G.R. No. 17958
February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas,
when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew
Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard
flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless,
the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south
seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to
present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession,
for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a
Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise
subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock
in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid
in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned
by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the
Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and
brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described.
All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young
women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it
would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days
of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally
arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo,
who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able
to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian,
Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged
in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the
Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws
in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the
trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two
defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena
perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which
had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a
one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has
been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a process of
elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime
of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high
seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit
and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of
force as was done in the lover court and as is again done in this court, that
the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes
humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but
against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any
country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it
is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime
was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state,
"for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."
(U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is
squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of
the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed
against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain,
shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena
perpetua.
If the crime be committed against
nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be
punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes
referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer
the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes
referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel
by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by
murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified in articles four
hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two
of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the
offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any
persons without means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper
of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions
of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it
shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the
provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of
the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized
and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a transfer of
territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political
law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so
far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States,
or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As
a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer,
designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of
a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government
they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn
[1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were
given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions of President
McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of
the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant
are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition
of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as
affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment
of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are
compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded
by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated, but
are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations. This enlightened
practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
(Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General
Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles
of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the
Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of
the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the
Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by
the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has
never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in
tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law.
This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its
inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the
Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States
declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and punish piracies
and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of
nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the
statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on
the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations,
and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S.
Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the members of
Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal
conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the
Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not
inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the
Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles of
the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be
that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the
words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are
mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of
the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat
similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith
([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in
the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious,
military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the Government of the
Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated,
article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against
citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the
subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished
with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against
nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it
shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of
piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal
Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the
circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena
perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense
against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of
saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to
whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In
this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the
Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three
aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime
was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its
commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were
employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be
taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore,
the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here
present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our
duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous
with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the
defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is
not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his
nonconformity. In
accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the
judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is
affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is
found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until
dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first
instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together
with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify
jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and
shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña,
Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.