SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5270
January 15, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court
of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by
section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to
this court, where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to
hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of
certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as
applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to
support the conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the
2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was then and there master of a
steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was
then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other
animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the
said accused H. N. Bull,
while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December,
1908, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport,
and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port
of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and
carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit,
so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals, in
this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and
there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means
for trying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there
cause some of said animals
to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit
others to be transported
loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured
in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and
failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals
while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and
many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel,
and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No.
55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into
effect January 1, 1901, provides that —
The owners or masters of steam, sailing,
or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other
animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any
foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them,
upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to
provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period
occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port of
debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage
and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the
animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901,
Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof the following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing,
or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other
animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign
port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means
for securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for
loading and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which
they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby
made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from vessels by swinging them
over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —
Any owner or master of a vessel, or
custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the
provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a
penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred
dollars, United States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may
be instituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost court organized in
the province or port in which such animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is
insufficient because it does not state that the court was sitting at a port
where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a
vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the
offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any provost court
organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there
is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for
the organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely
extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses committed
on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of
the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws
thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be
exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which such ship
or water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the
commission thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a
Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the
court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with
well recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is
conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under
the laws thereof. We have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense
of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when
the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the
time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States. No court
of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed
on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but
when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace
the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255,
note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter.,
ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency. This offense
was committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines these
waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came
to anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue
continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is
immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on
the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of
departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to
constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The
completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court
therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the
person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question
whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the
ship. Every. Every state has complete control and
jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even
public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission,
but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered
as open to the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such
vessels from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not established
until within comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford,
and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that
"the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with no
exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1,
Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by Lord Stowell
in an opinion given by him to the British Government as late as 1820. In the
leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.),
116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which
such vessels enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed as
"containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose
territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was
accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the
priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in
the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding
founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between
nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted
during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official exercise but little
control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are
justiciable by their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily
owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of territorial
sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its
justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally
careful to respect local laws and regulation which are essential to the health,
order, and well-being of the port. But comity and convenience does not require
the extension of the same degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There are
two well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to
them, According to the
French theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do
not concern the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are
justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The
French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on
board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew
against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628;
Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1,
p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been
admitted or claim by Great Britain as a right, although she has frequently
conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British
Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead
of a theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is
doubtless the leading English authority, says that —
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the
territoriality of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports
of a foreign state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points
in which the interests of the country are touched.
(Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a
merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the
local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or
through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204;
article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice
Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that —
When merchant vessels enter for the
purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient and dangerous to society
and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to
degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary and local
allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has
recently said that the merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of
another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern
the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in
peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U.
S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction
of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of commerce and
navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827,
which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country
"The right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may
arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation
whose interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the
local authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should
disturb the order or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in
Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to controversies between the
members of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes regarding wages. (2
Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass.,
188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are affected by many events
which do not amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by
one member of the crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the
public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn from the
cognizance of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike
and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel in the
port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace,
but the United States district attorney was instructed by the Government to
take the necessary steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the
governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition
of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip,
Swedish and Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not
appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to amount to a
breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for the
Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County
for an assault and battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port
of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty which
deprived the local courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness,
14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made through diplomatic channels to
the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State,
wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have
given the matter careful consideration in connection with the views and
suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the
treaty of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The
stipulations contained in the last clause of that article . . . are those under
which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the consular
officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature growing out
of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of
controversies resulting from personal violence involving offense for which the
party may be held amenable under the local criminal law.
This Government does not view the article
in question as susceptible of such broad interpretation. The jurisdiction
conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their right to sit as
judges or abitrators in such differences as may arise between captains and
crews of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the
captain or crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country.
When, however, a complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by the captain
or one or more of the crew of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the
order or tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such magistrate
to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of the local laws, and under
such circumstances in the United States it becomes a public duty which the
judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases
it must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities whether the
procedure shall take place in the United States or in Sweden to determine if in
fact there had been such disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and
if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the
party accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined
against the offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law
Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction
over offenses committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew
against another which amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of
the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language requires un
to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or traquillity
of the country. The offense with which the appellant
is charged had nothing to so with any difference between the captain and the
crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into
whose port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the nationality of
the vessel, the place of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of
any treaty or general principle of public law, are the court of the Philippine
Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in
this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does
not allege that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an
allegation which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court
sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to
construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the Government.
The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the
completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the statute
confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals
are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and
the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is
concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation of the animals
constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it
fails to allege that the defendant knowingly and willfully failed
to provide suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to
avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the
complaint that the act was committed willfully includes the allegation that it
was committed knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R.
Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used
in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly
or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and
directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538),
it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show, in the
words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of.
This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondent's counsel — that the
words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do
an act implies that it was done by design — done for a certain purpose; and I
think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To
the same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to
be on all fours with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the
defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the assertion
that "according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose
upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and
comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that what was done was done knowingly and
intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of
General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state the act or
omission complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary
and concise language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as
to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and the
court to pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which complies with
this requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language,
impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to "provide suitable means for
securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in
English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the
cattle "without providing suitable means for securing said animals while
in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said
animals in this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of
the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals were cruelty
torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of
said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the
information does not charge him with failure to provide "sufficient"
and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes"
and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original
complaint was prepared in English, and that the word
"suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado,"
"suficiente," and "conveniente," according to
the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant,
particularly in view of the fact that the objection was not made in the court
below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable
means for the protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the
constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto seems to rest upon a
fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands.
The statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation of
live stock between foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a
similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been enacted by the
legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have been in
violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States.
(Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State,
and its relation to the United States is controlled by constitutional
principles different from those which apply to States of the Union. The
importance of the question thus presented requires a statement of the
principles which govern those relations, and consideration of the nature and
extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the
Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable
diversity of opinion certain applicable constitutional doctrines are
established.
The Constitution confers upon the United
States the express power to make war and treaties, and it has the power
possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory
thus acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against the
possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its government being questioned,
the framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress should
have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting territory and other property belonging to the United States."
(Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory by the United
States, and until it is formally incorporated into the Union, the duty of
providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern the
territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate
thereto the ordinary powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U.
S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has provided
such governments for territories which were within the Union, and for newly acquired
territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a
government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative,
and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain general conditions in
accordance with which the local government should act. The organic act thus
became the constitution of the government of the territory which had not been
formally incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted
by the local legislature was determined by its conformity with the requirements
of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.)
To the legislative body of the local government Congress has delegated that
portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the
government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action
of the local legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This
power has been exercised during the entire period of the history of the United
States. The right of Congress to delegate such legislative power can no longer
be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs.
Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does
not by its own force operate within such territory, although the liberality of
Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to
create an impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by its
own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with
reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by those
prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act
at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De
Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S.,
244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U.
S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress
throughout the whole history of the United States, and legislation founded on
the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular
possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that
"The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally
inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the organized
territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within
the United States." When Congress organized a civil government for the
Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of the Revised Statutes
should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the
territory which was acquired by the United States as a result of the war with
Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in
conformity with the principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered
to the United States on August 13, 1898, and the military commander was
directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a peace
which should determine the control, disposition, and government of the Islands.
The duty then devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and
protect person and property within the occupied territory. Provision therefor
was made by proper orders, and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties
of military governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the
22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction of the
Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had practically effected the
conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish
sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace the future control,
disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the United States.
During the periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace
was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs.
Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed under the military
authority of the President as commander in chief. Long before Congress took any
action, the President organized a civil government which, however, had its
legal justification, like the purely military government which it gradually
superseded, in the war power. The military power of the President embraced
legislative, executive personally, or through such military or civil agents as
he chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901 —
The military power in exercise in a
territory under military occupation includes executive, legislative, and
judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a
military commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different
powers — the exercise of the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a
rule of action; of judicial power by determination of right; and the executive
power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights determined.
President McKinley desired to transform
military into civil government as rapidly as conditions would permit. After
full investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by the
appointment of a commission to which civil authority was to be gradually
transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the
approval of the President. "that part of the military power of the
President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character"
was transferred from the military government to the Commission, to be exercised
under such rules and regulations as should be prescribed by the Secretary of
War, until such time as complete civil government should be established, or
congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon the
Commission was declared to include "the making of rules and orders having
the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, and
imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the
establishment of an educational system to secure an efficient civil service;
the organization and establishment of courts; the organization and
establishment of municipal and departmental government, and all other matters
of a civil nature which the military governor is now competent to provide by
rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative
power to the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared
general principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the
protection of individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind that the
government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the
expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Island, and the measures adopted
should be made to conforms to their customs, their habits, and even their
prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the
indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The specific
restrictions upon legislative power were found in the declarations that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense
or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the
right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as
a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law
shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or
of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition
the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality
of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation
Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and
judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until
otherwise provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall
be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall
direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and
protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their
liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the
authority, which had been exercised previously by the military governor, was
transferred to that official. The government thus created by virtue of the
authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued
to administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President
until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by
the enactment of a law which, in connection with the instructions of April 7,
1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no
substancial changes in the form of government which the President had erected.
Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and approved the action of
the President in organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations
which had been imposed on the legislative power by the President's instructions
were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by legislative
act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the
rights and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under the
conditions. The action of the President in creating the Commission with
designated powers of government, in creating the office of the Governor-General
and Vice-Governor-General, and through the Commission establishing certain
executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified. Subsequently the
action of the President in imposing a tariff before and after the ratification
of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of
March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370;
Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law the
Islands were to continue to be governed "as thereby and herein
provided." In the future the enacting clause of all statutes should read
"By authority of the United States" instead of "By the authority
of the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the
Commission in all parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian
tribes was to be transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses — the
Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of the
Islands was thus assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired
territory not incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands
is not a State or a Territory, although its form and organization somewhat
resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which
unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its
creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United
States, which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not
directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States,
acting through the President and Congress, both deriving power from the same
source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations
thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the President
before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its
organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the
President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency which
lies upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and
when it exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines
the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the
Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental organism with
executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions
commonly assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as complete
as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this
separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For
instance, in the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and
the President to some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a
State the veto power enables him to exercise much control over legislation. The
Governor-General, the head of the executive department in the Philippine
Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has
no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on the model
with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the
advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and
priviliges.
In instituting this form of government of
intention must have been to adopt the general constitutional doctrined which
are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws
subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under the
national Constitution, and the States under the national and state
constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally
enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating under written
constitutions, must determine the validity of legislative enactments, as well
as the legality of all private and official acts. In performing these functions
it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the
United States. Under no other constitutional theory could there be that
government of laws and not of men which is essential for the protection of
rights under a free and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of
the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the courts must
consider the question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or
the Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State
legislature. The Federal Government exercises such powers only as are expressly
or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, while the
States exercise all powers which have not been granted to the central
government. The former operates under grants, the latter subject to
restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether the Constitution
of the United States contains a grant of express or implied authority to enact
it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the Federal or State
constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the
legislative authority of the Philippines Government which has not been
expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been
covered by congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some
provision of the organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of
the Philippines is granted in general terms subject to specific limitations.
The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but
to exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true
that specific authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to
certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon
certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as enactments
on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as
implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters.
(See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power
to annul specific acts of legislation by the Government of the Philippine tends
strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government
of the Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of enumerated
legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new government was to
operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress from the
necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to
grant general legislative power to the new government, subject to broad and
easily understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul its
acts if they met with disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all
laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to
Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the
same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not
suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by
Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them the laws of
Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until
annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act
No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the Legislature has been expressly or
implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution
of the United States operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no
application to the Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate
foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern
the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce
with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a
legislative body created by it, to which its power in this respect if delegate.
Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties which shall be paid
upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the
Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by improving
harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific provisions relating to
foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its general
regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the
reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its
approval. The express limitations upon the power of the Commission and
Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the
regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before
Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act
No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military
government, and the civil government instituted by the President, had the power,
whether it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce
between foreign nations and the ports of the territory. (Cross vs.
Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall.
(U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has remained in force since its enactment without
annulment or other action by Congress, and must be presumed to have met with
its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and the
Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation
of commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands,
and that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling
cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can not be left to the judgment
of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the
court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into
and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from
the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for securing
said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering
to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts,
all of which are fully sustained by the evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain
and master of the Norwegian steamer known as the Standard, for a period
of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, was engaged
in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to
and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the
defendant, as such master and captain as aforesaid, brought into the city of
Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was anchored,
under the directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of
the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court;
and that fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three others
of said cattle were dead, having broken legs; and also that said cattle were
transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the
deck and in the hold of said ship, without suitable precaution and care for the
transportation of said animals, and to avoid danger and risk to their lives and
security; and further that said cattle were so transported abroad said ship by
the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the city of Manila,
without any provisions being made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in
the hold thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position
for such transportation.
That a suitable and practicable manner in
which to transport cattle abroad steamship coming into Manila Bay and unloading
in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle, providing
partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear
thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are
transported, of that in case of storms, which are common in this community at
sea, such cattle may be able to stand without slipping and pitching and
falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the production of panics
and hazard to the animals on account or cattle were transported in this case.
Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and
experienced seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government,
and stated positively that since the introduction in the ships with which he is
acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of animals and cattle he
has suffered no loss whatever during the last year. The defendant has
testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according to his experience the
system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable
and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the
case is not maintainable, either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be
urged with logic that, for instance, three hundred cattle supports for the feet
and without stalls or any other protection for them individually can safely and
suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds of ships;
such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if
he is untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the wounding of
half the animals upon the ship if transported in the manner found in this case.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two
hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson
and Moreland, JJ., concur.
