JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the
full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast
powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line
demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread -
asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish
with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that
the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which
society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor
to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number,
is self-protection. The only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and
illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and
cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system
of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict
punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to
unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it
a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the
imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State
impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades
and colors, the skein irregular and broken.
Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression
of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve
their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted
against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by
RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid
from the constitutionally infirm. He
therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to
the crucible of constitutionality
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by
petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par.
(d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means
any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission,
gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project
or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition
of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves
at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition
of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the
crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said
public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as
provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and
all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of
Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4
April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8)
separate Informations, docketed as: (a)
Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b)
Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a),
3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), respectively; (c)
Crim. Case No. 26563, for
violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for
Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565,
for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11
April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification
"d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and,
for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications
"a," "b," and
"c" to give the accused
an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to
prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised
were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and
the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that
Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the
Plunder Law.
On 25
April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case
No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists
to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14
June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on
the ground that the facts alleged
therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which
it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended
Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its
Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001
petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral
arguments on 18 September
2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law
is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence
for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights
of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080
is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to
so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining
to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a
legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.[3]
Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a
legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of
constitutional adjudication. This
strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that
it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties
and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords
to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation
may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious
of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with
full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority.
Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune
with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act
with caution and forbearance. Every
intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a
statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly
possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held
that as long as there
is some basis
for the decision
of the court,
the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the
case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not
sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of
constitutionality. Of course, where the
law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law,
it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental
law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs
heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of
doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for
absent such a
showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if
well-founded, will hardly suffice. As
tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To
doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his
burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains
ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the
accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit
in its description
of the acts,
conduct and conditions required
or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable
certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself
or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, or malversation
of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving,
directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or
any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office
or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance
or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly
any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking
advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the
ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule
that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them
liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It
must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in
defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in
identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little
difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public
officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00
through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the
Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the
law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense
which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The
undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John
DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A.
No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY
with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY
TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17),
more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF
THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A
combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on
SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING,
RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for
HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL
gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00),
more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated
for the province of Ilocos
Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in
connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES
& JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000
SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN
THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND
FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00),
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF
STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME
'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by
unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS
AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or
ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that
the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts.
Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of
the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to
provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series"
in the key phrase "a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2,
and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4.
These omissions, according to
petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly
vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right
to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void
merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of
terms without defining them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we
use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each
and every word in an enactment. Congress
is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to
so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or
at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in
the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural,
plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[7] unless it is evident that
the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers - to use
statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or
process of combining. To combine is to
bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class
coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and
"series" to be
understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative
deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May
1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am
just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF
OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually
mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and
two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the
same act? For example, through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah,
because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we
include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we
say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we
say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of
the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but
combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say
combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same
act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there
are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because
when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary
crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is
only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts.
So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term “series?”
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two
misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be
combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that
sometimes “one” or maybe even “two” acts may already result in such a big
amount, on line
25, would the
Sponsor consider deleting the
words “a series of overt or,” to read, therefore: “or conspiracy COMMITTED by
criminal acts such as.” Remove the idea of necessitating “a series.” Anyway,
the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more
of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because “a series” implies several or
many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be
prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say “acts of plunder” there
should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by
existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is
referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public
treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets
belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts
falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par.
(d), say, misappropriation, malversation and
raids on the
public treasury, all
of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar.
(1). Verily, had the legislature
intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing
for it in the law.
As for
"pattern," we agree
with the observations of the Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is sufficiently
defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1)
to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly,
pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly,
there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or
'conspiracy' to achieve said
common goal. As commonly understood, the
term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method'
which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no
such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused
vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does
not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Under the circumstances,
petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is
manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has
been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that
a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand
what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be
invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face,
i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
A
statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[10]
But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched
in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard
though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently
ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever
directed against such activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be
invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this
case.
The
test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.[12]
It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be
held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act,
it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other
statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of
Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the
allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial
review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness
doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees
that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."[14]
A
facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected
speech. The theory is that "[w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that
his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for
testing the validity of penal statutes.
As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17]
the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained
in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words" and, again, that "overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct."
For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since
the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge
a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.
"A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to
do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established
rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will
not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also
be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth
challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as
a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and
in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes
results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied
to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected.[22] It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without
concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.[23] But, as the
U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute
is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process
of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . .
ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described
as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to
have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with
which the defendant is charged.[27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that
the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued
at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be
created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to
critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be
construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than
nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and
validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori,
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of
what the Plunder Law is all about. Being
one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that
the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate
committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full
knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be
mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed
to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect
and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction
that will support and give it effect. In
that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality
of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being
vague. Petitioners posited, among
others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic
with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates
due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what
it seeks to penalize. Petitioners
further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct
offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted"
benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted"
benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits
through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official
function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of
the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3,
par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident
bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely
describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par.
(e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the
same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct
offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official
support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p.
2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p.
19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the
public officer in:
x x x or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x
x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as
amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the
aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any
private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified,
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague
or ambiguous in the use of the term
"unwarranted" in Sec.
3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood
in its primary and general acceptation.
Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held
inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly
stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate
acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern
of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of
Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the
simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the
accused always has in his favor
the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and
unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt
that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.[29] The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal
law. It is critical that the moral
force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people
in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society
that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a
proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This
"reasonable doubt"
standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of
constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.[30]
The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on
this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9
October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr.
Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the
information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him
guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work
against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by
falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime
committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification
of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr.
Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. What is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber
in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was
charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the
prosecution proved two. Now, what is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am
aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the
totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt
criminal acts has to be taken singly.
For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only
P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1
million. Now, when we add the totality
of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the
rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due
respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the
crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the
crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other
acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120
million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum
up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these
transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a
crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did
not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden still remains with
the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of
that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There is no need to
prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been
committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is
charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on
the public treasury. The prosecution
need not prove
all these fifty
(50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of
the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least
P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to
the logical conclusion that
"pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating,
acquiring or amassing hidden wealth.
Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par.
(d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the
predicate acts. This conclusion is
consistent with reason and common sense.
There would be no other explanation for a combination or
series of
overt
or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The
prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort
to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series
or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect
of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important
element of the crime of plunder;"
and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of
evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the
accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law
without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that
case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal
Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction
under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a
conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused
charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well,
your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the
law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes,
your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence
and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid
Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate
crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying
Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your
Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the
crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of
plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation
to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of
Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure
for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4
does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but
only operates in furtherance of a remedy.
It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is
to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument
that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for
the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of
the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after
all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a
separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability
of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid,
the remaining provisions
of this Act
and the application of such
provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole
act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly
be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the
objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza
that plunder is a malum in
se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely
because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven
in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges
guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void,
petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the
deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . .
. And the evidence that will be required
to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act
but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit
this crime of plunder.[33]
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the
succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And,
Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of
Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and
faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes,
Mr. President . . .[34]
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is
conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every
criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it
proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the
elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that -
Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for
such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court.
The
application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal
Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that
mens rea is an element of plunder since
the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent. It is true that §2
refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder."
There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well
to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about
not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."[35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a
malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the
decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. Other
heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No.
7659. Referring to these groups of
heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is
treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the
normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of
the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts;
destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or
resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as
murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention,
where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the
victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation,
destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua
to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in
the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of
the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself
to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged
masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population,
the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the
culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so
deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly
lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any
form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an
actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very
survival of the people it governs over.
Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and
repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in
death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers,
that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and
damage to society.
The
legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. For
when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are
mala in se[37] and
it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of
the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking,
without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA
7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it to
say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this
long dead issue, the
same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray[38] to the
archives of jurisprudential history. The
declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands
as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in
the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and
obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken
its very foundation. The anatomy
of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the
corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk
the coffers of the government. Drastic
and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated,
extraordinarily methodical and economically
catastrophic looting of
the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed
to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left
unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral
and institutional fiber of our nation.
The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the
legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society
against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few
issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion
generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his
eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has
driven a wedge
of dissension among
our people that may linger for a
long time. Only by responding to the
clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall
we emerge triumphant in the midst of
ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080
otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the
law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring
opinion of J. Mendoza.
Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred and joins J. Mendoza's
concurring opinion.
Kapunan, Pardo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., please see concurring opinion.
Panganiban J., please see separate concurring opinion.
Carpio, J., no part.
Was one of the complainants before Ombudsman.
