowledgment by the parent. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child
arose not because he was the true or real child of his parents but because
under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child.
26 The relevant law on the matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
Art.
283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the
child as his natural child:
(1)
In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2)
When the child is in continuos possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3)
When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4)
When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
While
the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father to
recognize the child as his natural child, for the purpose of the present
case, petitioner is obliged to recognize Merceditas as his spurious
child. This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 289 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Art.
289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other illegitimate)
children . . . under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284.
In
reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent court found, as it is
likewise our finding, that private respondent's evidence to establish her
filiation with and the paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be
ignored or brushed aside by the highly improbable and fatally flawed testimony
of Melencio and the inherently weak denials of petitioner:
Significantly,
the Court a quo believed that plaintiff's mother and defendant carried
an intimate relations. It nonetheless was not satisfied that defendant is the
father of the plaintiff because it is not convinced that her mother and
defendant were in cohabitation during the period of her conception, and took
into account the testimony of Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the apartment
where Leoncia de los Santos was living and who positively testified that he
took care of all the bills and that he shared the same bed with plaintiffs mother.
The
court a quo completely ignored the fact that the apartment at Guagua was
rented by the defendant, and that Melencio Reyes, who was a mere employee and
godson of the defendant with a monthly salary of P560.00 was a mere subaltern
of the latter, and only frequented the place upon instruction of the defendant
to take care of the needs of the plaintiff.
As
pointed out by appellant, Leoncia and Artemio stayed in an apartment at the
back of the Guagua Telephone System owned by and of which Artemio was the
General Manager (TSN, p. 46, 8/18/73) and Melencio was the Officer-in-Charge in
the absence of Artemio whose residence and main office was in Cavite. There,
for the first time, Leoncia met Melencio (TSN, pp. 3-4, 1/25/74). The apartment
in Guagua was rented in the name of Melencio. As Leoncia does not speak the
Pampango dialect (TSN, p. 50, 8/18/73), Artemio gave Leoncia the instruction to
call upon Melencio for whatever Leoncia needs (TSN, pp. 11-12, 1/25/74). Thus,
it was Melencio who procured all the supplies and services needed in the
apartment for which procurement Melencio gives to Leoncia the corresponding
receipts of payment for liquidation of cash advances Artemio or the Guagua
Telephone System or Leoncia herself, gives to Melencio (Exhs. A, A-1 to 14;
TSN, p. 32, 8/13/73; TSN, pp. 7, 12 and 14, 1/25/74).
At
the Guagua apartment, Artemio would visit Leoncia three of four times a week
and sleeps there (TSN, p. 47, 8/13/73). Artemio was giving Leoncia an allowance
of P700.00 a month (TSN, p. 38, 7/18/73).
Leoncia
got pregnant and Artemio found it difficult to commute between Cavite and
Guagua so that in June 1962, Artemio transferred Leoncia to Calle San Juan,
Pasay City (TSN, pp. 19-20, 7/18/73) where they were known as husband and wife
(id. p. 41). In leaving Guagua for San Juan, Pasay City, Leoncia was
fetched by Artemio in a car driven by Artemio himself. (pp. 9-11, Appellant's
Brief)
Even
as Artemio and Leoncia lived and transferred to several places heretofore
mentioned, Melencio continued to be a trusted man Friday of Artemio who would
deliver notes (Exhs. "F", "F-1" and "F-3") and
money from Artemio to Leoncia. For reference, among the notes identified by
Leoncia as having come from defendant were the following:
Exh.
"F-1"
"Dear
Ne,
Magsimula
akong makausap ni Gracing ay nagkaroon ako ng diferencia sa paa at ngayon ay
masakit pa.
Si
Miling ay ngayon lamang nakarating dito kung hindi ka aalis diyan ay si Miling
na lamang ang utusan mo sa Makati kung may kailangan ka dian.
Sgn."
"Mayroon
akong nakitang bahay na mayayari malapit sa municipio ng Makati. Ipakikita ko
sa iyo kung papayag ka.
Sabihin
mo kay Miling kung hindi ka aalis diyan bukas ay pupunta ako.
Walang
makitang bahay sa San Juan.
Sgn."
Exh.
"F-2"
"Ne,
sa Viernes ay pupunta ako dian marami akong ginagawa.
Sgn."
Exh.
"F-3"
"Ne,
si Miling ay bukas pupunta dito ay sa tanghali ay pupunta ako diyan (11:30 am).
Wala akong pera ngayon kaya bukas na, sigurado yon.
Sgn."
Exh.
"F-4"
"Dear
Ne, Pacencia ka na at hindi ako nakapaglalakad gawa ng mataas ang dugo, kaya
minsan-minsan lamang ako makapunta sa oficena.
Ibigay
mo ang bayad sa bahay sa Sabado ng umaga, pipilitin kong makarating dian sa
Jueves.
Sgn."
The
address "Ne" in the beginning of these notes refer to Leoncia whose
nickname is "Nene" but which Artemio shortens to "Ne".
Miling is the nickname of Melencio. The "Gracing" mentioned in Exh.
"F-1" refers to Gracia delos Santos, a sister-in-law of Leoncia who
was with Artemio when Leoncia was removed from the hospital during the birth of
Merceditas. (pp. 17-19, Appellant's Brief). These tiny bits of evidence when
pieced together ineluctably gives lie to defendants' diversionary defense that
it was with Melencio S. Reyes with whom the mother lived with during her period
of conception.
The
attempt of Melencio S. Reyes to show that he was the lover of Leoncia being in
the apartment and sharing the same bedroom and the same bed hardly inspires
belief.
xxx
xxx xxx
Undoubtedly,
the role played by Melencio S. Reyes in the relationship between Leoncia and appellant
(sic) was that of a man Friday although appellant (sic) would not trust him to
the hilt and unwittingly required him to submit to Leoncia an accounting of his
expenditures
(Exhs. A, A-1 to A-14) for cash advances given to him by Leoncia, Artemio or
Guagua Telephone System which would not have been the case, if it were true
that there was an intimate relationship between him and plaintiff's mother.
Evidently,
following the instruction of his employer and Godfather, Melencio foisted on
the court a quo the impression that he was the lover and paramour of
Leoncia but since there was really no such relationship, he could not state the
place in San Juan or Highway 54 where he took Leoncia, nor how long they stayed
there belying his pretense (sic) of an intimate relationship with plaintiffs
mother. 27
Having
discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio, respondent court then
applied paragraph (2) of Article 283:
The
court a quo did not likewise consider the evidences as sufficient to
establish that plaintiff was in continuous possession of status of a child in
view of the denial by appellee of his paternity, and there is no clear and
sufficient evidence that the support was really given to plaintiff's mother.
The belated denial of paternity after the action has been filed against the
putative father is not the denial that would destroy the paternity of the child
which had already been recognized by defendant by various positive acts clearly
evidencing that he is plaintiff's father. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot
be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be incompatible with the stability of
the civil status of person, the permanence of which affects public interest.
Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the revocation of
such act will not revoke the recognition itself (1 Tolentino, pp.
579-580, 1983 Ed.).
To be sure, to establish "the open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is
necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
"Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession of status
shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession
of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly
and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment though without
publicity (since the relation is illegitimate) (J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno,
Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. 1, 1964 ed., pp. 269-270 citing Coquia
vs. Coquia, CA 50, O.G. 3701) There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed
father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation
of paternal affection and care. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, 1983 ed., p. 602). (Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
86302, September 24, 1991.)
It
was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the
Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent
prenatal examination by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they
went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio
himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas
(sic) bore the surname of "Ilano" since birth without any objection
on the part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her
discernment she had always known and called Artemio as her "Daddy"
(TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he
would play with Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat,
and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all
what a father should do for his child — bringing home goodies, candies, toys
and whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives
Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence that
Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such.
Special attention is called to Exh. "E-7" where Artemio was telling
Leoncia the need for a "frog test" to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff
pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was
sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru
Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. "E-2" and "E-3",
and "D-6"), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74)
and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila Banking Corporation Check
No. 81532 (Exh. "G") and the signature appearing therein which was
identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks
and Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN,
p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and signature
were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77;
TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During
the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, Artemio has
shown concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in
Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of
Merceditas (sic) (Exh. "H") for the fourth and fifth grading
period(s) (Exh. "H-1" and "H-2") as the parent of
Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of Artemio were both identified by Leoncia
and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. "H-1" and
"H-2" at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic)
and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). . . .
xxx
xxx xxx
When
Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, Artemio gave
Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best
regards, Temiong". (Exh. "I"). (pp. 19-20, Appellant's Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his
signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence indubitably
showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate
of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married
does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee's daughter. This particular entry
was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that
plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long beforehand diabolically
conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total
stranger to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process
falsified the latter's signatures and handwriting. 28
Granting
ex gratia argument that private respondent's evidence is not sufficient
proof of continuos possession of status of a spurious child, respondent court
applied next paragraph (4) of Article 283:
.
. . plaintiffs testimonial and documentary evidence . . . (is) too replete with
details that are coherent, logical and natural which cannot be categorized as
mere fabrications of an inventive and malicious mind of which Leoncia de los
Santos was not shown to possess.
The natural, logical and coherent
evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship between Leoncia and
appellee, their living together as circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts
of appellee in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support from
the testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no room to reasonably
doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his belated denials.
Notably,
the court a quo did not consider plaintiff's evidence as lacking in
credibility but did not deem as convincing proof that defendant is the father
since the Certificate of Live Birth was not signed by appellee and since the
monthly report card is not sufficient to establish recognition, considering the
denial of the defendant of his signature appearing thereon.
While
defendant's signature does not appear in the Certificate of Live Birth, the
evidence indubitably disclose(s) that Leoncia gave birth on December 30, 1963
to Merceditas (sic) at 4:27 p.m. at the Manila Sanitarium. Artemio arrived at
about 5:00 (TSN, p. 25, 5/17/74). At about 7:00 p.m., a nurse came (id.
p. 26) who made inquiries about the biodata of the born child. The inquiries
were directed to Artemio in the presence of Elynia who heard the answers of
Artemio which the nurse took down in a sheet of paper (id. p. 28). The
inquiries were about the name of the father, mother and child. After the
interview the nurse told them that the information has to be recorded in the
formal form and has to be signed by Artemio (id. p. 30) but because
there is no office, as it was past 7:00 p.m., the nurse would just return in
the morning for Artemio's signature. Artemio gave the instruction to the nurse
to give the biodata to Leoncia for her signature as he was leaving very early
the following morning as in fact Artemio left at 5:00 a.m. of December 31, 1963
(id. p. 33). Artemio stayed in the hospital in the evening of December
30, 1963 (id. p. 26). As pointed out in Castro vs. Court of
Appeals, 173 SCRA 656:
The
ruling in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila (102 Phil.
1050 [1958] and Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System
(128 SCRA 53 [1984] that if the father did not sign in the birth certificate,
the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, register, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity does not apply to this case because it was
Eustaquio himself who went to the municipal building and gave all the data
about his daughter's birth. . . .
.
. . the totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more than sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt that appellee is the father of the
plaintiff Merceditas (sic) Ilano.
As
elucidated in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, Supra:
xxx
xxx xxx
.
. . although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she
has nevertheless established that status by another method.
What
both the trial court and the respondent did not take into account is that an
illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed affiliation by "any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to
the Civil Code, . . . Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. 29
The
last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically
covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. "Any other evidence or
proof" that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render
unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted
in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements
of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph.
30 This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as
provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation.
31
As a necessary consequence of the
finding that private respondent is the spurious child of petitioner, she is
entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent court took into
account the following:
The obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a right to recover the same needs
it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial
or extrajudicial demand.
(Article 203, Family Code of the Philippines.)
The complaint in this case was filed on
August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been born on December 30, 1963, was about
nine (9) years old at the time and was already of school age spending about
P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses alone, while defendant was
earning about P10,000.00 a month. She attained the age of majority on December
30, 1984 (Article 234, Supra). She is therefore entitled to support in
arrears for a period of twelve (12) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14)
days, which is hereby fixed at
P800.00 a month for the
first three (3) years; and considering the declining value of the peso as well
as her needs as she grows older, at a graduated increase of P1,000.00 a month
for the next three (3) years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding three (3)
years; and P1,500.00 a month for the last three (3) years, four (4) months and
fourteen (14) days until she attained the age of majority.
This being an action for legal support,
the award of attorney's fees is appropriate under Article 2208 (6) of the Civil
Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under the given facts and
circumstances that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.
32
We
concur with the foregoing disposition, in the absence of proof that it was
arrived at arbitrarily.
The
other allegation of petitioner that the appeal was prosecuted almost ten years
after the decision of the trial court was rendered does not deserve any
consideration because it appears that it is being raised for the first time in
this petition. 33
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated December 17, 1991 and its resolution dated February
26, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
