EN BANC
G.R. No. 151445
April 11, 2002
ARTHUR D. LIM and PAULINO R. ERSANDO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY as alter ego of HER
EXCELLENCEY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, and HONORABLE ANGELO REYES in his capacity
as Secretary of National Defense, respondents.
----------------------------------------
SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, petitioners-intervenors,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGA-ARROYO, ALBERTO ROMULO, ANGELO REYES,
respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition
as well as a petition-in-intervention, praying that respondents be restrained
from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and that after
due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of
injunction and/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan
and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.
The facts are as follows:
Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the
armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to
take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan
02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest
combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. In theory,
they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines
and the United States in 1951.
Prior to the year 2002, the last "Balikatan" was
held in 1995. This was due to the paucity of any formal agreement relative to
the treatment of United States personnel visiting the Philippines. In the
meantime, the respective governments of the two countries agreed to hold joint
exercises on a reduced scale. The lack of consensus was eventually cured when
the two nations concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999.
The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is
proximately rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by
President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on
September 11, 2001. On that day, three (3) commercial aircrafts were hijacked,
flown and smashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York
City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. by terrorists with alleged
links to the al-Qaeda ("the Base"), a Muslim extremist organization
headed by the infamous Osama bin Laden. Of no comparable historical parallels,
these acts caused billions of dollars worth of destruction of property and
incalculable loss of hundreds of lives.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino
P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined subsequently by
SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations, who filed a
petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002.
Lim and Ersando filed suit in their capacities as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO, on the other hand, aver that
certain members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and
hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao.
They likewise pray for a relaxation on the rules relative to locus standi
citing the unprecedented importance of the issue involved.
On February 71 2002 the Senate conducted a hearing on the
"Balikatan" exercise wherein Vice-President Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr., who is concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, presented the Draft
Terms of Reference (TOR). Five days later, he approved the TOR, which we quote
hereunder:
I. POLICY LEVEL
1. The Exercise shall be consistent with the Philippine
Constitution and all its activities shall be in consonance with the laws of the
land and the provisions of the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
2. The conduct of this training Exercise is in accordance
with pertinent United Nations resolutions against global terrorism as
understood by the respective parties.
3. No permanent US basing and support facilities shall be
established. Temporary structures such as those for troop billeting, classroom
instruction and messing may be set up for use by RP and US Forces during the
Exercise.
4. The Exercise shall be implemented jointly by RP and US
Exercise Co-Directors under the authority of the Chief of Staff, AFP. In no
instance will US Forces operate independently during field training exercises
(FTX). AFP and US Unit Commanders will retain command over their respective
forces under the overall authority of the Exercise Co-Directors. RP and US
participants shall comply with operational instructions of the AFP during the
FTX.
5. The exercise shall be conducted and completed within a
period of not more than six months, with the projected participation of 660 US
personnel and 3,800 RP Forces. The Chief of Staff, AFP shall direct the
Exercise Co-Directors to wind up and terminate the Exercise and other
activities within the six month Exercise period.
6. The Exercise is a mutual counter-terrorism advising,
assisting and training Exercise relative to Philippine efforts against the ASG,
and will be conducted on the Island of Basilan. Further advising, assisting and
training exercises shall be conducted in Malagutay and the Zamboanga area. Related
activities in Cebu will be for support of the Exercise.
7. Only 160 US Forces organized in 12-man Special Forces
Teams shall be deployed with AFP field, commanders. The US teams shall remain
at the Battalion Headquarters and, when approved, Company Tactical headquarters
where they can observe and assess the performance of the AFP Forces.
8. US exercise participants shall not engage in combat,
without prejudice to their right of self-defense.
9. These terms of Reference are for purposes of this
Exercise only and do not create additional legal obligations between the US
Government and the Republic of the Philippines.
II. EXERCISE LEVEL
1. TRAINING
a. The Exercise shall involve the conduct of mutual military
assisting, advising and training of RP and US Forces with the primary objective
of enhancing the operational capabilities of both forces to combat terrorism.
b. At no time shall US Forces operate independently within
RP territory.
c. Flight plans of all aircraft involved in the exercise
will comply with the local air traffic regulations.
2. ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS
a. RP and US participants shall be given a country and area
briefing at the start of the Exercise. This briefing shall acquaint US Forces
on the culture and sensitivities of the Filipinos and the provisions of the VF
A. The briefing shall also promote the full cooperation on the part of the RP
and US participants for the successful conduct of the Exercise.
b. RP and US participating forces may share, in accordance
with their respective laws and regulations, in the use of their resources,
equipment and other assets. They will use their respective logistics channels.
c. Medical evaluation shall be jointly planned and executed
utilizing RP and US assets and resources.
d. Legal liaison officers from each respective party shall
be appointed by the Exercise Directors.
3. PUBLIC AFFAIRS
a. Combined RP-US Information Bureaus shall be established
at the Exercise Directorate in Zamboanga City and at GHQ, AFP in Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City.
b. Local media relations will be the concern of the AFP and
all public affairs guidelines shall be jointly developed by RP and US Forces.
c. Socio-Economic Assistance Projects shall be planned and
executed jointly by RP and US Forces in accordance with their respective laws
and regulations, and in consultation with community and local government
officials.
Contemporaneously, Assistant Secretary for American Affairs
Minerva Jean A. Falcon and United States Charge d' Affaires Robert Fitts signed
the Agreed Minutes of the discussion between the Vice-President and Assistant
Secretary Kelly.
Petitioners Lim and Ersando present the following arguments:
I
THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES SIGNED THE MUTUAL
DEFENSE TREATY (MDT) in 1951 TO PROVIDE MUTUAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE 'CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES' OF EACH COUNTRY ONLY IN THE CASE
OF AN ARMED ATTACK BY AN EXTERNAL AGGRESSOR, MEANING A THIRD COUNTRY AGAINST
ONE OF THEM.
BY NO STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION CAN IT BE SAID THAT THE ABU
SAYYAF BANDITS IN BASILAN CONSTITUTE AN EXTERNAL ARMED FORCE THAT HAS SUBJECT
THE PHILIPPINES TO AN ARMED EXTERNAL ATTACK TO WARRANT U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
UNDER THE MDT OF 1951.
II
NEITHER DOES THE VFA OF 1999 AUTHORIZE AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO
ENGAGE IN COMBAT OPERATIONS IN PHILIPPINE TERRITORY, NOT EVEN TO FIRE BACK
"IF FIRED UPON".
Substantially the same points are advanced by petitioners
SANLAKAS and PARTIDO.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General points to infirmities
in the petitions regarding, inter alia, Lim and Ersando's standing to file
suit, the prematurity of the action, as well as the impropriety of availing of
certiorari to ascertain a question of fact. Anent their locus standi, the
Solicitor General argues that first, they may not file suit in their capacities
as, taxpayers inasmuch as it has not been shown that "Balikatan 02-1
" involves the exercise of Congress' taxing or spending powers. Second,
their being lawyers does not invest them with sufficient personality to
initiate the case, citing our ruling in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora. Third, Lim and Ersando have failed to demonstrate the requisite showing
of direct personal injury. We agree.
It is also contended that the petitioners are indulging in
speculation. The Solicitor General is of the view that since the Terms of
Reference are clear as to the extent and duration of "Balikatan
02-1," the issues raised by petitioners are premature, as they are based
only on a fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference. Even petitioners'
resort to a special civil action for certiorari is assailed on the ground that
the writ may only issue on the basis of established facts.
Apart from these threshold issues, the Solicitor General
claims that there is actually no question of constitutionality involved. The
true object of the instant suit, it is said, is to obtain an interpretation of
the VFA. The Solicitor General asks that we accord due deference to the
executive determination that "Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the VFA,
considering the President's monopoly in the field of foreign relations and her
role as commander-in-chief of the Philippine armed forces.
Given the primordial importance of the issue involved, it
will suffice to reiterate our view on this point in a related case:
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the
constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this Court,
in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural barrier
and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the early Emergency
Powers Cases, where we had occasion to rule:
'x x x ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President
Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they
were not proper parties and ruled that 'transcendental importance to the public
of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.' We have since then applied the
exception in many other cases. [citation omitted]
This principle was reiterated in the subsequent cases of
Gonzales vs. COMELEC, Daza vs. Singson, and Basco vs. Phil, Amusement and
Gaming Corporation, where we emphatically held:
Considering however the importance to the public of the case
at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to
determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they have
not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. xxx'
Again, in the more recent case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona,
Jr., this Court ruled that in cases of transcendental importance, the Court may
relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is
no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a
constitutional question based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which
enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming respect for each
other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant
petition.
Hence, we treat with similar dispatch the general objection
to the supposed prematurity of the action. At any rate, petitioners' concerns
on the lack of any specific regulation on the latitude of activity US personnel
may undertake and the duration of their stay has been addressed in the Terms of
Reference.
The holding of "Balikatan 02-1" must be studied in
the framework of the treaty antecedents to which the Philippines bound itself.
The first of these is the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, for brevity). The MDT has
been described as the "core" of the defense relationship between the
Philippines and its traditional ally, the United States. Its aim is to enhance
the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint
training with its American counterparts; the "Balikatan" is the
largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT's objectives. It is
this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it
seeks to reaffirm.
The lapse of the US-Philippine Bases Agreement in 1992 and
the decision not to renew it created a vacuum in US-Philippine defense
relations, that is, until it was replaced by the Visiting Forces Agreement. It
should be recalled that on October 10, 2000, by a vote of eleven to three, this
Court upheld the validity of the VFA. The V FA provides the "regulatory
mechanism" by which "United States military and civilian personnel
[may visit] temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities
approved by the Philippine Government." It contains provisions relative to
entry and departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle registration,
criminal jurisdiction, claims, importation and exportation, movement of vessels
and aircraft, as well as the duration of the agreement and its termination. It
is the VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT despite the passage of
years. Its primary goal is to facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation
between American and Philippine military forces in the event of an attack by a
common foe.
The first question that should be addressed is whether
"Balikatan 02-1" is covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement. To
resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself: Not much help can be
had therefrom, unfortunately, since the terminology employed is itself the
source of the problem. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an
impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which was
left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of
undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The
sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that
United States personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with
the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political
activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
We are not left completely unaided, however. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which contains provisos governing
interpretations of international agreements, state:
SECTION 3. INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES
Article 31
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith ill
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the tenus of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and
annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the party .
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the
context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is
established that the parties so intended.
Article 32
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from
the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31 :
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd unreasonable.
It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of
interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to
verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be
used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context
of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside
the aforesaid context. As explained by a writer on the Convention,
[t]he Commission's proposals (which were adopted virtually
without change by the conference and are now reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of
the Convention) were clearly based on the view that the text of a treaty must
be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties;
the Commission accordingly came down firmly in favour of the view that 'the
starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text,
not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties'. This is not
to say that the travauxpreparatoires of a treaty , or the circumstances of its
conclusion, are relegated to a subordinate, and wholly ineffective, role. As
Professor Briggs points out, no rigid temporal prohibition on resort to travaux
preparatoires of a treaty was intended by the use of the phrase 'supplementary
means of interpretation' in what is now Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.
The distinction between the general rule of interpretation and the
supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to ensure that the
supplementary means do not constitute an alternative, autonomous method of
interpretation divorced from the general rule.
The Terms of Reference rightly fall within the context of
the VFA.
After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the
ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word
“activities" arose from accident. In our view, it was deliberately
made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this
manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes
other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on
new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation's marine
resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress,
disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of
school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the
current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that “Balikatan
02-1," a "mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training
exercise," falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities
in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual
Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities
-as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant petition,
are indeed authorized.
That is not the end of the matter, though. Granted that
"Balikatan 02-1" is permitted under the terms of the VFA, what may US
forces legitimately do in furtherance of their aim to provide advice,
assistance and training in the global effort against terrorism? Differently
phrased, may American troops actually engage in combat in Philippine territory?
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates
that US exercise participants may not engage in combat "except in
self-defense." We wryly note that this sentiment is admirable in the
abstract but difficult in implementation. The target of "Balikatan 02-1"
the Abu Sayyaf, cannot reasonably be expected to sit idly while the battle is
brought to their very doorstep. They cannot be expected to pick and choose
their targets for they will not have the luxury of doing so. We state this
point if only to signify our awareness that the parties straddle a fine line,
observing the honored legal maxim "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non
potest facere per directum." The indirect violation is actually
petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a
war principally conducted by the United States government, and that the
provision on self-defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true nature
of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial.
In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow
foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. We bear
in mind the salutary proscription stated in the Charter of the United Nations,
to wit:
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes
stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx
4. All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx
In the same manner, both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the
Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and international
agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of
the 1987 Constitution. In particular, the Mutual Defense Treaty was concluded
way before the present Charter, though it nevertheless remains in effect as a
valid source of international obligation. The present Constitution contains key
provisions useful in determining the extent to which foreign military troops
are allowed in Philippine territory. Thus, in the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies, it is provided that:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx
SEC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx
SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign
policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right
to self- determination.
SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national
interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in the
country.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx
The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers
of the Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more pointedly, the
Transitory Provisions state:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by
the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
The aforequoted provisions betray a marked antipathy towards
foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general.
Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of
direct exception. Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our
obligations arising from international agreements.
A rather recent formulation of the relation of international
law vis-a-vis municipal law was expressed in Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, to wit:
xxx Withal, the fact that international law has been made
part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of
international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine
of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are
given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.
This is not exactly helpful in solving the problem at hand
since in trying to find a middle ground, it favors neither one law nor the
other, which only leaves the hapless seeker with an unsolved dilemma. Other
more traditional approaches may offer valuable insights.
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty
is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not
allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for
its failure to perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view. Witness our
jurisdiction as I stated in section 5 of Article VIII:
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx
In Ichong v. Hernandez, we ruled that the provisions of a
treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or
that it is subject to the police power of the State. In Gonzales v. Hechanova,
xxx As regards the question whether an international
agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the
Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not
be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court
may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or
executive order or regulation is in question." In other words, our
Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act
of Congress.
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are
prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.
Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops actively
engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged
training and assistance exercise? Contrary to what petitioners would have us
do, we cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as
reported from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, we do not take
cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se, not because of any issue
as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that
facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. As a
result, we cannot accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners'
allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged in "doublespeak" in
trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign
troops on native soil. The petitions invite us to speculate on what is really
happening in Mindanao, to issue and make factual findings on matters well
beyond our immediate perception, and this we are understandably loath to do.
It is all too apparent that the determination thereof
involves basically a question of fact. On this point, we must concur with the
Solicitor General that the present subject matter is not a fit topic for a
special civil action for certiorari. We have held in too many instances that
questions of fact are not entertained in such a remedy. The sole object of the
writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion: The
phrase "grave abuse of discretion" has a precise meaning in law,
denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility."
In this connection, it will not be amiss to add that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Under the expanded concept of judicial power under the
Constitution, courts are charged with the duty "to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." From the facts obtaining, we find that the holding of
"Balikatan 02-1" joint military exercise has not intruded into that
penumbra of error that would otherwise call for correction on our part. In
other words, respondents in the case at bar have not committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition and the petition-in-intervention are
hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient
in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Carpio, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, dissenting opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, join the dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, separate opinion.
Davide., Jr., C.J., Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, join the main
and separate opinion of J. Panganiban.
