FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A.
ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution 1 dated September
27, 1995 and the Decision 2 dated April 10, 1996 of the Court of Appeals 3 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 36533, 4 and the Orders 5 dated August 29, 1994 6 and February
2, 1995 7 that were issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-93-18394. 8
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the
instant petition, as stated in the questioned Decision 9, are as follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its
airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. . . .
On April
27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco
dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both
Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their
hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they
were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer
attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security
personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian
police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an
accomplice.
When
plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials
interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back
to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA
Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police
for the immediate release of the detained crew members but did not succeed
because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be
tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to understand
the local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank paper and a document
written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to
Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff
learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the
Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of
detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDI (sic).
In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On
January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was
already behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief
Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought
her to the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her
about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure
on her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not
until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to
catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One
year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few
minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed
to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see
Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid
of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the
case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to
her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to
Manila.
Shortly
afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again
and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so
after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the
investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
In
Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on
June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge
interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After
one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as
her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had
forbidden her to take flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told
to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her
to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.
On July
3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where
the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to
her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes.
Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with
Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the
music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition. 10
Facing
conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner
SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the
Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal.
Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA,
while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the international
flights.
11
Because
she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against
her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila,
12 she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of
the cause.
On
November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint 13 for damages against SAUDIA, and
Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country manager.
On
January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss 14 which raised the
following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action
against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest;
(3) that the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to try the case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion
to Dismiss) 15. Saudia filed a reply 16 thereto on March 3, 1994.
On June
23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint 17 wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as
party defendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion
to Dismiss Amended Complaint 18.
The
trial court issued an Order 19 dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.
From the Order of respondent Judge 20 denying the Motion to
Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on September 20, 1994, its Motion for Reconsideration 21
of the Order dated August 29, 1994. It alleged that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil
Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. On October 14, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition 22 (To Defendant's
Motion for Reconsideration).
In the Reply 23 filed with the trial court on October 24,
1994, SAUDIA alleged that since its Motion for Reconsideration raised lack of
jurisdiction as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply,
even if that ground is raised for the first time on appeal. Additionally,
SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not have any substantial interest in
the prosecution of the instant case, and hence, without jurisdiction to
adjudicate the same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order 24 dated
February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIA's Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent
portion of the assailed Order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi
Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and the Opposition
thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on October 14, 1994, as well as
the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on
October 24, 1994, considering that a perusal of the plaintiffs Amended
Complaint, which is one for the recovery of actual, moral and exemplary damages
plus attorney's fees, upon the basis of the applicable Philippine law, Article
21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, within the jurisdiction
of this Court as regards the subject matter, and there being nothing new of
substance which might cause the reversal or modification of the order sought to
be reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration of the defendant, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 25
Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order 26 with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with
Temporary Restraining Order 27 dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting the
respondent Judge from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise
directed, in the interim.
In another Resolution 28 promulgated on September 27, 1995,
now assailed, the appellate court denied SAUDIA's Petition for the Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:
The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is hereby DENIED, after considering the Answer, with Prayer to Deny
Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it
appearing that herein petitioner is not clearly entitled thereto (Unciano
Paramedical College, et. Al., v. Court of Appeals, et. Al., 100335, April 7,
1993, Second Division).
SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court
the instant Petition 29 for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
dated October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition,
respondent Court of Appeals rendered the Decision 30 dated April 10, 1996, now
also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended
Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and
thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held that
certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss,
inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an
adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order 31 dated April 30, 1996, given due course by
this Court. After both parties submitted their Memoranda, 32 the instant case
is now deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
I
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil
Case No. Q-93-18394 based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the proper
law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this case
involves what is known in private international law as a "conflicts
problem". Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippines will sit in judgment
of the acts done by another sovereign state which is abhorred.
II
Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not
a jurisdictional requirement. Besides, the matter as to absence of leave of
court is now moot and academic when this Honorable Court required the
respondents to comment on petitioner's April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For
Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From
Notice Thereof. Further, the Revised Rules of Court should be construed with
liberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996
decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 entitled "Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon.
Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al." and filed its April 30, 1996 Supplemental
Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order on May 7,
1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day reglementary period as provided for
under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision
in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 has not yet become final and executory and this Honorable
Court can take cognizance of this case. 33
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the
following issues emerge for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE
NO. Q-93-18394 ENTITLED "MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI ARABIAN
AIRLINES".
II.
WHETHER
RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THIS CASE PHILIPPINE LAW
SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner
SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the
outset. It maintains that private respondent's claim for alleged abuse of
rights occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence
of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the law
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi
rule. 34
On the
other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is
based on Articles 19 35 and 21 36 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is
properly a matter of domestic law. 37
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there
is no dispute that the interplay
of events occurred in two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint 38
dated June 23, 1994:
2. Defendant
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign airlines corporation doing
business in the Philippines. It may be served with summons and other court
processes at Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.). Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar
Building, 114 Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the
Saudi Arabian government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer
and Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in
service by defendant SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred
plaintiff to Manila.
7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the
Jakarta incident was already behind her, her superiors reauested her to see MR.
Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she
saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police took her
passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by
as the police put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case against
Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her
passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila,
plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a
later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Meniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA.
When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi
court where she was asked to sigh a document written in Arabic. They told her
that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it
turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June
27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff
to report to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further
investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila
manger, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary and that it posed
no danger to her.
10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to
the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28,
1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the
Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the
airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer
told her that the airline had forbidden her to take that flight. At the
Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya
Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew
quarters, until further orders.
11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted
plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five
months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi
court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in
Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a
disco, dancing, and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case,
plaintiff sought the help of the Philippines Embassy in Jeddah. The latter
helped her pursue an appeal from the decision of the court. To pay for her
upkeep, she worked on the domestic flights of defendant SAUDIA while,
ironically, Thamer and Allah freely served the international flights. 39
Where
the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign
element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a
"conflicts" case.
A
factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the
diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a "foreign
element". The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and
economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the
geographic limits of their birth or conception. 40
The
forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. 41 The foreign element
may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an
alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one
State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the
foreign element may assume a complex form. 42
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private
respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA
is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada
with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during
her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a
"conflicts" situation to arise.
We thus find private respondent's assertion that the case is
purely domestic, imprecise. A conflicts problem presents itself here, and the
question of jurisdiction 43 confronts the court a quo.
After a careful study of the private respondent's Amended
Complaint, 44 and the Comment thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her
cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith.
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code
provides:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for damages.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of
Appeals, 45 this Court held that:
The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended
to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law,
Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with private
respondent's assertion that violations
of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in
the municipal forum.
Based on the allegations 46 in the Amended Complaint, read
in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction 47 we find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
48 Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
cots or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court — the venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — [Now Regional
Trial Court]
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.
Pragmatic
considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in
favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private
interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is
quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally
important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum,
"vex", "harass", or "oppress" the defendant, e.g.
by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance
is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed. 49
Weighing
the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the
case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it
would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains
substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to
her.
Moreover,
by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of
the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.
Similarly,
the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties
herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court,
private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the
court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several
motions 50 praying for the dismissal of Morada's Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also
filed an Answer In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very
patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other
reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial
court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on
grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.:
51
We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14,
1962, aside from disputing the lower court's jurisdiction over defendant's
person, prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's
cause of action has prescribed. By interposing such second ground in its motion
to dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd. availed of an affirmative defense on the basis of
which it prayed the court to resolve controversy in its favor. For the court to
validly decide the said plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it necessarily
had to acquire jurisdiction upon the latter's person, who, being the proponent
of the affirmative defense, should be deemed to have abandoned its special
appearance and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that;
When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the
sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his
motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A
special appearance by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a general
appearance, if the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a
dismissal of the action upon the further ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter. 52
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial court has
jurisdiction over the case and that its exercise thereof, justified.
As to
the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to
answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given
situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states;
and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
53
Several theories have been propounded in order to identify
the legal system that should ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should
intrinsically advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do not
always do so. The forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of
these two important values should be stressed. 54
Before
a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a
certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as
"characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It
is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of
question specified in a conflicts rule." 55 The purpose of
"characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
56
Our
starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual
situation, event, or operative fact. 57 An essential element of conflict rules
is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or
"point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a
factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting
factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. 58
Note
that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for
the determination of the applicable law. 59 These "test factors" or
"points of contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of
the following:
(1) The
nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or
his origin;
(2) the
seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the
situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be
situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are
involved;
(4) the
place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a
contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort
committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the
place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to
be exercised;
(6) the
intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the
place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The
lex fori — the law of the forum — is particularly important because, as we have
seen earlier, matters of "procedure" not going to the substance of
the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies
whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from
application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the
exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the
flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers
contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment. 60 (Emphasis
ours.)
After a
careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended
Complaint deemed admitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are
convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion
that although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to
Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the
charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her
person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious
charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
There
is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the "handing
over" or "turning over" of the person of private respondent to Jeddah
officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties as employer.
Petitioner's purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately
caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent.
Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution
of private respondent under the guise of petitioner's authority as employer,
taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As
purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and
imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury or
harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner
could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs
done, once duly proven.
Considering
that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
"connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be the
place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And
applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines
could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious
conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she
had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and
in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her due and
observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect
her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred
in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here is
the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the
person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had
lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told,
it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged
tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional
rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability
61 have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just
results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find
here an occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship" rule,
which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context
of this case.
In
applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue:
(a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. 62
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that
over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no
question that private
respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident
foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage.
Thus, the "relationship" between the parties was centered here,
although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law
violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most
significant contact with the matter in this dispute, 63 raised by
private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in
our view, has been properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the
situs of the tort complained of and the place "having the most interest in
the problem", we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law
on tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the
resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that
the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which
could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioner's
insistence that "[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has
the burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the
matter." 64 As aptly said by private respondent, she has "no
obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her
cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21" of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never
alleged that Saudi law should govern this case. 65 And as correctly held by the
respondent appellate court, "considering that it was the petitioner who
was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the burden was
on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia
is". 66
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent
appellate court in upholding the trial court's denial of defendant's (herein
petitioner's) motion to dismiss the case. Not only was jurisdiction in order
and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was obviously available, and
expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at hand.
Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the
ultimate outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the
litigants, but also for the vindication of the country's system of law and
justice in a transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial
court must proceed to try and adjudge the case in the light of relevant
Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign element or elements
involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging the
results of the case in any manner whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil
Case No. Q-93-18394 entitled "Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines" is hereby REMANDED
to Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.