ILANO v. CA
G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994
NOCON, J.
FACTS:
Ø Leoncia
first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to
Atty. Mariano C. Virata.
Ø Leoncia,
then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner
again. Later, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became
intimate and with his promise of marriage, they eloped.
Ø While
they were living at Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was
born Her birth was recorded as Merceditas
de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz
Ilano. Inasmuch as it was already past
seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following
morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth
certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following
morning.
Ø During
the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed
concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St.
Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth
grading periods
Ø CA REVERSED RTC
judgment declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the duly
acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.
ISSUE:
W/N
MERCEDITAS S. ILANO is the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.
HELD:
Petition is DENIED. CA affirmed.
YES.
Ø Under
the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or
those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into:
(1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful
wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (2) Spurious, whether
incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal
impediments. Since
petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was
conceived, she is a
spurious child. Rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the
true or real child of his parents but because under the law, he had been
recognized or acknowledged as such a child.
A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn.
A mere change of mind would be incompatible with the stability of the civil
status of person, the permanence of which affects public interest. Even when
the act in which it is made should be revocable, the revocation of such act
will not revoke the recognition itself. To be sure, to establish "the open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is
necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
"Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession of status
shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession
of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly
and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment though without
publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by
continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
Ø The
mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the
totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs
to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was
falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Merceditas is not
appellee's daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio
himself in order to avoid embarrassment.
Ø It
is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had
long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that
defendant, who claims to be a total stranger to be a total stranger, was the
father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures and
handwriting.
Ø The
natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the
relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their living together as
circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and
supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary
evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not
be infirmed by his belated denials.
Ø Any
other evidence or proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to
render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence
submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet
requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the
last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation
evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate
filiatio
Ø As a
necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious
child of petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her,
respondent court took into account the following:
Ø The
obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has
a right to recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid
except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
Ø The
complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been
born on December 30, 1963, was about 9 years old at the time and was already of
school age spending about P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school expenses
alone, while defendant was earning about P10,000.00 a month. She is therefore
entitled to support in arrears for a period of 12 years, 4 months and 14 days,
which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for the 1st 3 years; and considering
the declining value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a
graduated increase of P1,000.00 a month for the next 3 years; P1,300.00 a month
for the succeeding 3 years; and P1,500.00 a month for the last 3 years, 4
months and 14 days until she attained the age of majority.
Ø This
being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's fees is appropriate
under Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and
equitable under the given facts and circumstances that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.
