EN BANC
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ
a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and
hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally
important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while
the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these
two novel questions is “No.” The explanation of and the reasons for, as
well as the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001 and July 3, 2001
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first
assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a
warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a
warrant, but at the same time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive
portion of the Order reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause
against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest
of the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into consideration
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court
fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondent’s temporary liberty at ONE
MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
“Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his
passport and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to
include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure List.”
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the
cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice
v. Ralph C. Lantion.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States
Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note
Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and
0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition
of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of
the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them
to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was
granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25.
The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a
petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however,
assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No.
139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed
the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of
the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable
period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued
its October 17, 2000 Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three
justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier
Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the
appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No.
01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject
of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been
issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281
CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in
violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of
Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of
Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions,
in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US
Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition
prayed for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to
Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an
“Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed that petitioner’s
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and
set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court
allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance
of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative
prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15,
2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order,
directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
Hence, this Petition.
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
“The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a
procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest
warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.
“The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the
prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
‘1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence
of any law that provides for such power.
‘2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended,
which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in
extradition proceedings.
‘3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or
proceedings leading to extradition.
‘4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings
or proceedings leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only
of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the existence of special
circumstances.
‘5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition
proceedings, the public respondent received no evidence of ‘special
circumstances’ which may justify release on bail.
‘6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance
exists that will engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.
‘7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do
not ensure compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
‘8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the
case entitled ‘Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 17, Manila,’ CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent
in granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail
orders.’”
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether
Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can
be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty
while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall
take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from
petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to
seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. We shall
also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in
disposing of the substantive issues.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for
Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: “(1) the issues were fully considered
by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda
and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration
motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent
nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief
is extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample
opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are
purely of law.”
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the
following reasons: “(1) even if the petition is lodged with the Court of
Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides
them, the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have
the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all
lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one
case ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to
recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise
adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail
both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided
by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would
resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them
opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the
Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing extradition
treaties.”
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not
prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule,
though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2)
when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. As a fourth
exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua
non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been
squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. Aside from
being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure
questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special and important
reasons therefor. In Fortich v. Coronawe stated:
“[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the
judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent
cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman,
and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in
Cuaresma:
‘x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. x x x.’
“Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over
the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future
litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their
petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time
and money.
“That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher
interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate
what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:
‘Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court
has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition,
we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been
taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.’
In a number of other exceptional cases, we held as follows:
“This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial
Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us
in cases where special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the same.”
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue
of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the
present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression
over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or
construction of the treaty and the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in
the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its
intent. Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of
extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, understanding
certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues
raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing
crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from
one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight
of affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing
crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly,
governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes
that transcend international boundaries.
Today, “a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon
extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in
the suppression of crime.” It is the only regular system that has been devised
to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance
with municipal and international law.
“An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that
criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them
is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced.
For to the extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of
punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the
territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition arrangements
and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a
corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the
consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition
arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct
encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime itself.”
In Secretary v. Lantion we explained:
“The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and
one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by
treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and more, crimes are
becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime
prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this
trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose
activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is
to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible
movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational
crimes.”
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel,
and an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford
to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in
order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have
examined, and that both accept and trust, each other’s legal system and
judicial process. More pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s
signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and
the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person
sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that the
accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant
and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein;
otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly
attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition
proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the
constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui
generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
“An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the
state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional
rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused
cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
“There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal
proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a
criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow
admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited
‘upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case.’ Finally, unlike in
a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in
an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable
but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The United
States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises
wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the
nation’s foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.”
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called
upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be
extradited. Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only
result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure
of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or
convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try
that person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities
to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The
ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine
whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether
the person sought is extraditable.
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the
Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the
Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national
interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the
requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations
thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world
community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering
into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on
reciprocity.
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our
obligations under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the
accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition,
as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, “[t]he
demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require
it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper
warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make the surrender.”
Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This
prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive
branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee
the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to
the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought
to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings
would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in
the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the
requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings
there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the
requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is
charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the
processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them
at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying
high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the
will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given
sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the
accused, a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed
against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to
escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such
procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited
-- including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in
future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly
and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due
process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule
setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after
the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of
that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It
states:
“SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.-
(1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court
shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the
petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant
for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any where within
the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest
and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice.
Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the
summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear
the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
“(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if
issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having
charge of the case.” (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s act of immediately setting
for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses
the word “immediate” to qualify the arrest of the accused. This
qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of
the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing
parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to
prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a
hearing can no longer be considered “immediate.” The law could not have
intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is
not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not
expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual
situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the
knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely
to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a
speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication
among others, were the following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May
26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing
Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2)
Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted
evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly
authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the
Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I “Appendix of Witness [excerpts]
Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers” and enclosed Statements
in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J “Table of Contents for
Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix” with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5)
Annex MM, the Exhibit L “Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced
in the Affidavit of Betty Steward” and enclosed Statements in two volumes.
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression
from these records adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether
the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to “best
serve the ends of justice.” He could have determined whether such facts
and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie
meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from these
supporting documents that “probable cause” did exist. In the second
questioned Order, he stated:
“In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of
[its] request for extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the
Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing against
the extraditee.”
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the
petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from
the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having
already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent
judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez.
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the
answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the
summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the
word “hearing” is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the
holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so
provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and
the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings.
“It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something
reasonable and something not inconsistent with generally recognized principles
of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards third
States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the
reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable
to the less reasonable x x x .”
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a
notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some
future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape.
Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that consequence, for the
very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the accused from
the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez,
does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. It provides:
“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation
-- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no
requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of
arrest.
In Ho v. People[54] and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge
required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of
personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. All we required was that the “judge must have sufficient supporting
documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least,
upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of
probable cause.”[55]
In Webb v. De Leon,[56] the Court categorically stated that a judge was not
supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
“Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely
determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an
accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review
the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if
it is supported by substantial evidence.”
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely
further examine complainants and their witnesses.[57] In the present case,
validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing
the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the
rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard
and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his
entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort
to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the
determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire
proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This
scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action
is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more
protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at
all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view
of respondent’s demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper
procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the
judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding
whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance
with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is
extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of
further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of
the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima
facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion
of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then
the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the
extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to
appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape
and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure
will “best serve the ends of justice” in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
“Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures
the right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be
extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section
4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and
consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply
according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the
Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the
subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
“conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It
does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended”
does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is
available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application
“only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.” Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken
to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are
not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in
the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present
case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from
the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for
bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti in arguing that,
constitutionally, “[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x
liberty x x x without due process of law.”
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the
extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due
process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is
the opportunity to be heard[63] but, at the same time, point out that the
doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.[64] Where
the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call
for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.[65] In the present
case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when
the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is
no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the
immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his
arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the
DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a
determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge’s independent prima facie
determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under
the court’s custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail
rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition
of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country.
But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due
processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now
has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting
state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the
risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez
his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition
for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without
the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the government’s
interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating
with the world community in the suppression of crime. Indeed,
“[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights
accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable
government interests.”
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and
weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to
run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of
violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively
liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or
escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the
Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail
in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as
a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the
Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place
with and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice
would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to
cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the
resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis
of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need
for their speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave
abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules
to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that
the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness
to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the
“life, liberty or property” of every person. It is “dynamic and
resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application.”
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that,
after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of
the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it
is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the
applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that
extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from
the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest
concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which
is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the
courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so
that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be
unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever
protective of “the sporting idea of fair play,” it also recognizes the limits
of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are
compelling enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on
bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now
discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member
of the House of Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention
will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not
persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, the Court has already debunked the
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
“When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress,
they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person
with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so
knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
“In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
“The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws.’ This simply means that all persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or
hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.
“Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that
allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same
class as all persons validly confined under law?
“The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties
imposed by the ‘mandate of the people’ are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members
of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function
well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on
the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the
Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty.
The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The
duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of
nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of
those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve
provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and
order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
“A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or
otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or
types of individuals.
“The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed
by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even
if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
“We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of
the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.”
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the
United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents
were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case
against their representative, including his detention pending the final
resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we
are constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office is
by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings
are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the
case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that
extradition cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to
determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the
Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it,
as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights
available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly
delay the proceedings. This is quite another matter that is not at issue here.
Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and
academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more
reason would the grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay
by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be
tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would
also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this
claim, he stresses that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999;
yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during
the preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact
cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to
its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching
closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot
be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our
government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition
for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the
trial court at anytime after the applicant has been taken into custody and
prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the
present case, the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application
for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this
Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is
totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties -- in
particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient
opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and
exhaustively private respondent’s claim to bail. As already stated, the
RTC set for hearing not only petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant,
but also private respondent’s prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter
required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the
application for bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply,
the lengthy Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties.
Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not
normally observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal.
Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the
potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings --
entitled “Manifestations” by both parties and “Counter-Manifestation” by
private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenez’s plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its
entirety. The trial court would again hear factual and evidentiary
matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and
verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked for a remand.
Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual
matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of
Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments. Remanding the
case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal
reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring,
Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices themselves --
has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant questions
in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will
only further delay these already very delayed proceedings, which our
Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is
prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What
is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly “disregarding
basic freedoms when a case is one of extradition.” We believe that this
charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in
its length and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights
to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the
request expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence
that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable.
The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing
the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its
territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have
reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial
system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of
the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case
therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal
case in which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an
extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused
are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a court’s
request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or
has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the
jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is
that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is
sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition
Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The
magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further
documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses.
If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a
warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to
answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for
bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the
burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the
community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling
circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting
state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of
reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not
a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the
peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to
fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for a prior
opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to
the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the
petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental
fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion
of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the conscience of society. But it
is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for
respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of
government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign
relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of
government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise
review authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They
should not allow contortions, delays and “over-due process” every little step
of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile
but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply
in good faith with a treaty partner’s simple request to return a
fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious haven
where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate,
checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international
cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate
speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while
safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23,
2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3,
2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez.
The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional
Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings
before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the
letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our
Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
