EDUARDO P. DIEGO, complainant, vs. JUDGE SILVERIO Q.
CASTILLO, Regional Trial Court, Dagupan City, Branch 43, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint against Regional Trial
Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the
law.
The facts and circumstances of the criminal case are
summarized, as follows:
a) On
January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio,
Jr., solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos. In the marriage contract, the accused used
and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of single;
b) In a
document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a “Decree of Divorce” and
purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court
of Harris County, Texas (247th Judicial District), it was “ordered, adjudged
and decreed, that the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between Jorge de
Perio and Crescencia de Perio are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and Annulled and
the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce.”
c)
Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage
with herein complainant’s brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev.
Fr. Clemente T. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the
accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of
single.[1]
After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, respondent
Judge promulgated a decision, on February 24, 1999, the dispositive part of
which stated:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the STATE to prove accused’s guilt
beyond whisper of doubt, the COURT hereby orders her ACQUITTAL with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The decision states that the main basis for the acquittal
was good faith on the part of the accused.
Respondent Judge
gave credence to the defense of the accused that she acted without any
malicious intent. The combined
testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense was aimed at convincing the
court that accused Lucena Escoto had sufficient grounds to believe that her
previous marriage to Jorge de Perio had been validly dissolved by the divorce
decree and that she was legally free to contract the second marriage with
Manuel P. Diego.
In rendering the decision, respondent Judge reasoned, thus:
While it is true that in our jurisdiction the matrimonial
bond between Jorge de Perio and the accused are not yet annulled, it remains
undisputed that cessation of the same was decreed in the Family District Court
of Harris County, Texas, 247th Judicial District, effective February 15, 1978.
x x x
The CHARGE filed against the accused is categorized as Mala
en se (sic) which requires the indispensable presence of criminal intent/dolo.
The felony on BIGAMY as defined and penalized by the Revised
Penal Code explicitly mandates that it must be committed with criminal intent.
In other words, there must be an unquestionable demonstration on the part of
the perpetrator that he/she criminally, willfully and unlawfully contracted a
second marriage despite knowledge that his/her first marriage is still
existing.
As borne out by the evidence adduced, the accused contracted
the second marriage after she was informed and furnished of the Divorce Decree
which was granted by the Family District Court of Harris County Texas in her
favor.
As an ordinary laywoman accused being a recipient of a
divorce decree, she entertains the impression that she can contract a
subsequent marriage which she did when she married the late Manuel Diego.
To the
honest evaluation of the Court the act complained of against the accused is not
patently illegal for the reason that she acted in good faith believing that her
marriage was already annulled by a foreign judgment.[3]
Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the
respondent Judge is manifestly against the law and contrary to the
evidence. He questions the evidentiary
weight and admissibility of the divorce decree as a basis for the finding of
good faith. In addition, complainant
stresses that the evidence on record negates respondent Judge’s finding of good
faith on the part of the accused. Thus,
complainant urges this Court to impose sanctions upon respondent Judge as,
according to complainant, these acts amount to knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.
In his comment, respondent Judge explains that what was in
issue was the criminal culpability of the accused under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge
does not dispute that the second marriage was bigamous because at the time it
was contracted, the first marriage was still subsisting since divorce is not
recognized in our country and because the accused’s first husband was still
alive. Respondent Judge, however,
maintains that what was controlling was whether by virtue of the divorce decree
the accused honestly believed, albeit mistakenly, that her first marriage had
been severed and she could marry again.
According to respondent Judge, the same is a state of mind personal to
the accused. He further stressed that knowledge of the law should not be
exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay person, and that
ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent.
By separate manifestations, both parties agreed to submit
the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
The Disputed Decision
A careful study of the disputed decision reveals that
respondent Judge had been less than circumspect in his study of the law and
jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy case.
In his comment, respondent Judge stated: “That the accused
married Manuel P. Diego in the honest belief that she was free to do so by
virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistake of fact.”
This Court, in People v. Bitdu,[4] carefully distinguished
between a mistake of fact, which could be a basis for the defense of good faith
in a bigamy case, from a mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even a
lay person, from liability. Bitdu held
that even if the accused, who had obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan
custom, honestly believed that in contracting her second marriage she was not
committing any violation of the law, and that she had no criminal intent, the
same does not justify her act. This
Court further stated therein that with respect to the contention that the
accused acted in good faith in contracting the second marriage, believing that
she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say
that everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know
that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof.[5]
Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for
bigamy, is People v. Schneckenburger, [6] where it was held that the accused
who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in the Philippines, in the
belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy.
These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is
whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.
Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment
Knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized under
Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that
the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently,
willfully or intentionally. It is firmly
established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is
unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that
the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.[8]
The law
requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case
submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that
said judgment is unjust.[9] This Court reiterates that in order to hold
a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was
made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law.[10]
As held in Alforte v. Santos,[11] even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an
accused, she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of
bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.
Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust
decision must still be proved and failure on the part of the complainant to
prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint.[12]
There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law, Mañozca v.
Domagas,[13] is instructive. Therein
respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law resulting in a
manifestly unjust judgment for granting a demurrer to the evidence in a bigamy
case. The grant of the demurrer to the
evidence was based on the judge’s finding of good faith on the part of the
accused, anchored upon a document denominated as a “Separation of Property with
Renunciation of Rights.” This Court stated that said act of the judge exhibited
ignorance of the law, and accordingly he was fined in the amount of P5,000.
Also, in Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr.,[14] where therein
respondent judge was given a reprimand with a stern warning of a more severe
penalty should the same or similar act be committed in the future, this Court
explained:
We have heretofore ruled that a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he
renders. To unjustifiably hold
otherwise, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and
would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment. The error
must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the
judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative sanctions
are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.
As a
matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge
charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. It does not mean, however, that a judge,
given the leeway he is accorded in such cases, should not evince due care in
the performance of his adjudicatory prerogatives.
Furthermore, in Wingarts v. Mejia,[15] where therein
respondent judge, although absolved of any guilt for the charge of knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, was still imposed sanctions by this Court, thus:
In any event, respondent judge deserves to be appropriately
penalized for his regrettably erroneous action in connection with Criminal Case
No. 2664 of his court. We have
repeatedly stressed that a municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of the
judicial arm that is closest in reach to the public he serves, and he must
accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost probity. Any kind
of failure in the discharge of this grave responsibility cannot be
countenanced, in order to maintain the faith of the public in the judiciary,
especially on the level of courts to which most of them resort for redress.[16]
Applying
these precedents to the present case, the error committed by respondent Judge
being gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature
sufficient to warrant disciplinary action.
Penalty
After evaluation of the merits of the case, the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent Judge be reprimanded
with a stern warning of a more severe penalty in the future.
The act of respondent Judge in rendering the decision in
question took place on February 24, 1999 or before the effectivity, on October
1, 2001, of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which classified gross ignorance of the law as
a serious charge and penalized the offense with a fine of not less than P20,000
but not more than P40,000.
Applying the rule as then prevailing,[17] and in line with
applicable jurisprudence,[18] the sanction on respondent Judge should be a fine
in the amount of P10,000.
WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby FINED in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
and Carpio, JJ., concur.
