G.R. No. 155791
March 16, 2005
MELBA QUINTO, petitioner, vs. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER
PACHECO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At
around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade 4
elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about
eleven years old, were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and
Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go
fishing with them inside the drainage culvert.[1] Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he
opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of
the drainage system.[2]
Respondent
Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with
respondent Andres and Wilson, entered the drainage system which was covered by
concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot
deep.[3] After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of
the drainage system and left[4] without saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back
inside, and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already
dead. Respondent Andres laid the boy’s
lifeless body down in the grassy area.[5] Shocked at the sudden turn of events,
Garcia fled from the scene.[6] For his part, respondent Andres went to the
house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson’s mother, and informed her that her
son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the
drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her.[7]
The
cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been conducted. The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal
complaint against the respondents for Wilson’s death.
Two
weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and
petitioner Quinto.[8] Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the
drainage system catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared that he saw Wilson already
dead when he passed by the drainage system while riding on his carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was
exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBI
performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his autopsy report
containing the following postmortem findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition,
attired with white long sleeves and dark pants and placed inside a wooden
coffin in a niche-apartment style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left
forearm.
Laryngo – tracheal lumina – congested and edematous
containing muddy particles with bloody path.
Lungs – hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure;
section contains bloody froth.
Brain – autolyzed and liquefied.
Stomach – partly autolyzed.
CAUSE
OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory.[9]
The NBI
filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and Pacheco
in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for
homicide by dolo against the two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tarlac, Tarlac, charging the respondents with homicide. The accusatory portion reads:
That at around 8 o’clock in the morning of November 13,
1995, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Dante Andres
and Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy, conspiring, confederating, and helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were fishing,
causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who
testified on direct examination that the hematoma at the back of the victim’s
head and the abrasion on the latter’s left forearm could have been caused by a
strong force coming from a blunt instrument or object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea also
indicated that the victim died of drowning, as some muddy particles were also
found on the lumina of the larynx and trachea (“Nakahigop ng putik”). Dr. Aguda stated that such injury could be
caused when a person is put under water by pressure or by force.[11] On
cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on the scalp was caused
by a strong pressure or a strong force applied to the scalp coming from a blunt
instrument. He also stated that the victim could have fallen,
and that the occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt object.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilson’s
head could have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a
body of water, the boy could have died by drowning.
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the
doctor declared that the
4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilson’s face could have also been
caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a
rough surface. He also stated that the
trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation.[12]
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the
respondents had admitted the pictures showing the drainage system including the
inside portions thereof,[13] the prosecution rested its case.
The
respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28,
1998. It also held that it could not
hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant
evidence to prove their liability for Wilson’s death.
The petitioner
appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as the civil aspect of
the case was concerned. In her
brief, she averred that –
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING
THAT NO PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE
FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON QUINTO.[14]
The CA
rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on December
21, 2001. It ruled as follows:
The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable
doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the
criminal acts complained of. Thus,
pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex
delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a
criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the
accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil.
672)[15]
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised
the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS’ CRIMINAL
LIABILITY, LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD
RESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.[16]
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere
possibilities, surmises and speculations when it held that Wilson died because
(a) he could have fallen, his head hitting the stones in the drainage system
since the culvert was slippery; or (b) he might have been bitten by a snake
which he thought was the prick of a fish fin, causing his head to hit hard on
the top of the culvert; or (c) he could have lost consciousness due to some
ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner
also alleges that the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution failed
to prove any ill motive on the part of the respondents to kill the victim, and
in considering that respondent Andres even informed her of Wilson’s death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the
testimony of the Medico-Legal Expert, Dr. Aguda; the nature, location and
number of the injuries sustained by the victim which caused his death; as well
as the locus criminis. The petitioner
insists that the behavior of the respondents after the commission of the crime
betrayed their guilt, considering that respondent Pacheco left the scene,
leaving respondent Andres to bring out Wilson’s cadaver, while respondent
Andres returned inside the drainage system only when he saw Garcia seated in
the grassy area waiting for his friend Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence
on record to show that either or both the respondents caused the death of her
son and, as such, are jointly and severally liable therefor.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that
since the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to prove that they
committed the crime of homicide and caused the death of Wilson, they are not
criminally and civilly liable for the latter’s death.
The petition has no merit.
Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[17] The civil
liability of such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and
indemnification for consequential damages.[18] When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.[19]
With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the
two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil.[20]
The
prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to
deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate
him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain
social order.[21] The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution,
reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or
injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the
accused.[22] While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove the cause of
action of the private complainant against the accused for damages and/or
restitution.
The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil action. However, the civil action
based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from where the civil
liability may arise does not exist.[23]
Moreover,
a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.[24] “Natural” refers to an occurrence in
the ordinary course of human life or events, while “logical” means that there
is a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting
injury or damage. The felony committed
must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.[25]
There
must be a relation of “cause and effect,” the cause being the felonious act of
the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the
victim. The “cause and effect”
relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing conditions,
such as the pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones patologica
del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended party (la predisposicion del
ofendido); the physical condition of the offended party (la constitucion fisica
del herido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the
negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al herido);
or the conditions supervening the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary
infection or gangrene.[26]
The felony
committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
(a) there is an active force that intervened
between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active force is
a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the
accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the
intentional act of the victim.[27]
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a
manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their
felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to
prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his
delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.[28]
A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from
human life a salutary and essential safeguard.[29] This Court has emphasized
that:
… Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties
attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy
in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death,
and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime
might escape conviction and punishment. …[30]
In People v. Quianzon,[31] the Supreme Court held:
… The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3,
1879, said in a case similar to the present, the following: Inasmuch as a man
is responsible for the consequences of his act – and in this case, the physical
condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the
seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed,
but by the result actually produced; and as the wound which the appellant
inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which determined his death, without
his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in
question should be qualified as homicide, etc.[32]
In the present case, the respondents were charged with
homicide by dolo. In People v.
Delim,[33] the Court delineated the burden of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused for homicide or murder:
In the
case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which
consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant’s agency
in the commission of the act. Wharton
says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the
subjective element of crimes. In
homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove:
(a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced
by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of
accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the
criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which
produced the death. To prove the
felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct
or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in
other words, that there was intent to kill.
Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim
and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately
after the killing of the victim. If the
victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.[34]
Insofar
as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private
complainant is burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight
of evidence. Although the
evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the
defendant, he is not entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not sufficient
to sustain his cause of action. The
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of that of the defendants’.[35]
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence
provides how preponderance of evidence is determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In
determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of
the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means
and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature
of the facts to which they testify, the probability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the
same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.[36]
In the
present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the
prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which
the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a
cause of action against the respondents for damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the
collective testimonies of Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the
Necropsy Report of Dr. Dominic Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter
hematoma on the scalp. But as to how the
deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He presented two possibilities: (a) that the
deceased could have been hit by a blunt object or instrument applied with full
force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a
hard object:
COURT:
The Court would ask questions.
Q So it is possible
that the injury, that is – the hematoma, caused on the back of the head might
be due to the victim’s falling on his back and his head hitting a pavement?
A Well, the
14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if the fall is strong enough
and would fall from a high place and hit a concrete pavement, then it is
possible.
Q Is it possible
that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement and the head hit the
pavement, the injury might be caused by that slipping?
A It is also
possible.
Q So when the
victim was submerged under water while unconscious, it is possible that he
might have taken in some mud or what?
A Yes, Sir.
Q So it is your
finding that the victim was submerged while still breathing?
A Yes, Your Honor,
considering that the finding on the lung also would indicate that the victim
was still alive when he was placed under water.[37]
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side
of the victim’s face could have been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall
or pavement:
Q The abrasion 4x3
centimeters on the right [side of the] face, would it be caused by the face
rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement?
A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a
skin to a rough surface.
Q Rough surface?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q When you say that
the trachea region was full of mud, were there no signs that the victim was
strangled?
A There was no
sign of strangulation, Your Honor.[38]
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda
that the deceased might have slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit
his head on the pavement, thus:
Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have
been caused when the victim fell down and that portion of the body or occipital
portion hit a blunt object and might have been inflicted as a result of falling
down?
A - If the fall … if
the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is also possible.[39]
The trial court took into account the following facts:
Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the
prosecution that there were stones inside the culvert. (See Exhibit “D” to “D-3”). The stones could have caused the victim to
slip and hit his head on the pavement.
Since there was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with water must
be very slippery, aside from the fact that the culvert is round. If the victim hit his head and lost
consciousness, he will naturally take in some amount of water and drown.[40]
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court,
as well as its conclusion based on the said findings.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its assessment of probative weight of the evidence of
the parties, and its conclusion anchored on such findings, affirmed no less by
the CA, are given conclusive effect by this Court, unless the trial court
ignored, misapplied or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which, if
considered, would change the outcome of the case. The petitioner failed to show any
justification to warrant a reversal of the findings or conclusions of the trial
and appellate courts.
That
the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia
testified that the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid
that he refused to join respondents Andres and Pacheco inside.[41] Respondent Andres had no flashlight;
only respondent Pacheco had one.
Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might
have caused the abrasion on the left forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether the
abrasions on the face and left forearm of the victim were made ante mortem or
post mortem.
The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of
evidence that either or both the respondents hit the deceased with a blunt
object or instrument, and, consequently, any blunt object or instrument that
might have been used by any or both of the respondents in hitting the deceased.
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed
or committed serious crimes for no reason at all.[42] However, the absence of
any ill-motive to kill the deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to
prove that no violence was perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive
on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the
latter was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that
respondent Andres used to go to their house and play with her son before the
latter’s death:
Q Do you know this
Dante Andres personally?
A Not much but he
used to go to our house and play with my son after going from her mother who is
gambling, Sir.
Q But you are
acquainted with him, you know his face?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please
look around this courtroom and see if he is around?
A (Witness is
pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the courtroom.)[43]
When the petitioner’s son died inside the drainage culvert,
it was respondent Andres who brought out the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her son’s
death. Even after informing the
petitioner of the death of her son, respondent Andres followed the petitioner
on her way to the grassy area where the deceased was:
Q Did not Dante
Andres follow you?
A He went with me,
Sir.
Q So when you went
to the place where your son was lying, Dante Andres was with you?
A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my
son was there at the culvert, I ran immediately. He [was] just left behind and he just
followed, Sir.
Q So when you
reached the place where your son was lying down, Dante Andres also came or
arrived?
A It was only when
we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.[44]
In sum,
the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause of
action for damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.
IN
LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and
Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
