THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney
Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the
accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and
corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial,
found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and
were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months
to two years and two months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants
appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo
Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received
from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received
escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him
dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant
and asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and
privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their
sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were
shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a
picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if
overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same
instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by
the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew
one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the
same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried
to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining
Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go
with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with
defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal
street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group
arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then
stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida
indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping
with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room
which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis
and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with
his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired
at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots,
Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots
came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene.
Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the
notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named
Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the
killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased.
Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir."
The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy
by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45
caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully
supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea.
Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to
Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the
latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and
upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that
he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and
upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas,
stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the
former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned
towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas."
Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened
the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas
stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while
the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted
his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and
upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking
up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their
testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they are vitiated by a
natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are
materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter
was apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from
the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while
the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a
noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when
the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson,
the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions
that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime
charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating
averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene
Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson was still
sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain
extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual
recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was
still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis
assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus
corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to
observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was
committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory
pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of
Irene's testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not
concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her
cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were
unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the
occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in
disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson
was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on
sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo
Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his
identity. And the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held
responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as
appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their
official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no
criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so
declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We
are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the
crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by
circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of
honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15
Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when
the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case,
defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to
open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no
answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and
called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at
that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the
door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife
and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate.
A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was
marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit
of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed
by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the
pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in
imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because
the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being
pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the
facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of
killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances
cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate
action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and
opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could
even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been
made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is
the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the
victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at
sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or
aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified
in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the
offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he
escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil,
738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him
with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could
be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in
the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall
be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to
any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109,
sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal
liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J.,
p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas
was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace
to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no
justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no
resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This,
in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S.
vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal
"must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he
has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of
official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which
places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how,
as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a
criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety
rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it
never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here,
the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there
exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the
mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not condonation — should be
the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of
official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal
negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence,
the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil.,
939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de
imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de
dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha
producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de
tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal
Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56
Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the
identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed
is murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a
mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying
circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According
to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in
the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There
are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying
one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first
requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The
second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the
necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to
arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and
they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire
to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by
killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance
from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According
to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and
appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating
circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of
reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of
the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with
costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal,
managed to escape and flee form Manila to the provinces. Receiving information
to the effect that he was staying with one Irene in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
the office of the Constabulary in Manila ordered the Provincial Inspector in
Cabanatuan by telegram dispatched on December 25, 1938, to get Balagtas
"dead or alive". Among those assigned to the task of carrying out the
said order, were Antonio Z. Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, and Alberto
Galanta, a Constabulary corporal, to whom the telegram received by the
Provincial Inspector and a newspaper picture of Balagtas were shown. Oanis,
Galanta and a Constabulary private, after being told by the Provincial Inspector
to gather information about Balagtas, "to arrest him and, if overpowered,
to follow the instructions contained in the telegram," proceeded to the
place where the house of Irene was located. Upon arriving thereat, Oanis
approached Brigida Mallari, who was then gathering banana stalks in the yard,
and inquired for the room of Irene. After Mallari had pointed out the room, she
was asked by Oanis to tell where Irene's paramour, Balagtas, was, whereupon
Mallari answered that he was sleeping with Irene. Upon reaching the room
indicated, Oanis and Galanta, after the former had shouted "Stand up, if
you are Balagtas," started shooting the man who was found by them lying
down beside a woman. The man was thereby killed, but Balagtas was still alive,
for it turned out that the person shot by Oanis and Galanta was one Serapio
Tecson.
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having
committed murder. The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, however,
convicted them only of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentenced them
each to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years
and 2 months of prision correctional, to jointly and severally indemnify the
heirs of Serapio Tecson in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis
and Galanta have appealed.
In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were
charged, they undoubtedly followed the order issued by the Constabulary
authorities in Manila requiring the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan to get
Balagtas dead or alive, in the honest belief that Serapio Tecson was Anselmo
Balagtas. As the latter became a fugitive criminal, with revolvers in his
possession and a record that made him extremely dangerous and a public terror,
the Constabulary authorities were justified in ordering his arrest, whether
dead or alive. In view of said order and the danger faced by the appellants in
carrying it out, they cannot be said to have acted feloniously in shooting the
person honestly believed by them to be the wanted man. Conscious of the fact
that Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the appellants did not want
to take chances and should not be penalized for such prudence. On the contrary,
they should be commended for their bravery and courage bordering on
recklessness because, without knowing or ascertaining whether the wanted man
was in fact asleep in his room, they proceeded thereto without hesitation and
thereby exposed their lives to danger.
The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants
were authorized to use their revolvers only after being overpowered by
Balagtas. In the first place, the alleged instruction by the Provincial
Inspector to that effect, was in violation of the express order given by the
Constabulary authorities in Manila and which was shown to the appellants. In
the second place, it would indeed be suicidal for the appellants or, for that
matter, any agent of the authority to have waited until they have been
overpowered before trying to put our such a character as Balagtas. In the third
place, it is immaterial whether or not the instruction given by the Provincial
Inspector was legitimate and proper, because the facts exist that the
appellants acted in conformity with the express order of superior Constabulary
authorities, the legality or propriety of which is not herein questioned.
The theory of the prosecution has acquired some
plausibility, though quite psychological or sentimental, in view only of the
fact that it was not Balagtas who was actually killed, but an "innocent
man . . . while he was deeply asleep." Anybody's heart will be profoundly
grieved by the trade, but in time will be consoled by the realization that the
life of Serapio Tecson was not vainly sacrificed, for the incident will always
serve as a loud warning to any one desiring to follow in the footsteps of
Anselmo Balagtas that in due time the duly constituted authorities will, upon
proper order, enforce the summary forfeiture of his life.
In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally
liable if the person killed by them was in fact Anselmo Balagtas for the reason
that they did so in the fulfillment of their duty and in obedience to an order
issued by a superior for some lawful purpose (Revised Penal Code, art. 11,
pars. 5 and 6). They also cannot be held criminally liable even if the person
killed by them was not Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson, because they did
so under an honest mistake of fact not due to negligence or bad faith. (U.S.
vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488).
It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but said article is
clearly inapplicable since the killing of the person who was believed to be
Balagtas was, as already stated, not wrongful or felonious.
The case of U.S. vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the
Solicitor-General, is not in point, inasmuch as the defendant therein, who
intended to injure Hilario Lauigan with whom he had a quarrel, but killed
another by mistake, would not be exempted from criminal liability if he
actually injured or killed Hilario Lauigan, there being a malicious design on
his part. The other case involved by the prosecution is U.S. vs. Donoso (3
Phil., 234). This is also not in point, as it appears that the defendants
therein killed one Pedro Almasan after he had already surrendered and allowed
himself to be bound and that the said defendants did not have lawful
instructions from superior authorities to capture Almasan dead or alive.
The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the
appellants, Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, acquitted, with costs de
oficio.
HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:
According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow
the rule that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm without regard
to his life which he has, by his conduct, already forfeited," whenever
said criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in
danger of imminent attack. Precisely, the situation which confronted the
accused-appellants Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta in the afternoon of
December 24, 1938, was very similar to this. It must be remembered that both
officers received instructions to get Balagtas "dead or alive" and
according to the attitude of not only the said appellants but also of Capt.
Monsod, constabulary provincial inspector of Nueva Ecija, it may be assumed
that said instructions gave more emphasis to the first part; namely, to take
him dead. It appears in the record that after the shooting, and having been
informed of the case, Capt. Monsod stated that Oanis and Galanta might be
decorated for what they had done. That was when all parties concerned honestly
believed that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a dangerous criminal who
had escaped from his guards and was supposedly armed with a .45 caliber pistol
Brigida Mallari, the person whom the appellants met upon arriving at the house
of Irene Requinea, supposed mistress of Balagtas, informed them that said
Balagtas was upstairs. Appellants found there asleep a man closely resembling
the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If you are Balagtas stand up," But the
supposed criminal showed his intention to attack the appellants, a conduct
easily explained by the fact that he should have felt offended by the intrusion
of persons in the room where he was peacefully lying down with his mistress. In
such predicament, it was nothing but human on the part of the appellants to
employ force and to make use of their weapons in order to repel the imminent
attack by a person who, according to their belief, was Balagtas It was
unfortunate, however that an innocent man was actually killed. But taking into
consideration the facts of the case, it is, according to my humble opinion,
proper to apply herein the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong
(15 Phil., 488). In the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an innocent
mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness on the part of the
accused, who having no time to make a further inquiry, had no alternative but
to take the facts as they appeared to them and act immediately.
The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special
circumstances of this case which favored the accused-appellants, arrives at the
conclusion that an incomplete justifying circumstance may be invoked, and
therefore, according to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty should be one which is lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed
by law. This incomplete justifying circumstance is that defined in Article 11,
No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, in favor of "a person who acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office." I
believe that the application of this circumstance is not proper. Article 69 of
the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is
not wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by
reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to
exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in articles 11
and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts
shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of
the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article
84 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines, and which was also taken from
Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee
created by Administrative Order No. 94 of the Department of Justice for the
drafting of the Revised Penal Code, in commenting on Article 69, said that the
justifying circumstances and circumstances exempting from liability which are
the subject matter of this article are the following: self-defense, defense of
relatives, defense of strangers, state of necessity and injury caused by mere
accident. Accordingly, justifying circumstance No. 5 of Article 11 dealing with
the fulfillment of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right, calling or office,
cannot be placed within its scope.
The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his
commentary of Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 which is the source
of Article 69 of our Code says:
Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la
menor edad, ni del que obra violentado por una fuerza inrresistible o impulsado
por miedo insuperable de un mal igual o mayor, o en cumplimiento de un deber, o
en el ejercito legitimo de un derecho, oficio o cargo, o en virtud de
obediencia debida, ni del que incurre en alguna omision hallandose impedido por
causa legitima o insuperable, puede tener aplicacion al articulo que
comentamos. Y la razon es obvia. En ninguna de estas execiones hay pluralidad
de requisitos. La irrespondabilidad depende de una sola condicion. Hay o no
perturbacion de la razon; el autor del hecho es o no menor de nueve años;
existe o no violencia material o moral irresistible, etc., etc.; tal es lo que
respectivamente hay que examinar y resolver para declarar la culpabilidad o
inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto, imposible que acontezca lo que el texto que
va al frente de estas lineas rquiere, para que se imponga al autor del hecho la
penalidad excepcional que establece; esto es, que falten algunos requisitos de
los que la ley exige para eximir de responsabilidad, y que concurran el mayor
numero de ellos, toda vez que, en los casos referidos, la ley no exige
multiples condiciones.
It must be taken into account the fact according to Article
69 a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of
the conditions required by the law to justify the same or exempt from criminal
liability. The word "conditions" should not be confused with the word
"requisites". In dealing with justifying circumstance No. 5 Judge
Guevara states: "There are two requisites in order that this circumstance
may be taken into account: (a) That the offender acted in the performance of
his duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) That the injury or
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the performance of a duty or
the lawful exercise of a right or office." It is evident that these two
requisites concur in the present case if we consider the intimate connection
between the order given to the appellant by Capt. Monsod, the showing to them
of the telegram from Manila to get Balagtas who was with a bailarina named
Irene, the conduct of said appellants in questioning Brigida Mallari and giving
a warning to the supposed criminal when both found him with Irene, and the statement
made by Capt. Monsod after the shooting.
If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision
of the court below, there are more reasons in favor of the acquittal of
appellant Galanta. According to the evidence no bullet from the gun fired by
this accused ever hit Serapio Tecson. Galanta was armed in the afternoon of
December 24, 1938, with a .45 caliber revolver (Exhibit L). He so testified and
was corroborated by the unchallenged testimony of his superior officer Sgt.
Valeriano Serafica. According to this witness, since Galanta was made a
corporal of the Constabulary he was given, as part of his equipment, revolver
Exhibit L with a serial No. 37121. This gun had been constantly used by
Galanta, and, according to Sgt. Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied said accused
when he took it from his trunk in the barracks on the night of December 24,
1938, upon order of Captain Monsod, it was the same revolver which was given to
the witness with five .45 caliber bullets and one empty shell. Fourteen unused bullets
were also taken from Galanta by Sergeant Serafica, thus completing his regular
equipment of twenty bullets which he had on the morning of December 24, 1938,
when Sergeant Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms in the
possession of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the constabulary
post at Cabanatuan. Galanta stated that he had fired only one shot and missed.
This testimony is corroborated by that of a ballistic expert who testified that
bullets exhibits F and O, — the first being extracted from the head of the
deceased, causing wound No. 3 of autopsy report Exhibit C and the second found
at the place of the shooting, — had not been fired from revolver Exhibit L nor
from any other revolver of the constabulary station in Cabanatuan. It was
impossible for the accused Galanta to have substituted his revolver because
when Exhibit L was taken from him nobody in the barracks doubted that the
deceased was none other than Balagtas. Moreover, Exhibit L was not out of order
and therefore there was no reason why Galanta should carry along another gun,
according to the natural course of things. On the other hand, aside from wound
No. 3 as above stated, no other wound may be said to have been caused by a .45
caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound
No. 2 must have been caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's
record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45
caliber bullet, but inasmuch as the diameter of the wound's entrance was only 8
mm., the caliber should be .32 and not .45, because according to the
medico-legal expert who testified in this case, a bullet of a .45 caliber will
produce a wound entrance with either 11 mm. or 12 mm. diameter. All other
wounds found by the surgeon who performed the autopsy appeared to have been
caused by bullets of a lesser caliber. In consequence, it can be stated that no
bullet fired by Galanta did ever hit or kill Serapio Tecson and therefore there
is no reason why he should be declared criminally responsible for said death.
